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EDITORIAL  AND ANNOUNCEMENTS 
EDITORIAL  
Whither AFIR ? 
In an editorial in ASTIN Bulletin 17.2 m November 1987, Hans Bfihlmann 
introduced Actuaries of the Third Kind. In ASTIN Bulletin 19.1 in April 1989, 
Franqols Delavenne, Chairman of the newly formed AF IR  section, described 
the formation and objectives of that section These editorials, together with 
articles by M~ller, Schweizer & F6llmer and Dhaene appeared in a spectal ~ssue 
of ASTIN Bulletin (19S) in November 1989. 
Since then the 1st AF IR  International Colloquium has taken place m Pans 
in Aprd 1990, and by the time this e&tonal is being read, the 2nd AF IR  
International Colloquium will have taken place in Brighton m April 1991. 
Sixty-four different papers were presented to the Paris Colloquium, and 82 will 
have been presented in Brighton. Some of these, and other articles, may make 
their way into the pages of ASTIN Bulletin. 
What can we say so far about the way AF IR  has developed? Most of the 
papers are derived from the general field of modern financial economics. They 
are based on statistical and mathematical approaches to the investment of 
institutional assets, and can clearly be differentiated from the many articles 
that are of interest o investment analysts around the world, dealing with the 
fortunes of particular compames, industries or national economies, and with 
the mmedmte prospects for share prices, interest rates or exchange rates 
Although many of the AF IR  papers are of interest to financial economists 
generally, many also are of particular relevance to those actuaries concerned 
with insurance companies, pension funds and similar institutions that have 
non-tradable liabilities. It is in this area that AF IR  can make its own specml 
contribution. 
Many of the papers have been primarily descriptive - -  what sort of model 
best describes a particular market, or does a particular market behave in line 
with some theoretically derived hypothesis? Others are prescriptive - -  how can 
theoretical ideas contribute to desigmng an optimal asset allocation strategy, or 
to appropriate methods for the calculatmn of premiums or the valuation of 
habdities? 
One can also classify the papers in a different way: do they relate to a 
general investment opic; to the asset side of a financial lnsututlon (asset- 
liability matching); or to the liabihty side of a financial institution? For 
actuaries in general, this last theme is perhaps the most interesting. The paper 
by Cummins in ASTIN Bulletin 20.2 describes some uses of the theoretical 
models of financial economics to justify particular methods of setting prem- 
iums, in a context in which premium rates need to be justified to a State 
Insurance Commissioner. 
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A similar application is the use of option pricing theory to calculate the 
values of pensions or annuities which increase in line with a consumer price 
index, subject to some upper hmlt, another is in the pricing of the guarantees 
inherent in a with profits life assurance as compared with a unit hnked 
policy. 
The two main themes for papers for the 2nd AF IR  International Colloqumm 
are: asset-liability matching; and interest rate models. A third theme that runs 
through a number of papers is the application of a stochastic model for 
investments other than the pure random walk model, in particular what has 
become known in Britain as the 'Wilkie investment model' .  
I should like to suggest a number of areas towards which those interested in 
AF IR  could apply their ingenuity. The first is asset-liabdity matching models, 
approached either through fixed interest matching, which requires an analysis 
of interest rate models and 'durat ion '  measures, or through application of the 
portfolio selection approach. Although much has been done in this area, there 
remain many unsolved problems. What are appropriate asset allocation models 
which take account of habdltles emerging over the very many years that 
insurance companies and pension funds work in? What are the opttmlsatlon 
objectives of such an institution? It is not simply a matter of maxlrmslng 
terminal wealth or surplus at the end of a long period, since varying bonus 
rates on life policies or varying contribution rates for pension funds during the 
course of the period come into consideration. How does one allow for dynamic 
decision-making with such a long time horizon? 
Further problems are: how does one allow for the existing assets held, and 
the potential costs of changing them? And how does one allow for the 
uncertainty that must exist in one's estimates of the probabd~ty distributions of 
returns on particular assets? One possible optimum portfolio is usually 100% 
in the asset that seems to promise the highest expected return, regardless of 
variability; but if there is uncertainty about one's estimate of that expected 
return, it is not advantageous to incur expense m pursuit of an uncertain 
marginal benefit, even for the risk-neutral investor. 
In order to implement any asset allocation method, one must have some sort 
of model of the distribution of returns on the classes of investment under 
consideration. The statistical lnvesugatlon of historic investment series seems to 
me to be the next major undertaking for members of AFIR. Very many 
investigations by financial economists have concentrated on the short term, 
gathering data at daily or weekly intervals for a small number of years. They 
have generally found that a random walk model of some kind fits the data 
reasonably well Few investigations have considered the behavlour of such a 
series over long numbers of years, but those that have done so have generally 
discovered that the random walk model is an unsatisfactory description over 
the long run, and that a model that includes some sort of reversion of interest 
rates to a mean level or of share dividend yields or Price/Earnings ratios to a 
mean level IS more satisfactory. 
More gathering of long runs of data from a variety of different countries, 
and more statistical investigation of such data needs to be done. In an 
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international field, one would also like to see how exchange rates have 
behaved : randomly in the short run, and according to purchasing power parity 
in some way m the long run seems a plausible first hypothesis. 
Consequential on these first two themes ~s what sort of equilibrium model 
results from an international economy, with multiple currencies, in which 
investors from different countries have different ypes of liabilities and different 
possible objectwes. The classical Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assumes 
that all investors work in one currency (such as US dollars) and measure their 
utility as functions of wealth m that currency. But many International investors 
measure their wealth in Swiss francs, German marks or Brmsh pounds, and 
others measure m real terms (after allowing for price inflation) rather than m 
currency at all What consequences does such a more elaborate structure have 
for the CAPM 9 
The final field of research l should like to propose to AF IR  members relates 
to the habihty side, building on the work of Cummins and others in relation to 
prermum-rating, on the use of option pNclng methods for valuing habflmes 
with inherent options included--anything of the form which pays the greater of 
A and B, or the lesser of A and B, includes an nnphed opt ion--and the 
apphcatlon of the methods of financial economists, whether through the 
CAPM or otherwise, to the question of the appropriate rate of return for 
discounting risky hablhtJes This is of importance in the valuation of an 
insurance company where a realistic rather than a prudent valuation is 
required, for example for profit testing, estimating the value of a company for 
purchase or sale, or the consolidation of the accounts of insurance subsidiaries 
in a parent company which is not an insurance company. 
All this sounds like plenty of work for the future. It is almost too late to 
produce a new paper for the 1992 International Congress of Actuaries, but it is 
hoped that there will be an AFIR International Colloquium in 1993 (location 
still to be decided), and the pages of the ASTIN Bulletin are available for those 
who would like a widespread and thoughtful international readership Your 
offerings addressed to me or to one of the other editors please. 
DAVID WILKIE 

XXII ASTIN COLLOQUIUM 
MONTREUX,  SWITZERLAND, 9th to 13th SEPTEMBER 1990 
The Swiss orgamsers of the 22nd ASTIN Colloquium, mindful of the need to 
bring theory and practice closer together, arranged for the meetings to be held 
in the Casino in Montreux. Judging by the number of actuaries who at the end 
of the Colloquium departed for Geneva m second-class carnages, there is scope 
for further progress to be made. 
With such an attractive setting as Montreux it was scarcely surprising that 
the attendance r ached a new record level, with 256 actuaries from 23 countries 
and all five continents represented. The traditional ASTIN conviviality was 
well under way by the end of the reception with which we were welcomed on 
the Sunday evening, and anyone who did not make new friends during the days 
that followed can scarcely have been trying. 
The business meetings began, naturally enough, with the opening ceremony, 
the hlghhght of which was an invited lecture by Peter Gmemer, the First 
Secretary of the SwJss Insurance Association, on "The future European 
insurance market and the Swiss insurance industry". Part way through the 
Colloquium there was a second invited lecture by James W MacGmnitle on 
"Actuarial ethics and integrity". In view of the wide general interest of these 
lectures, which were not available in printed form, summaries of the lectures 
are appended to these notes. 
Topic 1 : Models of Finance 
Uncertainties abound in the world of investment, and most actuaries need to 
be concerned w~th financial risk whatever their field of work. Not surprising 
indeed, that ASTIN now has a sister group, AFIR, formed to consider 
financial risk. There is clearly an overlap between the two groups, as regards 
areas of interest. It was remarked by Philippe Maeder who, with Jean-Pierre 
Melchner, had prepared the summary of the papers under Topic 1, that there 
was scope for co-ordination between the two groups regarding topics for 
papers. 
The four papers presented on Topic 1 confirmed the scope for applying 
models of finance to diverse areas of actuarml work. Philippe ARTZNER and 
Freddy DELBAEN consider credit insurance, and discuss the optimal time at 
which a borrower with default risk should prepay a risky fixed rate loan. 
Werner HURLIMANN considers the concept of a premmm to cover the 
investment risk in life insurance. Dawd SANDERS &scusses a possible use for 
opuon pricing m the premium rating of stop loss and excess of loss reinsurance. 
Patrick BROCKETT and Yehuda KAHANE consider how a rational investor may 
choose between two investment opportunities. 
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Topic 2: Experience rating 
Twelve papers were presented on this topic, including one paper transferred 
from Topic 3, and Alois Glsler presented a summary of them which he and 
Ren6 Schmeper had prepared. 
The first group of papers is related to the determination of the pure risk 
premium and to the assessment of claims reserves AIois GISLER and Peter 
REINHARD suggest hat the problem of outhers m rating ~s best dealt with by a 
combination of credibility and robust statistics GABRY et El. are also faced 
with outliers m a large volume of Dutch industrial fire insurance data which 
they are using to derwe a set of rxsk premium rates. They use a pragmatic 
approach, applying a combination of top-shcmg and credibihty techniques. 
Erhard KREMER shows how to determine the necessary coefficients to make 
practical use of the exponentaal smoothing cred~bxlity estimator which he puts 
forward as an alternative to the credibility estimator with geometric weights. 
Ragnar NORBERG considers hnear predictors and credibility estimators based 
on a continuous ume model rather than a fimte set of observations. 
The final paper m the first group, by Thomas MACK, lS alone m being 
unconnected with crediblhty theory. MACK reveals that the estxmauon of 
|BNR claims reserves is a special case of the analysis of cross classified data. 
He shows that, for example, the method of marginal totals for cross classified 
data leads to the chain ladder method for assessing reserves. The author 
advocates the use of an alternative model for the total claim amount, for both 
rating and reserving, based on the Gamma dlstrlbuuon 
The second group of papers relates to bonus-malus ystems Jean-Luc 
BESSON and Christian PARTRAT advocate the use of the Poisson-Gamma model 
for claim frequencies m motor insurance. They use a goodness-of-fit test to 
illustrate the superiority of thJs model, although Chresten Dengsoe suggested m 
the discussion that the test statistics put undue emphas~s on the small number of 
pohcles with four or five claims. Hans GERBER explains the recent change m 
the bonus-malus ystem used in Switzerland. The new system imposes an 
increased penalty following a claim and is thereby an improved discriminator 
between low and high risks. Tormod Sande pointed out in the discussion that, 
even under the new system, high risk pohc~es continue to pay on average 
substantially less than their share of premzums Jn the long term Th~s feature ~s 
common to all bonus-malus ystems. 
The third group of papers is devoted to the pricing of non-proportional 
reinsurance covers. GunnEr BENKTANDER advocates the use of a simple model 
to determine the extent to which the reinsurance risk premium for excess of loss 
cover in fire insurance ~s affected by varying the retention. 
There are clearly ~mmense practical difficulties m rating stop loss reinsurance 
cover. There ~s always the potentml for over-generous claim settlement by the 
cedant at the expense of the reinsurer, especially if habfl~ty claims are covered. 
Reinsurers need all the help they can get ~f they are to make th~s form of cover 
available at affordable rates. In th~s regard, the two papers on stop loss cover 
are to be welcomed Jozef TEUGELS and B.lorn SUNDT describe a scheme of 
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stop loss rating for motor fleets which takes account of the claims experience of 
the individual fleet Lionel MOREAU also considers the rating of stop loss cover 
for motor fleets He uses data from a large company over a five year period 
and, despite some shortcomings of the data, obtains a set of numerical 
results. 
Reinstatement premmms are a common feature of non-proportional reinsur- 
ance cover, but there is little m the actuarial literature on the mathematical 
treatment of such premiums. Bjorn SUNDT discusses the pure premium and the 
loading needed for excess of loss cover with reinstatements. Reinstatement 
premium ~s a form of claims-dependent premium, and Stefan BERNEGGER 
considers the variance loading for excess of loss cover taking into account the 
,nfluence of claims-dependent prem,ums Since this paper addresses very much 
the same problems as that by SUNDT, It was presented under Topic 2 even 
though it was originally allocated to Topic 3. 
Topic 3: Numerical methods 
Fifteen papers were presented on this topic and Erwln Straub presented a 
summary of them which he and Andr6 Dubey had prepared. 
The first group of papers considers ruin probability and applications. 
Marc-Henn AMSLER uses the probablhty of ruin, the severity of ruin and the 
time of ruin in assessing the riskiness of an insurance portfoho. Examples are 
given relating to hfe assurance, and the results show the influence of dxfferent 
reinsurance programmes on the financial stability of the portfolio Francois 
DUFRESNE, Hans GERBER and Elias SHIU show how classical risk theory, and 
m particular rum theory, can be adapted when the gamma model IS used to 
represent he aggregate claims process Lourdes CENTENO provides an algo- 
rithm to calculate an optimum excess of loss retention, given certain assump- 
tions regarding the calculation of the reinsurance premium. Dawd DICKSON 
and Howard WATERS give an algorithm for approximating the finite time 
non-ruin probabihtles for the classical nsk model. The authors show that the 
algorithm can also be used to calculate infinite time non-ruin probabilities, and 
they address certain problems of numerical lnstabihty. Hans SCHMITTER 
derives an explicit expression for the ulnmate ruin probability when the claim 
amount distribution is discrete with a finite number of steps. 
The second group of papers considers the aggregate claims distribution 
Marc GOOVAERTS and Robert KAAS give a recurslve algorithm, using Panjer's 
formula, to compute the distribution function of a compound sum of claim 
numbers, when the number of summands follows a generalised Polsson 
distribution. Werner H URLIMANN proposes an approximation of the aggregate 
claims distribution by approximating the claim size distribution using the 
algebraic moment method. Thomas MULLER treats compound Polsson proc- 
esses, their Panjer recurs~on and the effect of merging two or more portfolios. 
Some properties of compound Polsson processes are shown to be basic 
properties of the exponential power series. Bob ALTING VON GEUSAU proposes 
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a method to test the posslblhty of a trend over tIme in given data. In the 
Poisson case the distribution function of the proposed staustJc can be 
calculated by means of the shovelboard approach, i.e. by making use of the 
fact that Polsson distributed variables, given their sum, are multmominally 
distributed. To aid our understanding, the author's presentation at the meeting 
included the display of a picture of a shovelboard, which Is the basis of a 
well-known family pastime m the Netherlands. Erhard KREMER uses Fourier 
analysis to deal with the computation of the distribution function of total 
claims amounts where the ordered claims have been mulhplled by given 
coefficients 
The third group of papers relates to clmms reserves. Te~vo PENTIKAINEN and 
Jukka RANTALA analyse the three basic types of inaccuracies inherent in the 
estimation of claims reserves, model errors, parameter errors and stochastic 
errors The authors simulate a claims process and analyse various estimation 
methods with regard to their sensmwty m respect of the three basic types of 
errors. Erwm KUMMERLI apphes two formulae proposed by De Vylder and 
Kahane to run-off triangles for each of several classes of non-hfe business m a 
medium-sized company, and comments on the results. Hans EKHULT presents a
program to calculate clmms reserves in d~sability insurance as expected present 
values of future annuity payments. 
The two remaining papers could not be allocated to any of the above three 
groups. Bruno KOLLER discusses preadsheet programming languages and then 
shows how to use a spreadsheet to carry out Bayesian graduation, using an 
example from health insurance Erhard KREMER applies the Cauchy-Schwarz 
inequality and derives an upper bound for the variance of the clmms amount 
covered by stop-loss reinsurance. 
During one of the working sessions on Topic 3 there was an impromptu 
debate on whether models or, alternatively, the observed ata would normally 
provide the better indicator of future experience. Conflicting--and entertain- 
rag--views were expressed The issue was finally clarified by Hans Btihlmann's 
comments that neither models nor data of the past wdl normally be m accord 
with the future experience, but that a model is constructed to try to reflect 
one's perception of what the future wdl hold. 
Speakers' Corner 
Speakers' Corner is a well-estabhshed feature of ASTIN Colloquia, and 
provides an opportumty for members to make a contribution on the topic of 
their choice without the constraint of submItting a paper several months before 
the time of the colloquium. 
Three of the papers in Speakers' Corner considered the probability of ruln 
and made the assumption of an underlying compound Po~sson process. R~chard 
VERRALL derives a sample re-use estimate of the probability of rum, making 
use of the full bootstrap distribution and a saddlepomt approximation. Angela 
van HEERWAARDEN and Robert KAAS consider the concept of stop-loss order 
and develop a proof from which can be shown that the risk with higher 
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stop-loss premiums generates a higher ruin probabdity. Anna STEENACKERS 
and Marc GOOVAERTS obtain upper and lower bounds for stop-loss premiums 
and for rum probabdmes where certain features of the cla,m severity function 
are known. 
Menachem BERG develops procedures for detecting possible trends in time 
non-homogeneous claim occurrence processes Use IS made of Bayesian 
revision procedures, and results for cla,m occurrence and claim size processes 
are combined to predict the total claim process. Ud~ MAKOV presents a 
samphng-resamphng technique to assess the posterior distribution of a Baye- 
sian credibihty model for arbitrary likehhood function and prior distribution. 
It is explained that thereby the computational difficulties of evaluating 
integrals are overcome. Benedetto CONTI and Felix LAUCHLI consider two 
classes of distribution functions which are regarded as important in non- 
proportional reinsurance work. Properties of these classes are set out and 
results are given following an analysis of the maximum likehhood estimator 
Bill JEWELL presents the third act of what has been described as a three-act 
play. The author advocates the formulat,on of the IBNR problem in continuous 
time and using a Bayesian approach. The paper points to the possibility of the 
working actuary of the future being able to predict dtstrtbuuons of numbers 
and amounts of IBNR claims 
Arthur RENSHAW shows how the existing range of actuarial graduation 
techniques can be considerably extended using generahsed linear models There 
is detaded discussion of how such models can be used to graduate the 
probablhtles of death and the force of mortahty. 
Georg HARBITZ summanses the discussions which have taken place recently 
m Norway leading to the making of government regulations requiring 
appointed actuaries in general insurance companies as well as m hfe insurance 
companies. The detailed regulations are gwen by way of Appendix These 
developments m Norway will be of interest in other countries where some 
statutory role for non-life actuaries is being considered. 
Other Colloquium Events 
The ASTIN General Assembly took place after the coffee break on Wednesday 
morning. Alf Guldberg, President of the Swedish Actuarial Society, announced 
that the next Colloqumm wdl be held in Stockholm in the summer of 1991, and 
welcomed members to complete a provisional registration form. 
For the last few years there has been debate, sometimes heated, at ASTIN 
business meetings on the topic of the composition and system of election of the 
Committee. The Committee put forward some proposals at Montreux for 
changing the ASTIN rules and some alternative proposals were put forward by 
an ASTIN member. An interesting debate took place in which several members 
took part. Although contrary views were expressed, the discussion took place 
in a friendly atmosphere, as we would expect within a group such as ASTIN. 
The Commlttee's proposed changes to the rules were accepted by a majority 
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decision and will be implemented It is pleasing to note that the matter has 
finally been resolved. 
Following the rule changes, the Committee will remain responsible for 
making nominations for Committee membership, and also ~t will still be 
possible for members to make further nominations at a General Assembly. 
However, the Committee, in making their nominations, are now charged with 
the responsibility of seeking a good balance of Committee membership as 
regards geographical spread, type of employment and research versus applied 
orientation. The Committee will gwe particular consideration to proposals 
through national actuarial organlsatlons, but will reserve the right to make 
other nominations. 
On Tuesday afternoon we boarded coaches for an enjoyable xcursion into 
the Swiss countryside and mountains, including a visit to Gruy&es. 
We were privileged to meet on Wednesday evening for aperitifs reside the 
Chfiteau de Chillon, not normally available for private functions. This lakeside 
castle dates back to the 13th century, and narratives by well-known writers 
have contributed to its fame. Byron wrote "The Prisoner of Chillon ", but we 
were not persuaded by the assertion of one eminent actuary that Byron had 
himself been imprisoned m the castle I 
On thls occasion the after-droner speeches were delivered before the dinner 
began. Heralded by a fanfare of trumpets, the speakers included the retiring 
Chairman, Jean LemaJre, and his successor, B.jorn Ajne, who elegantly, 
entertainingly and appropriately referred to Jean's ablhty to make elegant, 
entertaining and appropriate speeches. 
After the speeches we boarded the boat "La  Suisse" for a cruise on Lake 
Geneva, with banquet and dancing. Needless to remark, the whole evening was 
superbly organlsed by our Swiss hosts and thoroughly enjoyed by the 
participants and accompanying persons 
After the final working session on Thursday morning, the brief closing 
ceremony took place. Bjorn Ajne announced the topics for papers for the 1991 
Colloqumm m Stockholm The emphasis eemed to be very much on meeting 
modern challenges, the topics being The Use of Financial Theory in Insurance, 
High Tech Reinsurance and Modern Statistical Techniques 
It was no surprise that the Swiss orgamslng committee, under the chairman- 
ship of Robert Baumann and with Hans Gerber as head of the Scientific 
Committee, had done a most effioent .job in organlslng all the aspects of the 
Colloquium Our lack of surprise in no way diminished our gratitude to them. 
After making our farewells and leaving the Casino there was a final opportun- 
Ity to take photographs of the flower-decked pathway by the lakeside, which 
had provided such pleasant morning and evemng strolls in the sunshine each 
day. We look forward to meeting again in Sweden. 
MARTYN BENNETT 
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APPENDIX:  INVITED LECTURES 
Lecture: "The future European insurance market and the Swiss insurance 
industry" by Peter Gmeiner 
The speaker began by drawing attention to the msurance-mindedness of the 
Swiss, whose insurance premiums (hfe and non-life combined) in 1988 
amounted to US$ 2,324 per head of the population, about 60 per cent of this 
was life In addition to the group life assurance provided by many employers 
for their staff, life assurance is widely used by individuals as a means of 
saving. 
The Swiss approach to cartels is to allow them in pnnclple but to seek to 
outlaw abuse; a fire insurance cartel had recently been prohibited. Agreements 
between insurers were seen as a means of avoiding the risk of insolvency. The 
market is closely regulated and insurance tariffs are m principle subject to 
approval. There are very few brokers operating in Switzerland, almost all the 
business being obtained through tied agents of the companies. Such brokers as 
there are have been actwe for only a few years, and m the major centres of 
population - -  mostly for mdustnal risks. 
A feature of the Swiss insurance companies is their high capitahsahon. The 
increase in the level of the stock market has enabled insurance companies to 
expand their capital m favourable conditions. Swiss companies transact a large 
amount of business outside their country, some Swiss companies started 
transacting foreign business when they were formed xn the 19th century, and 
out of the total premium income of SF 70bn of the Swiss companies in 1988, 
SF 46bn related to foreign business. 
The speaker then turned to the developments currently taking place m the 
EC and the influence they were likely to have on the conduct of insurance m 
Switzerland He referred m particular to the intention within the EC to drop 
the examination and approval of insurance tariffs, perhaps with an exception 
with regard to compulsory insurance, and to the ending of insurance monopol- 
ies where they still exist - -  for example m some German states. 
Mr Gmelner then summarlsed the Swiss political aims and the options open 
to them. They would hke to see European unity, of a kind which operated on 
the so-called principle of subsl&arity, with decision-making from bottom to 
top They want to see a democratic Europe, with decisions taking account of 
local traditions. Switzerland would hke to develop its policy of neutrality, in 
conjunction with the other neutral states: Austria, Sweden and Finland 
Switzerland had already concluded a bdateral agreement with the EC on 
non-life insurance. 
He ended by reviewing the reasons why, in his opinion, the Swiss insurers 
could face the future with confidence they had a traditionally heavy commit- 
ment to foreign business and hence a long experience in handhng it; the Swiss 
insurance compames are willing and able to adapt to new circumstances; they 
have great financial strength; and they are firmly rooted xn the economically 
sound Swiss structure. 
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Lecture: "Actuarial ethics and integrity" by James W. MacGinnitie 
The speaker began by referring to recent and current developments in North 
America, where the Society of Actuaries has introduced an admission course 
for new fellows, mainly on ethics, the Casualty Actuarml Society IS developing 
a profess~onahsm course for new assocmtes and the Canadian Institute of 
Actuaries ~s also runmng courses on similar topics. He menUoned also the 
current discussions in Europe regarding the acceptability of actuarial reports 
and opinions across borders within the EC. 
He next went on to summanse the features commonly assocmted with 
membership of a learned profession: 
1. The members possessed expert knowledge not easily obtainable by the rest 
of the commumty or by clients 
2. The members owned a techmcal language not easily understood by 
others. 
3. It was difficult for outsiders to evaluate the quahty of the advice they 
received, this being a matter essentmlly to be controlled by the profession 
4. The member was in a position to be independent m a way that the client 
generally was not. 
5. The members belonged to an 6hte group, had been subjected to a rigorous 
programme of study and were rewarded by such features as prestige, 
financial gain and camaraderie. 
This all tended to lead to an unequal relahonship between the professional 
and has or her client. It was fundamentally important hat the member's pecial 
skills should be used m the best interests of the client, and that the client's 
interests hould be placed ahead of the professional's interests. 
The speaker listed a number of ethical issues facing actuaries, namely 
The potentml for abuse by the actuary of his or her posluon, and the need 
for the primacy of the interests of the client. 
The actuary's responsibility to the pubhc, especmlly m v~ew of the increasing 
role of actuaries m the pubhc arena 
The development of codes of conduct. 
The need for continuing education, to maintain the actuary's special 
knowledge and skills in current conditions. 
He suggested that the testing of actuaries could be considered in three parts: 
I. Knowledge of actuarial principles. 
2. The ability to apply that knowledge m specific sltuaUons, such as to specific 
types of insurance. 
3. Knowledge of specific legal and regulatory matters 
There was increasingly a need to evaluate quallficauons across national 
boundaries 
Guidelines were required regarding the relauonshlp between actuary and 
chent (including business relationships). Most of the guidehnes used in practice 
specified prohlbmons, i.e. they set out what ought not to be done rather than 
what ought to be done, since the latter carried a much greater danger of 
leading to htlgatton. 
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He mentioned three key factors for a satisfactory relationship with the client: 
truth, confidence and consent. 
The speaker then gave examples of the types of situations to be used as 
illustrations of potential ethical problems In the admission courses in the 
USA. 
The danger of encouraging a client to agree to a liberal interpretation of 
regulations and hence lead htm into an unsound course of action. 
The dangers associated with inadequate data, inadequate time, or an 
inadequate budget 
The difficulty of dealing with an unsavoury chent, who wishes to do 
something that would be against the public interest, or even illegal. 
The difficulty of deoding when to blow the whistle - -  at what point does the 
actuary have a liability to report dlegal or unprofessional activity. 
The need to see that errors that have been identified are corrected - -  one's 
own, or errors on the part of another actuary. 
The decision as to who is the chent - -  e.g the actuary's employer, or the 
person paying the fee, may not be the real client; for some purposes it may 
be considered appropriate to regard the members of a pension plan as the 
clients. 
The speaker concluded with some comments about integrity He remarked that 
the actuarial profession had acquired a reputation for integrity, despite the fact 
that it had not specifically set out to select its members by reference to 
integrity, nor had it specifically trained for it. As examples of circumstances 
where there might be an especml need for integrity, he referred to pressures 
which might be placed on the actuary to: 
1. reduce perceived margins in technical reserves; 
2. increase the credibility adjustment following a good claims experience; 
and 
3 replace advance funding by pay-as-you-go. 
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ABSTRACT 
This survey paper presents the basic concepts of cooperative game theory, at an 
elementary level. Five examples, including three insurance applications, are 
progressively developed throughout the paper The characteristic function, the 
core, the stable sets, the Shapley value, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodlnsky 
solutions are defined and computed for the different examples. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Game theory is a collection of mathematical models to study situations of 
confhct and/or cooperation. It attempts to abstract out those elements that are 
common to many conflicting and/or cooperatwe ncounters and to analyse 
these mathematically. Its goal is to explain, or to provide a normative guide 
for, rational behavlour of individuals confronted with strategic decisions or 
involved m socml interaction. The theory is concerned with opttmal strategic 
behaviour, equilibrium situations, stable outcomes, bargaining, coahtion for- 
matlon, equitable allocations, and similar concepts related to resolvmg roup 
&fferences The prevalence of competition m many human activities has made 
game theory a fundamental modeling approach in such diversified areas as 
economics, poht~cal science, operations research, and mdltary planning 
In this survey paper, we wdl review the basic concepts of multiperson 
cooperative game theory, with insurance apphcat~ons in mind. The reader is 
first invited to ponder the five following basic examples. Those examples wdl 
progressively be developed throughout the paper, to introduce and Illustrate 
basic notions. 
Example 1. United Nations Security Council 
Fifteen nations belong to the United Nations Security Council five permanent 
members (China, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the 
Umted States), and 10 nonpermanent members, on a rotating basis (m 
November 1990' Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, the Ivory 
Coast, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen, and Zalre). On substantwe matters, 
including the investigation of a dispute and the application of sanctions, 
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decisions reqmre an affirmative vote from at least nine members, Including all 
five permanent members. If one permanent member votes against, a resolution 
does not pass. This is the famous "veto r ight" of the "big five," used 
hundreds of times since 1945. Thts veto right obviously gives each permanent 
member a much larger power than the nonpermanent members. But how much 
larger? [] 
Example 2. Electoral representation I Nassau County [m LUCAS (1981)] 
Nassau County, in the state of New York, has six municipalities, very unequal 
in population. The County Government is headed by a Board of six Super- 
visors, one from each municipality In an effort to equalize citizen representa- 
tion, Supervisors are given different numbers of votes The following table 
shows the situation m 1964. 
District Population % No of Votes % 
Hempstead I } 778,625 57 1 31 27 0 
Hempstead 2 31 27 0 
Oyster Bay 285,545 22 4 28 24 3 
North Hempstead 213,335 16 7 21 18 3 
Long Beach 25,654 2 0 2 I 7 
Glen Cove 22,752 1 8 2 I 7 
1,275,801 [15 
A simple majority of 58 out of 115 is needed to pass a measure Do the citizens 
of  North Hempstead and Oyster Bay have the same political power m their 
Government9 [] 
Example 3. Management of ASTIN money [LEMAIRE (1983)] 
The Treasurer of ASTIN (player l) wishes to invest the amount of 1,800,000 
Belgian Francs on a short term (3 months) basis. In Belgium, the annual 
interest rate is a function of the sum invested. 
Deposit Annual Interest Rate 
O- 1,000,000 7 75 % 
1,000,000-3,000,000 10 25 % 
3,00,0,000-5,000,000 12 % 
The ASTIN Treasurer contacts the Treasurers of the International Actuarial 
Association (I.A.A - player 2) and of the Brussels Association of Actuaries 
(A.A.Br. - player 3). I.A.A. agrees to deposit 900,000 francs m the common 
fund, A.A.Br. 300,000 francs Hence the 3-mdlion mark is reached and the 
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interest rate will be 12% How should the interests be split among the three 
associations? The common practice in such situations is to award each 
participant in the fund the same percentage (12%). Shouldn't  AST IN  however 
be entitled to a higher rate, on the grounds that it can achxeve a y~eld of  
1025% on its own, and the others only 7 .75%? [] 
Example 4. Managing retention groups [BORCH (1962)] 
[For slmphclty, several figures are rounded in this example]. Consider a group 
o fn  I = 100 individuals. Each of  them is exposed to a possible loss of  l, with a 
probability q~ = 0.1. Assume these persons deode to form a risk retention 
group, a small insurance company, to cover themselves against that risk. The 
premium charged will be such that the ruin probabil ity of  the group is less than 
0.001. Assuming that the risks are independent, and using the normal 
approximation of  the binomml distribution, the group must have total funds 
equal to 
PI = nlql+ 3x/nlql ( l - -q l )  = 10+9 = 19 
Hence each person will pay, in addition to the net premium of  0.10, a safety 
loading of  0.09 
Another group consists of  n2 = 100 persons exposed to a loss of  1 with a 
probablhty q2 = 0.2. If they form their own retention group under the same 
conditions, the total premium will be 
P2 = n2q2+ 3x/n2q2(1-q2) = 20+12 = 32. 
Assume now that the two groups decide to join and form one single 
company In order to ensure that the ruin probability shall be less than 0.001, 
this new company must have funds amounting to 
PI2 = nlql+n2q2+ 3x/n lq l ( I -q0+n2q2(1-q2)  
= 10+20+ 15 
= 45. 
Since Piz = 45 < Pi + Pz = 51, the merger results in a decrease of  6 of  the 
total safety loading. How should those sawngs be divided between the two 
groups? A traditional actuarial approach would probably consist in dividing 
the safety loading in proport ion to the net premiums. This leads to premiums 
of 15 and 30, respectively. The fairness of  this rule is certainly open to 
question, since it awards group 1 most of  the gain accruing from the formation 
of  a single company In any case the rule is completely arbitrary [] 
Example 5. Risk exchange between two insurers 
Insurance company C~ owns a portfolio of  risks, with a mean claim amount  of  
5 and a variance of  4. Company C2's portfolio has a mean of  10 and a variance 
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of 8. The two companies decide to explore the posslblhty to conclude a risk 
exchange agreement. Assume only hnear risk exchanges are considered Denote 
by x I and x2 the claim amounts before the exchange, and by Yl and Y2 the 
claim amounts after the exchange. Then the most general form of a linear risk 
exchange is 
Yl = ( l -00x l+ fl x2+K 
0_< ~,p_< 1 
Y2 = o~ x l+(1 - f l )xE - -K  
where K is a fixed (positive or negative) monetary amount. I f  K = 5~-  10fl, 
then E(y  0 = E(xO = 5 and E(y2) = E(x2) = 10. So the exchange does not 
modify expected claims, and we only need to analyse variances. Assuming 
independence, 
Var (Yt) = 4(I --002"1"-8fl 2
Var (Y2) = 40¢2+8( 1__fl)2 
If, for instance, c~ = 0.2 and ,6' = 0.3, Var(y~) = 3.28 < 4 and 
Var (Yz) = 4.08 < 8. Hence it is possible to improve the situation of both 
partners (if we assume, in this simple example, that companies evaluate their 
sltuanon by means of the retained variance). Can we define "opt ima l "  values 
of a and fl? [] 
Those examples have several elements m common :
- -Par t i c ipants  have some benefits to share (pohtlcal power, savings, or 
money). 
- -  This opportumty to divide benefits results from cooperation of all partici- 
pants or a sub-group of participants. 
- -  Individuals are free to engage in negotiations, bargaining, coalition formation. 
- -  Participants have conflicting objectives; each wants to secure the largest 
part of the benefits for himself. 
Cooperative game theory analyses those situations where participants' 
objectives are partially cooperative and partially conflicting. It Is In the 
participants' interest o cooperate, in order to achieve the greatest possible total 
benefits. When it comes to sharmg the benefits of cooperation, however, 
individuals have conflicting goals. Such situations are usually modeled as 
n-person cooperative games in characteristic function form, defined and 
illustrated m Section 2 Section 3 presents and discusses natural conditions, the 
mdwidual and collective rationality conditions, that narrow the set of possible 
outcomes. Two concepts of solution are defined: the yon Neumann-Morgen- 
stern stable sets and the core. Section 4 is devoted to axiomatic approaches that 
aim at selecting a unique outcome. The main solution concept is here the 
Shapley value. Section 5 deals with two-person cooperative games without 
transferable utilities. The Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution concepts are 
presented and applied to Example 5. A survey of some other solutions and 
concluding remarks are to be found m Sections 6 and 7. 
COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND ITS INSURANCE APPLICATIONS 21 
2. CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTIONS 
First, let us specify which situations will be considered in this paper, and some 
implicit assumptions. 
- -  Participants are authorized to freely cooperate, negotmte, bargain, collude, 
make binding contracts with one another, form groups or subgroups, make 
threats, or even withdraw from the group 
- -  All participants are fully reformed about the rules of the game, the payoffs 
under each possible situation, all strategies available . . . .  
- -  Participants are negotiating about sharing a given commodity (such as 
money or political power) which is fully transferable between players and 
evaluated m the same way by everyone. This excludes for instance games 
where participants evaluate their positron by means of a concave utility 
function; risk aversion is not considered. (In other words, it is assumed that 
all individuals have linear utility functions). For this reason, the class of 
games defined here is called "Cooperatwe games with transferable utili- 
ties." Thts major assumption wdl be relaxed in Section 5. 
Defimtion 1" An n-person game in characteristic function form F is a pair 
[N, v], where N = {1,2 . . . . .  n} is a set of n players, v is a real valued 
characteristic function on 2 N, the set of all subsets S of N. v assigns a real 
number v(S)  to each subset S of N, and v(qS) = 0. 
Subsets S of N are called coalitions. The full set of players N is the grand 
coalition. Intuitively, v(S) measures the worth or power that coalition S can 
achieve when its members act together. Since cooperation creates avings, it is 
assumed that v is superaddltive, i.e., that 
v(SU T) >>, v (S )+v(T)  for all T, S c N such that S["I T = q~ 
Defimuon 2 Two n-person games F and F',  of respective characteristic 
functions v and v', are said to be strategically equivalent if there exists numbers 
k > 0, c~ . . . .  cn such that 
v' (S)  = kv(S)  + Z c, for all S_cN.  
The switch from v to v' only amounts to changing the monetary units and 
awarding a subsidy c, to each player. Fundamentally, this operation doesn't 
change anything. Hence we only need to study one game in each class of 
strategically equivalent games. Therefore games are often normalized by 
assuming that the worth of each player is zero, and that the worth of the grand 
coalition is 1 [In the sequel expressions such as v({l,3}) will be abbreviated as 
v(13)]. 
v(l) = 0 t = 1, . ,n  v(N)  = 1 
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Example 1. (UN Security Council). Since a motion either passes or doesn't, we 
can assign a worth of l to all winning coalitions, and 0 to all losing coahtlons. 
The game can thus be described by the charactermtlC function 
v(S) -- l for all S containing all five permanent members and at least 4 
nonpermanent members 
v(S) = 0 for all other S. [] 
Games such that v(S) can only be 0 or 1 are called simple games One 
interesting class of simple games is the class of weighted majority games. 
Definition 3 A weighted majority game 
F = [M; wt . . . . .  w,], 
where w I , . . . ,  wn are nonnegatwe real numbers and 
M > - iv,, 
2 ,-i 
~s the n-person cooperative game with characteristic function 
v(S) = 1 If 2 w, >_ M 
v(S) = 0 If L w, < M, 
I ES  
for all S _~ N. w, is the power of player l (such as the number of shares held in 
a corporation) M is the required majority. 
Example 1. It is easdy verified that the UN Security Council's voting rule can 
be modelled as a weighted majority game. Each permanent member ts awarded 
seven votes, cach nonpermanent member one vote. The majority required to 
pass a motion is 39 votes A motion can only pass Jf all five permanent 
members (35 votes) and at least four nonpermanent members (4 votes) are in 
favor Without the adhesion of all permanent members, the majority of 
39 votes cannot be reached. 
F = [39; 7,7,7,7,7, l , l , l , l , l , l , l , l , l ,1] 
Does this mean that the power of each permanent member is seven times the 
power of nonpermanent members? [] 
Example 2. Nassau County's voting procedures form the weighted majority 
game [58, 31,31,28,21,2,2] It clearly shows that numerical voting weights do 
not translate into political power. An inspection of all numerical posslbdttles 
reveals that the three least-populated municipalities have no voting power at 
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all. Their combined total of 25 votes ~s never enough to tap the scales. To pass a 
motion simply reqmres the adhesion of two of the three largest districts So the 
assigned voting weights might just as well be (31,31,28,0,0,0), or (I,1,1,0,0,0). 
We need a better tool than the number of votes to evaluate participants' 
strengths. [] 
Example 3. (ASTIN money). Straightforward calculations lead to the total 
interest each coalmon can secure 
v(1) = 46,125 
v(2) = 17,437.5 
v(3) = 5,812.5 
v(12) = 69,187.5 
v(13) = 53,812.5 
v(23) = 30,750 
v(123) = 90,000 [] 
Example 4. (Retention groups) This example differs from the others in the 
sense that figures here represent costs (to mm~m~se) and not earnings (to 
maxlmise). Instead of a superadditive characteristic function v(S), a cost 
function c(S) is introduced. Scale economies make c(S) a subad&tive func- 
tlon 
c(S[.J T) _< c(S)+c(T) for all S, T~_ N such that Sf' l  T= q~ 
A "cos t "  game is eqmvalent o a "sawngs"  game, of characteristic function 
v(s) = ~ c,-c(S). 
I tS  
In the case of the example, c(S) is the premmm paid by each coalition 
c( l )  = 19 
c(2) = 32 
c(12) = 45 [] 
3. VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS AND THE CORE 
Example 3. (ASTIN money) If they agree on a way to subdivide the profits of 
cooperatmn, the three Treasurers will have a total of 90,000 francs to share 
Denote ~ = (~j, ~z, ~3) the outcome (or payoff, or allocation)' player t will 
receive the amount ~, Obwously, the ASTIN Treasurer wdl only accept an 
allocation that awards ham at least 46,125 francs, the amount he can secure by 
himself This is the m&vldual rationahty con&tion. [] 
Defimtton 4 A payoff c~ = (~1,0~2 . . . . .  0~,) Is mdwidually rational if 0~, > v(i) 
l = l, . . ,n .  
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Defimtton 5 An imputation for a game F = (N, v) is a payoff  ~ = (~l . . . . .  0~,) 
such that 
~, >_ v(t) i : 1 . . . . .  n 
~ cx, = v(N) 
1=1 
An imputation is an lndwldually rational payoff  that allocates the maximum 
amount  (This condition is also called "ef f ic iency" or "Pareto-opt imal i ty") .  
Example 3. (AST IN  money) An imputation is any allocation such that 
~+~2 +~3 = 90,000 
~j 2 46,125 
~2 2 17,437.5 
~3 ~ 5,812.5 [] 
Example 4. (Retention groups). In this cost example, an imputation Is any set 
of  premiums (~,  72) such that 
~l +~2 = 45 
~l ~ 19 
~2 ~ 32 
Let us now add a third group of  n 3 = 120 individual to this example, all 
subject to a loss o f  1 with a probabil ity q3 = 0.3. A risk retention group with a 
rum probablhty of  .001 would require a total premium of 
n3q3+3N/n3q3( ]  - -q3)  = 36+15 = 51 
I f  all three groups decide to merge to achieve a maximum reduction of  the 
safety loading, the total premium will be 
n lq t+ n2q2+n3q3 + 3x/ntq l ( l -q l )+n2q2( l -q2)+n3q3( I -q3)  
= 10+20+36+21 
= 87 
In this case an imputation is a payoff  (ctl, ct2,0~3) such that 
~+~2 +~3 = 87 
~l ~ 19 
~2 ~ 32 
~3 ~ 51 
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Are all those imputations acceptable to everybody? Consider the allocation 
(17, 31, 39). It is an imputation. It will however never be accepted by the first 
two groups Indeed they are better off withdrawing from the grand coaht~on, 
forming coalition (12), and agreeing for instance on a payoff (15 5, 29.5). 
Player 3, the third group, cannot object to this secession since, left alone, he 
will be stuck to a premium of 51 He will be forced to make a concession 
during negotiations and accept a higher ~3. ~3 needs to be at least 42 to 
prevent players 1 and 2 to secede This is the collective rationality condition: 
no coalmon should have an incentive to quit the grand coalmon. [] 
Definition 6. A payoff (cx I , a2, -., ~xn) is collectively rational if 
Z o~, _> v(S) for all S c N. 
Defimtion 7 The core of the game is the set of all collectively rational 
payoffs. 
The core of a game can be empty. When it is not, it usually consists of several, 
or an infinity, of points. It can also be defined using the notion of 
dominance. 
Definmon 8. Imputation ,8 = (ill,,82 . . . . .  ,sn) 
= (al ,  ~z , - . . ,  ~n) with respect o coalition S if 
(i) S~q,  
(i 0 fl,> ~, for all i tS  
dominates imputation 
(ill) v(S) >_ ~ L 
tES  
So there exists a non-void set of players S, that all prefer ,8 to ~, and that has 
the power to enforce this allocation. 
Definition 9 Imputation ,8 dominates imputation ct if there exists a coalition S 
such that fl dominates ~ with respect o S 
Definition 7' The core is the set of all the undominated imputations. 
Definitions 7 and 7' are equivalent. 
Example 4. (Retention groups). The core ~s the set of all payoffs that allocate 
the total premium of 87, while satisfying the 3 individual and 3 collective 
ratlonahty conditions. 
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0~l'k-0~2+0~ 3 = 87 
~X~ _< 19 
0~ 2 < 32 
0C 3 ~ 51 
0~+~ 2 _< 45 
~ +CX 3 _< 63 5 
~X2+0~ 3 < 75.3 
So the core enables us to find upper and lower bounds for the premiums 
~+~2+~3 = 87 
11.7 _< ~xl _< 19 
23.5 < ~x2 _< 32 
42 _< ~x 3 _< 51 
An allocation that violates any mequahty leads to the secession of  one or two 
groups. [] 
Example 3. (AST IN money). The core consists of  all payoffs such that 
0~ I +~2q-0~3 = 90,000 
46,125 < 0~ < 59,250 
17,437.5 < 0c 2 < 36,187.5 
5,812.5 < 73 < 20,812.5 [] 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the core was historically not the first concept 
that attempted to reduce the set of  acceptable payoffs with rationality 
conditions. In their path-breaking work, VON NEUMANN and MORGEN- 
STERN (1945) introduced the notion of  stable sets 
Definition 10 A von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of  a game f '  = (N, v) is 
a set L of  imputations that satisfy the two following conditions 
(1) (External stabdlty) To each imputation ~x ~ L corresponds an imputation 
/3 ~ L that dominates c~ 
(ii) (Internal stabdlty) No imputation of L dominates another imputation of L. 
Stable sets are however usually very difficult to compute 
The main drawback of  the core and the stable sets seems to be that, in most 
cases, they contain an infinity of  allocations For instance, the core and the 
stable set of  all 2-person games simply consist of  all imputations It would be 
preferable to be able to single out a umque, " fa i r "  payoff  for each game Thls 
is what the Shapley value achieves 
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4 THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
Example 3. (ASTIN money). Assume the ASTIN Treasurer decides to initiate 
the coalition formation process. Playing alone, he would make v(l) = 46,125. 
If player 2 decides to join, coalition (12) will make v(12) = 69,187.5. Assume 
player 1 agrees to award player 2 the enhre benefits of cooperation; player 2 
receives his entire admission value v(12)-v( l )  = 23,062.5. Player 3 joins in a 
second stage, and increases the total gain to 90,000. If he is allowed to keep his 
entire admission value v(123)-v(12) = 20,812.5, we obtain the payoff 
[46,125; 23,062.5; 20,812.5] 
This allocation of course depends on the order of formation of the grand 
coalition. If player 1 joins first, then player 3, and finally player 2, and if 
everyone keeps his entire admission value, the following payoff results 
[46,125, 36,187.5, 7,687.5] 
The four other player permutations [(213), (231), (312), (321)] lead to the 
respecnve payoffs 
[51,750; 17,437.5; 20,812.5] 
[59,250; 17,437.5; 13,312.5] 
[48,000; 36,187.5; 5,812.5] 
[59,250, 24,937 5, 5,812.5] 
Assume we now decide to take the average of those six payoffs, to obtain the 
final allocation 
[51,750; 25,875 , 12,375 ] 
We have in fact computed the Shapley value of the game, the expected 
admission value when all player permutations are equiprobable [] 
The Shapley value is the only outcome that satisfies the following set of three 
axioms [SHAPI..EY, 1953)] 
Axiom 1 (Symmetry). For all permutations H of players such that 
v[ll(S)] = v(S) for all S, 0~nl,) = ~,. 
A symmetric problem has a symmetric solution. If there are two players that 
cannot be distinguished by the characteristic function, that contribute the same 
amount o each coalmon, they should be awarded the same payoff. This axxom 
is sometimes also called anonynuty, It imphes that the selected allocation only 
depends on the characteristic function, and not, for instance, on the numbering 
of the players 
Axiom 2 (Dummy players). If, for a player t, v(S) = v(Sll)+ P(l) for each 
coalition to which he can belong, then 0~, = v(0. 
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A dummy player does not contribute any scale economy to any coahuon. The 
worth of any coalition only increases by v(i) when he joins. Such an inessenual 
player cannot claim to receive any share of the benefits of cooperation. 
Axiom 3 (Ad&tlvity). Let F = (N, v) and F' = (N, v') be two games, and ~(v) 
and c((v) their respectwe payoffs. Then ~(v+v')= ~x(v)+~(v') for all 
players. 
Cr 2 
~I = v(1) 
INDIV IDUAL RAT IONAL ITY  
FOR PLAYER 1 
~z + ~2 = v(12) 
CHARACTERIST IC  FUNCTION 
SHAPLEY VALUE 
CORE/  
STABLE SET 
~ = v(2) 
D ISAGREEMENT 
POINT 
INDIV IDUAL RAT IONAL ITY  
FOR PLAYER 2 
\ 
O~ x 
FIGURE 1 Two-person cooperative game with transferable ut=llties 
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Payoffs resulting from two distinct games should be added. While the first two 
axioms seem quite justified, the latter has been criticized It rules out all 
interactions between the two games, for instance. 
Shapley has shown that one and only one allocation satisfies the three 
axioms 
~, = (1/nl) 2 ( s - l ) l (n -s ) ! [v (S ) -v (S~i ) ]  i = 1 , . . ,n  
s 
where s is the number of members of a coalition S 
The Shapley value can be mterpreted as the mathematical expectation of the 
admission value, when all orders of formation of the grand coalition are 
equiprobable. In computing the value, one can assume, for convenience, that 
all players enter the grand coaht~on one by one, each of them receiving the 
entire benefits he brings to the coalition formed just before him. All orders of 
formation of N are considered and intervene with the same weight 1/n! in the 
computation. The combinatorial coefficient results from the fact that there are 
( s -  1)! (n -s )  I ways for a player to be the last to enter coalition S'  the s -  1 
other players of S and the n -s  players of N"NS can be permuted without 
affecting Cs position 
In a two-player game, the Shapley value is 
oc, = ( l /2 ) [v ( lZ )+v(1) -v (2 ) ]  
cz2 = (1/2) [v(12)+ v (2) -v ( l ) ]  
It is the middle of the segment ocl +o¢2 = v(12), ~z¿ >- v(1), a2 >- v(2). This is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Example 1. (UN Security Council). In a weighted malonty game, the admission 
value of a player is either 0 or 1. One simply has to compute the probability 
that a player clinches victory for a motion. In the UN Security Council game, 
the power of a nonpermanent member t is the probablhty that he enters ninth 
in any coalition that already includes the five permanent members It is 
(8) 
cz, = (5/15) (4/14)(3/13) (2/12) (1/11) (9/10) (8/9) (7/8) (1/7) 
3 ~ v J~ -, J ,L 
all five permanent before t 3 of the a then 
nonpermanent enters 
before 
= 0.1865% 
By symmetry, the power for each permanent member is 
0c, = 19.62% 
So permanent nations are 100 times more powerful than nonpermanent 
nations. [Note: m practice a permanent member may abstain without impaIr- 
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ing the validity of an affirmatwe vote. Whde this rule complicates the analysis 
of the game, it only changes the second decimal of the Shapley value]. [] 
Example 2. (Nassau County) The Shapley value of the districts is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 
0, 0, 0). This analysis led the County authorities to change the voting rules by 
increasing the required majority from 58 to 63 There are now no more dummy 
players, and the new power md~ces are [0 283, 0.283, 0 217, 0 117, 0.050, 0.050]. 
This ~s certainly much closer to the original mtent~on. [] 
Example 4. (Retention groups). In the two-company version of this game, the 
Shapley value is [16,29]. In the three-company version, the value is [14.5, 26.9, 
45.6]. The traditional pro rata approach leads to [13.2, 26.4, 47.4]. It does not 
take into account he savings each member brings to the grand coalition, or its 
threat possibilities. It is unfair to the third group, because it fads to gwe proper 
credit to the important reduction (10) of the total safety loading it brings to the 
grand coahtlon [] 
The Shapley value may lie outside the core In the important subclass of 
convex games, however, it wdl always be in the core. 
Definmon 11. A game is convex if, for all S -~ T_c N, for all :¢ T, 
v(TOi)-v(T) >_ v(SOO-v(S).  
A game is convex when it produces large econonues of scale, a "snow-balhng" 
effect makes ~t increasingly interesting to enter a coalition as ~ts number of 
members increases. In particular, ~t ~s always preferable to be the last to enter 
the grand coaht~on N. The core of convex games ~s always non-void. 
Furthermore, ~t coincides with the unique yon Neumann-Morgenstern stable 
set. It is a compact convex polyhedron, of dimension at most n -1  The 
Shapley value lies m the center of the core, in the sense that it is the center of 
gravity of the core's external points. 
5. TWO-PERSON GAMES WITHOUT TRANSFERABLE UTILITIES 
Example 5. (Risk exchange). As shown in the presentation of the example, 
selecting ct = 0.2 and fl = 0.3 results m a decrease of Var (Yl) of 0.72, and a 
decrease of Var (Y2) of 3.92. This risk exchange treaty is represented as point 1 
in Figure 2. 
In this figure the axes measure the respective variance reductions, p~ and P2- 
Point 2 corresponds to ct =/3 = 0 4. It dominates point 1, since it leads to a 
greater variance reduction for both companies. Point 3 is 7 = 0.53,/3 = 0.47, ~t 
dominates points 1 and 2. It can be shown that no point can dominate point 3, 
and that all treaties uch that ct+/3 = 1 neither dominate nor are dominated by 
point 3. For instance, point 4 (ct = 0.7,/3 = 0.3) will be preferred to point 3 by 
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VARIANCE 
REDUCTION 
FOR Ca 
8 
IDEAL  POINT  b 
v (12)  = PARETO 
~PT IMAL  CURVE 
"I 
KALAI -SMORODINSKY SOLUTION 
NASH SOLUTION 
GAME 
SPACE M 
1 2 3 0 p~ = VARIANCE 
D ISAGREEMENT REDUCTION 
POINT  FOR Ci 
FIGURE 2 Two-person cooperaUve game without transferable uuhttes 
C~ However C 2 will prefer point 3 to point 4 Hence neither point dominates 
the other The set of all treaties such that ~+,8 = 1 forms curve v(12), the 
Pareto-opttmal surface. Points to the north-east of  v (12)cannot  be attained. 
All points to the south-west of v(12) correspond to a gwen selection ors  and ,8. 
The convex set of  all attainable points, including the boundary v(12), is called 
the game space M. That space ~s hm~ted by the Pareto-optlmal curve and the 
two axes. The axes represent the two mdw~dual ratlonahty conditIons: no 
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company will accept a treaty that results m a variance increase For instance 
point 5 (co = 0.35, fl = 0.65) will not be accepted by Ci While each point In 
the game space is attainable, it is in both companies' interest o cooperate to 
reach the Pareto-optlmal curve. Any point that does not lie on the north-east 
boundary is dominated by a Pareto-opt,mal point. Once the curve is reached, 
however, the players' interests become conflicting. C1 will negotiate to reach a 
point as far east as possible, while C2 will attempt to move the final treaty 
north. I f  the players cannot reach an agreement, no risk exchange will take 
place. The disagreement point results m no variance reduction. 
Hence all the elements of a two-player game are present in this slmphfied 
risk exchange xample. In fact, Figure 2 closely resembles Figure 1, with an 
important difference: the Pareto-optlmal set of treaties v(12) is a curve in 
Figure 2, while the characteristic function v(12) in Figure 1 is a straight line 
This is due to the non-transferability of utilities in the risk exchange xample. 
The players are " t rad ing"  variances, but an increase of l of Var (Y0 results In 
a decrease of Var (y~ that is not equal to 1. Example 5 is a two-person 
cooperative game without transferable utility. [] 
Definition 12. A two-person cooperative game without transferable utilities is a 
couple (M, d), where d =(d l ,  dz) is the disagreement point (the initial utilities 
of the players). M, the game space, is a convex compact set in the two- 
dimensional space E 2 of the players' utilities; it represents all the payoffs that 
can be achieved. 
Such a game is often called a two-person bargaining ame Let B be the set 
of all pairs (M, d). Since no player will accept a final payoff that does not 
satisfy the individual rationality condition, M can be hmited to the set of 
points (Pl,P2) such that p~ > d~ and P2 > d2. Our goal is to select a unique 
payoff in M. 
Definmon 13 A solution (or a value) Js a rule that assooates to each bargaining 
game a payof fm M It is thus a mapp ingf :B - - *E  2 such that f (M,d)  is a 
point P= (P,,P2) of M for all (M ,d)~B;  f l (M ,d)  =p l  and 
fz (M, d) = P2. 
The first solution concept for bargaining games was developed m 1950 by 
Nash. The Nash solution satisfies the four following axioms 
Axiom 1. Independence of hnear transformations 
The solution cannot be affected by linear transformations performed on the 
players' utilities. For all (M, d) and all real numbers a, > 0 and b,, let (M' ,  d')  
be the game defined by d,' = a,d,+b, (l = 1, 2) and M'  = {q ~ EZJ3p ~ M such 
that q, = a,p,+b,}. Then f , (M ' ,  d') = a,f,(M, d)+b, i = 1, 2. 
This axiom is hard to argue with. It only reflects the reformation contained 
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m utility functions. Since utilities are only defined up to linear transformations, 
~t should be the same for solutions. 
Axtom 2. Symmetry 
All symmetric games have a symmetric solution. A game is symmetric if 
dl = d2 and (p~, P2) ~ M ~ (P2, P0 ~ M The axiom requires that, in this case, 
f,(M, d) = f2 (M, d). 
Like axiom 1, axiom 2 requires that the solution only depends on the 
information contained in the model A permutation of the two players should 
not modify the solution, if they cannot be differentiated by the rules of the 
game. Two players with the same utility function and the same mmal wealth 
should receive the same payoff if the game space Is symmetric. 
Axiom 3. Pareto-optimality 
The solution should be on the Pareto-optlmal curve For all (M, d)~ B, if p 
and qE M are such that q, > p, (t = 1,2), then p cannot be the solution: 
f (M,  d) 4= p. 
Axiom 4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
The solution does not change ~f we remove from the game space any point 
other than the &sagreement point and the solution itself. Let (M, d) and 
(M', d) be two games such that M'  contains M andf (M ' ,  d) is an element of 
M. Then f ( M, d) = f ( M', d). 
This axiom formahzes the negotmt~on procedure. It requires that the 
solution, which by axiom 3 must lie on the upper boundary of the game space, 
depends on the shape of this boundary only in its nelghbourhood, and not on 
&stant points. It expresses the fact that, during negotiations, the set of the 
alternatives likely to be selected ~s progressively reduced. At the end, the 
solution only competes with very close points, and not with proposals already 
eliminated uring the first phases of the discussion. Nash's axioms thus model 
a bargaining procedure that proceeds by narrowing down the set of acceptable 
points. Each player makes concessions until the final point ~s selected. 
NASH (1950) has shown that one and only one point satisfies the four 
axioms. It is the point that maximizes the product of the two players' utility 
gains. Nash's solution is the function f, defined by f (M,  d)= p, such that 
p _> dand (P l -d l ) (p2-d2) >- (ql-dt)(q2-d2), for all q ~peM.  
Example 5. (Risk exchange). In this example, the players' objectwe is to reduce 
the varmnce of their claims Hence d = (0, 0) : if the compames cannot agree 
on a risk exchange treaty, they will keep their original portfolio, with no 
improvement The players' variance reductions are 
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Pt = 4 -4(1 -~x)2 -8 f l  2 
P2 = 8 -40~2-8(1 -~ 2 
Maximismg the product PIP2, under the condition ~+f l  = l, leads to the Nash 
solution 
= 0.613 
fl = 0.387 
Pl = 2.203 
P2 = 3.491 [] 
Nash's axiom 4 has been cnticised by KALA! and SMORODINSKY (1975), who 
proved that Nash's solution does not satisfy a monotonicity condition. 
Consider the two games represented in Figure 3. The space of game 1 is the 
four-sided figure whose vertices are at d, A, B, D. The Nash solution is B. The 
space of game 2 is the figure whose vertices are at d, A, C, D From the second 
player's point of view, game 2 seems more attractive, since he stands to gain 
more if the first player's payoff  is between E and D. So one would expect the 
second player's payoff to be larger in game 2. This is not the case, since the 
Nash solution of game 2 is C. 
P~ 
E D 
Pl 
FIGURE 3 Non-monotonlc~ty of Nash's solution 
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Axwm 5. Monotomcity Let b(M) = (bl, b2) the " idea l "  point formed by the 
maximum possible payoffs (see Figure 2): b, = max{p,l(pl,p2) ~ M} 
(l = 1, 2). I f  (M, d) and (M' ,  d) are two games such that M contains M' and 
b(M) = b(M'), then f (M,  d) >_ f (M ' ,  d). 
KALAI and SMORODINSKY have shown that one and only one point satisfies 
axmms 1, 2, 3, and 5. It is situated at the intersectIon of the Pareto-optlmal 
curve and the straight line linking the disagreement point and the ideal 
point. 
Example 5, It is easily verified that the equation of the Pareto-optlmal curve ~s 
+ ~  = 12 Since the ideal point is (4,8), the line joimng d and b 
has equatmn P2 = 2 pl • Kalai-Smorodmsky's soluUon point, at the intersection, ts
= 0.5858 
13 = 0 4142 
Pl = 1.9413 
P2 = 3.882l 
It is slightly more favourable to player 2 than Nash's solution. [] 
6. OTHER SOLUTION CONCEPTS -- OVERVIEW OF L ITERATURE 
Stable sets and the core are the most important solution concepts of game 
theory that attempt to reduce the number of acceptable allocations by 
introducing intuitive condmons. Both notions however can be criticized. 
Stable sets are difficult to compute. Some games have no stable sets. Some 
others have several. Moreover, the dominance relation is neither antlsymmetnc 
nor transitive It is for instance possible that an imputation fl dominates an 
imputation 0~ with respect o one coahtlon, while cx dominates fl with respect o 
another coahtmn Therefore an imputation inside a stable set may be domi- 
nated by an imputation outside. 
The concept of core is appealing, because it satisfies very intmtlve rationality 
conditions. However, there exists vast classes of games that have an empty 
core: the rationahty conditions are conflicting. Moreover, several examples 
have been built for which the core provides a counter-intuitive payoff, as 
shown in Example 6. 
Example 6. A pair of shoes 
Player 1 owns a left shoe. Players 2 and 3 each own a right shoe. A pair can be 
sold for $ 100. How much should 1 receive if the pair is sold? Surprisingly, the 
core totally falls to catch the threat posstbllmes of coafitton (23) and selects the 
paradoxical allotment (100, 0, 0). Any payoff that awards a positive amount to 
2 or 3 is dominated, for instance (99, 1, 0) is dominated by (99.5, 0, 0.5). 
36 JEAN LEMA1RE 
Moreover, the paradox remains tf we assume that there are 999 left shoes and 
1000 right shoes. The game is now nearly symmetrical, but the owners of right 
shoes stdl receive nothing. The Shapley value is (66%, 16%, 16%), defimtely a
much better representation of the power of each player than the core. [] 
Many researchers feel that the core is too static a concept, that it does not 
take into account the real dynamics of the bargaining process. In addition, 
laboratory experiments consistently produce payoffs that lie outside the core. 
This led AUMANN and MASCHLER (1964) to define the bargaining set. Th~s set 
exphcitly recognizes the fact that a negotiation process ~s a mulh-criterla 
situation. Players definitely attempt o maxim~se their payoff, but also try to 
enter into a "safe"  or "stable" coahtion. Very often, ~t 1s observed that 
players willingly give up some of their profits to join a coalition that they think 
has fewer chances to fall apart. This behavlour is modelled through a dynamic 
process o f "  threats" and "counter-threats." A payoff is then considered stable 
if all objections against it can be answered by counter-objections 
Example 7. Consider the three-person game 
v(i) = v(2)= v(3) =0 
v(12) = v(13)= 100 
v(23) = 50 
The core of this game is empty. For instance, the players will not agree on an 
allocation like [75, 25, 0], because it is dormnated by [76, 0, 24]. Bargaimng set 
theory, on the other hand, claims that such a payoff is stable. If player 1 
threatens 2 of a payoff [76,0, 24], this objection can be met with the 
counter-objection [0,25, 25]. Player 2 shows that, without the help of player 1, 
he can protect his payoff of 25, whde player 3 receives more in the 
counter-objection than in the objection. Similarly, objechon [0, 27, 23] of 
player 2 against [75, 25, 0] can be counter-obJected by [75, 0, 25]. So, if a 
proposal [75, 25, 0] arises during the bargaining process, it is probable that it 
wdl be selected as final payoff. Any objection, by either player l or player 2, 
can be countered by the other. On the other hand, a proposal hke [80, 20, 0] 1s 
unstable. Player 2 can object that he and player 3 will get more in [0, 21, 29]. 
Player 1 has no counter-objection, because he cannot keep his 80 whde offering 
player 3 at least 29 
Thus, in addition to all undominated payoffs (the core), the bargalmng set 
also contains all payoffs against which there exists objections, providing they 
can be met by counter-objections The bargaining set for this example consists 
of the four points 
[0, o, o] 
[75, o, 25] 
[75, 25, o] 
[ o, 25, 25] [] 
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The bargaining set ~s never empty. It always contains the core. For more 
details, consult OWEN (1968, 1982) or AUMANN and MASCHLER (1964). 
In 1965, DAVIS and MASCHLER defined the kernel of a game, a subset of the 
bargaimng set. In 1969, SCHMEIDLER introduced the nucleolus, a unique 
payoff, included m the kernel. It ~s defined as the allocation that mlnimises 
successively the largest coalitional excesses 
e(u, S) = v(S) - ~ o~, 
tES  
The excess is the difference between a payoff a coalition can achieve and the 
proposed allocation. Hence it measures the amount ("the size of the com- 
plaint") by which coalition S as a group falls short of its potential v(S) in 
allocation ~ If the excess is positive, the payoff ~s outside the core (and so the 
nucleolus exists even when the core is empty). If the excess is negative, the 
proposed allocation Is acceptable, but the coalition nevertheless has interest m 
obtaining the smallest possible e(~, S) The nucleolus ~s the imputation that 
minimises (lex~cographically) the maximal excess. Since it is as far away as 
possible of the rationality conditions, it lies in the middle of the core. It is 
computed by solving a finite sequence of linear programs. Variants of the 
nucleolus, hke the proportional and the &srupt~ve nucleolus, are surveyed 
among others m LEMAIRE (1983). The proportional nucleolus, for instance, 
results when the excesses are defined as 
Since it conststs of a single point, the nucleolus (also called the lexicographic 
center) prowdes an alternatwe to the Shapley value. The Shapley value has 
been subjected to some criticisms, mainly focussing on the ad&tivlty axiom and 
the fact that people joining a coahtion receive their full admission value. 
Example 3. (ASTIN money). The Shapley value, computed in Section 4, is 
[51,750 ; 25,875 ; 12,375] 
It awards an interest of 11.5% to ASTIN and I.A.A., and 16.5% to A.A.Br. 
This allocation is much too generous towards A.A.Br.'s Treasurer, who takes a 
great advantage from the fact that he ts essential to reach the 3-milhon mark. 
His admission value is extremely high (m proportion to the funds supphed) 
when he comes in last. The nucleolus is 
[52,687.5; 24,937.5; 12,375] 
or, in percentages 
[11.71; 11.08; 16.5] 
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It recognises the better bargaining position of ASTIN versus I A.A., but stdl 
favours A.A.Br. Both the Shapley value and the nucleolus, defined in an 
additive way, fail in this multiphcaUve problem. The proportional nucleolus 
suggests 
or, in percentages, 
[54,000 ; 27,000, 9,000] 
[12; 12; 12], 
thereby justifying common practice. [] 
Only the case of the two-person games without transferable utlliues has been 
reviewed in Section 5. A book by ROTH (1980) is devoted entirely to this case. 
It provides a thorough analysms of Nash's and Kalm-Smorodlnsky's solutions. 
The generalisatlon of those models to the n-person case has proved to be very 
difficult. In the two-person case, the disagreement point is well defined : ff the 
players don't agree, they are left alone. In the n-person case, if a general 
agreement m the grand coalitton cannot be reached, sub-coalmons may form 
Also, some players may wish to explore other avenues, like possible business 
partners outside the closed circle of the n players. This xs an objection against 
modeling market situauons as non-transferable n-person games. Such games 
ignore external opportumties, such as competitive outsxde elements See 
SHAPLE¥ (1964) and LEMAIRE (1974, 1979) for definitions of values in the 
n-player case. 
Though somewhat dated by now, the book by LUCE and RAIVVA (1957) is 
still an excellent mtroducuon to game theory and utthty theory. It provides an 
insightful critical analysis of the most important concepts An excellent book 
that surveys recent developments i  OwEN (1968, 1982, especially the second 
edition). A booklet edited by LUCAS (1981) provides an interesting, simple, 
abundantly illustrated analysis of the basics of cooperaUve and non-coopera- 
tive game theory. Finally, the proceedings of a conference on apphed game 
theory [BRAMS, SCHOTTER, SCHWODIAUER (1979)] provide a fascinating over- 
view (from a strategic analysis of the Bible to the mating of crabs) of 
apphcaUons of the theory. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Game theory solutions have been effectively implemented in numerous itua- 
tions. A few of those apphcanons are 
- -  allocating taxes among the divisions of McDonnell-Douglas Corporation 
- -  subdividing renting costs of WATS telephone hnes at Cornell University 
- -  allocating tree logs after transportation between the Finnish pulp and paper 
companies 
- -  sharing maintenance costs of the Houston medIcal ibrary 
- -  financing large water resource development projects m Tennessee 
- -  sharing construction costs of multipurpose reservoirs in the Umted States 
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--subdividing costs of building an 80-kilometer water supply tunnel In 
Sweden 
- -  settmg landing fees at B~rmlngham Airport 
- -  allotting water among agricultural communities in Japan 
- -  subsld~sing public transportation in Bogota 
Cooperative game theory deals with competition, cooperation, conflicts, 
negotiations, coaht~on formation, allocation of profits. Consequently one 
would expect numerous apphcat~ons of the theory m insurance, where compe- 
titive and conflicting situations abound. It has definitely not been the case. The 
first article mentionmg game theory in the ASTIN Bulletin was authored by 
BORCH (1960a). In subsequent papers, BORCH (1960b, 1963) progressively 
developed his celebrated risk exchange model, which in fact IS an n-person 
cooperatwe game w~thout transferable utihties. This model has further been 
developed by in the 1970s by Lemalre and several of his students [BATON and 
LEMAIRE (1981a, 1981b), BRIEGLEB and LEMAIRE (1982), LEMAIRE (1977, 
1979)]. The ASTIN Bulletin has yet to find a third author attracted by game 
theory! It is hoped that this survey paper will contribute to disseminate some 
knowledge about the situations game theory models, so that the risk exchange 
model will not stand for a long time as ~ts lone actuarial application. 
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ARTICLES 
COMBINING QUOTA-SHARE AND EXCESS 
OF LOSS TREATIES ON THE REINSURANCE 
OF n INDEPENDENT RISKS 
BY LOURDES CENTENO and ONOFRE SIMOES 
ISEG, Untversidade Tbcmca de Lisboa, Portugal 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we seek to find the optimal retentions for an insurance company 
which intends to reinsure ach o fn  risks belonging to its portfolio, by means of 
a pure quota-share treaty, a pure excess of loss treaty or any combination of 
the two. The criterion chosen to the selection of the optimal programme is the 
maximization of the adjustment coefficient, attending to the relationship 
existing between thls coeffioent and Lundberg's upper bound of the ruin 
probability. 
l .  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that an insurance company seeks reinsurance for n independent risks 
(by a risk we mean a single pohcy or a group of policies--so we could speak of 
n independent hnes of insurance), and has a choice between a pure quota-share 
treaty, an excess of loss treaty or any combination of the two, for any of the 
risks. The way this combination operates is as follows: first the quota share 
contract will apply, so that the insurer shall remain responsible for no more 
than its share--established by the contract- -of  any claim that may occur for 
that nsk; afterwards, the excess of loss contract applys, so that, by no means, 
shall the insurer (of course considering only that part for which it remains 
reponsible after the quota-share contract) pay more than a certain fixed 
amount of any claim that takes place. 
The problem consists of determining the optimal retention limits for each 
risk, in each of the two forms of reinsurance. "Opt imal"  in the sense those 
limits maximize the adjustment coefficient and, therefore, minimize the upper 
bound to the ruin probabihty, supplied by Lundberg's inequality This same 
criterion was also adopted by WATERS (1979) and CENTENO (1986) and, in a 
certain way, this work may be considered as a generalization of their results 
Although this criterion does not by any means have to minimize the (analyti- 
cally uncalculable) rum probability, it is a good criterion if one wishes to give 
analytical results. 
Surplus and stop loss treaties are not considered in th~s paper WATERS 
(1983), derives sufficient conditions for the adjustment coefficient to be 
uni-model, for stop loss reinsurance. 
ASTIN BULLETIN, Vol 21, No 1 
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For each ~= 1, 2 . . . .  , n, let a,, be the decision variable representing the 
quota-share retention on risk i; Me, the decision variable representing the 
N, 
of loss retention limit on risk i; Y, = _~~ X,j, with X,0-= 0, the excess 
j=0 
insurer's aggregate gross (of reinsurance) clatms on risk l, m some fixed time 
interval, where N, is the number of claims and {X,j}j= i. , N, are the in&vidual 
claims; P, the insurer's gross (of expenses and reinsurance) premmm income 
with respect o risk i and e, P, the amount used to cover the insurer's expenses 
with respect o the same nsk. 
After a combination of a quota-share with an excess of loss treaty the insurer 
N, 
will retain, from risk t, Y,(a,, Me) = ~ min {a, Xv,  M,}, (i = 1 . . . .  , n ) .  
j= l  
The choice of uniform aj = ... = an and Mi = ... = Mn, which is generally 
made in practice, has been dealt with in CZNTENO (1986). In this paper, 
therefore, retention limits which can, for instance, be set differently for 
portfolios of different classes of business are also dealt with 
Let Pt,(a,,  Me) be the total reinsurance premium paid by the insurer, in 
respect o risk i 0t is, naturally, the summation of the quota-share and excess 
of loss reinsuance premmms). 
The problem which is to be solved is, then, 
Maximize R (a,  _M_) 
sub. to: 0 _< a, _< 1 
M,>O 
( i=  1,2, . . ,n ) ,  
where R(a ,  M) ,  is the adjustment coefficient, defined, as it is known, as the 
unique positive root of 
Note that R(a ,  _M_) is the adjustment coefficient (see BEARD, PENTIKAINEN 
and PESONEN (1984), p. 363) after taking account of the reinsurance arrange- 
ment. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS AND PREMIMINARIES 
At: Y,(t = 1, 2 . . . . .  n) are independent random variables; 
For each i (t = I, 2 . . . . .  n): 
A2: N,( t  = 1, 2, . . ,  n)  is a Poisson random variable with parameter 2,; 
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,43: {X~j}j=l.2, N, are i i d. non-negative random variables, independent of 
N,, and with common distribution function F, such that 
F,(x) = O, x < X,o 
0 < F,(x) < 1, x > X,o, 
for some x,0 >_ 0, 
d 
A4: - -F t (x  ) exists and it is continuous everywhere; 
dx 
As: The m.g.f, of the random variables Xu, exists m the ( -  m, Q,] interval, 
fo r0  < Q,N +~ and 
hm E[e ''xo] = +m;  
l l~a j  
A6: The quota-share reinsurance premxum is 
(1 -a , )P , -c , (1 -a , )P ,  = (1-c,)  (1 -a , )P , ,  
where c,(1-a,)P, ,  0 < c, < 1, is the habitual commission paid by the 
quota-share reinsurer; 
A7: The excess of loss reinsurance premium, which we denote P,(a,, M,), is 
calculated according to the expected value principle, i.e., 
P,(a,,M,) = (1 +0~,)2, (a ,x -M, )dF , (x)  
M,/a I 
with ~, > 0. 
As. e~ > c,; 
,49: (1 - c , )P , -2 ,  E[X,] > 0, where E[X,] denotes the expected value of X,j, 
j=  1,2 . . . .  ,N,; 
Ai0: ( l -e , )P ,  < (I+o~,)2, E[X,]; 
Finally, we assume that 
All- ~ [(1-e,)P,-A,E[X,]]  > O. 
t= l  
From A2 and h 3 it follows that Y, and Y,(a,, M,) have compound Poisson 
distributions. From A 6 and A 7 we can say that 
(2) Pt,(a,, M,) = (1 -c,)  (1 -a , )  P,+(I  +~x,) 2, (a ,x -M, )  dF,(x). 
M,/a, 
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Assumption As is somewhat restrlcnve, but without it the insurer could 
reinsure the whole risk through a quota-share arrangement with a certain 
profit. The same applies to At0, but with respect to the excess of loss 
reinsurance treaty A 9 lmphes that the loading on the quota-share reinsurance 
premium is positive At last, All assures the existence of a margin, necessary to 
cover eventual deviations from the expected losses, and also to pay the 
reinsurance costs. 
Under assumptions A~, A2 and A3, R (a ,  __M_) is the only pos~nve root of 
(3) G(R; a,  __M_) = O, 
where 
(4) G(R;a ,_M_)= 2, eR~'~dF,(x)+e RM' [ I - F , (M, /a , ) ] - I  - 
~1 dO 
- R ~ [(I-e,)P,-P,,(a,, M,)] 
(See BEARD, PE~TIKAINEN and PESONEN (L984), p. 363, for the equivalence of 
(4) and (1).) Let E[W(a,_M_) ] denote the insurer's expected net profit, after 
reinsurance and expenses, i.e., 
(5) E[W(a,_M_> = ,=,~ I ( c , -e , )P ,+a,  [ ( I - c , )P , -a ,  E tX , ] ] -  
- 2 ,~x,  (a ,x -M, )dF , (x )  , 
M,/a, 
and let us define 
T= {(a_,_MM_)' 0_< a,_< 1, M,_> 0 and E[W(a_,__M_)] > 0}, 
and 
F = {a_. 0 _< a, _< 1, ~ = 1, 2, . . . ,  n and there exists at least one M such that 
E[W(a, .YM_)] > 0). 
Since 
0 
- -  E [W(a ,  MM_)] = 2,cx,( l -F , (M, /a, ) )  
0M, 
is non-negative, we can say that for fixed a,  the expected net profit will be 
mammum when M, = + oo (l = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n). Hence it is possible to specify F 
as being 
(6) F= {a :  ,=~ [ (c , -e , )P ,+a, [ ( I - c , )P , -2 ,E  [X,]]]> 0}.  
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Let us denote - -  G(R; a_,__M_.) by D(R, a_,M_) so that 
OR 
(7) D(R ;a ,M)= 2, a, xeR" '~dF , (x )+M,e"U ' ( l -F , (M, /a , ) )  - 
1=[ 
- ~ [(1 - e,) P, - P,, (a,, M,)], 
t=l  
with G(R; a_, _M_) defined by (4). 
The following lemma discusses the existence of the adjustment coefficient. 
Lemma 1 : 
O) R(a,_M_) exists, if and only l f(a,._M_)~T, 
(i0 For any (a,_MM_)~T, D(R;a,_M_) is positive at R = R(a,__M_). 
Proof: 
(i) By As, it is clear that for fixed (a,_.M_), G is defined for all 
R~(-oo ,  Q), 
where 
and 
Q = mln {~,} 
~,=f  +oo, if M,/a, < +oo 
L ~' , If M,/a, = +oo az 
( i=  1 ,2 , . . ,n ) .  
The first aspect to be considered, is that R = 0 is a trivial solution of 
equation (3); 
Secondly, we have that 
G(R,a ,M)= L (a ,x)2en" '~dF, (x)+M,2eeM'( l -F , (M, /a , )  
~R ~ - - -  ,=1 o0 
it Is non-negative, V (a ,M) ,  which means that G(R ;a ,M)  is a convex 
function of R, 
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Third, 
hm G(R; a, M) = 
R~Q t= l  
fM,/a, lim 2, 
R~Q O0 
[eRe'X--R(1 +tx,)a,x] dF,(x) + 
+ 2,[eRM'--R(1 +O~,)M,] (1 -F,(M,/a,))-2, -
- R[(c,-e,)P,+a,[(I  - c,) P , - ( I  +a , )  2, E[X,]]] t 
) 
= --boO, 
by assumptions As and A 9. 
Hence, as G(R; a ,  _M_) equals zero when R is null, G(R; a,  _MM_) Is a convex 
function of R, and G(R;a,_M_.) tends to infinity when R tends to Q, then, ~t 
will only exist such an R = R(a,_M_) > 0 which turns G(R,a, M) to be null 
again, if and only if, 
G(R; a,__M_) R=0 
0R 
<0.  
To finish the prof, we only have to notice that 
a G(R;a_,_MM_) [ < O.~.E[W(.qq,_gM_)] > O. 
I aR R=o 
(li) Immediate, given the proof of (1). 
The following lemma will be useful to the solution to our problem. 
Lemma 2 : For any a e F there exxsts a umque (a, ._M_) e T,  let it be (a,  _~._), 
such that 
- In (1 +~,) t = 1 ,2 , . . ,n .  
Proof: Let us consider the set of points _M_ such that 
In( l+0ct) _ l n ( l+~2)  =. . . -  In(l+~tn) _ 1 M > 0 
M 1 M 2 M, M ' 
and let us define 
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which is to say 
~ { i *  ~"(~') 
Qi " ~Qt  X H(a_, ~,l~t) = 2, MeM dF,(x) + 
t= l 0 
+ 2, A~( I+ct , ) [1 -F , ( /~t  In(l+~X,)a, ] - ~2 , -  
- [(1- e,) P,- (l - c,) (1-a,)P,] + 
i 
+oo 
+ (1 +~,)2, 
.,~ In (I + ct,) 
a t 
__  (a ,x -  lQ ln(l +tz,)) dF,(x) } . 
Then 
10 hm 
40+ 
_2_ 
H(a_, )14') = ~ - [(1 -e , )P , - (1  -c , )  (1 -a , )P ,  - 
t= l  
- (1 +o~,)2,a,E[X,]] > O, 
using A8 and A~0, 
2) hm H(a , JQ)  = - ~ {[(c,-e,) P ,+a, [ ( l - c , )P , -  
/~ ~ + oO 1=1 
-2,E[X,]]} < 0; 
3) Differentiating H(a, .,~') twice with respect to M we obtain (see, for 
example, COURANT and JOHN (1974), p 77) 
8 2 ~i~'nO+~')'(a,x)2 
eM dF,(x) > O. aM 2 H(a ,  A~) = 2, a, ~ a , x  
J= l  0 /~, j3 - -  
Hence, for each a • F there exists a unique posmve MTI = h.~ (a) such that 
H(ga ., )Q) = 0 and it is clear from the definmon of H(qq., JQ) that 
G ; a,/~/ =0,  
where 
._~.. = (A~I,  /~2 . . . . .  /Kin) = ( 3.7/ ]n (1 +0¢1) , /~/ In (1 ÷o¢2) , . , M In (l +~n)) O 
This lemma Implies that if we define 
(8) (~(/~;a_)=G(/~;a_, /~- l ln( l+Ct l ) ,  /~-tln(l+c¢2), . ,R- l ln( l+c¢, , ) ) ,  
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then G (R ; a )  has a unique positive root for each a ~ F. Let us denote it/~ (a.). 
It can be proved, using the Implicit Function Theorem (see for example 
COURANT and JOHN (1974), pp. 221-223), Part (2) of Lemma 1 and A4, that 
R (_a, _MM_.), for (a ,  _M_) ~ T ,  and /~ (a) ,  for a ~ F, are twice dlfferenUable. 
3. THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM 
The following result provides the solution to our problem. 
Result  I : 
(i) For  a fixed value a~F,  with a, 4:0,  Vi= 1,2 , . . . ,n ,  R(a,_M_) is a 
unimodal function of __M_, and for any a_s F its maximum value is 
k (a_) 
(i0 1~ (a_) is a unimodal function of  a_, for a_ ~ F and, at the point where it 
attains its maximum" 
a) a, = 1 if and only if - -  ./~ (a )  (a, = 1) > 0, 
or  
b) a, is such that - -  /~ (a ) = 0, If and only if 
~a~ 
8 
, 
~a, 
- - l~(a) (a ,  = 1) < 0, t = i ,2  . . . . .  n. 
Proof :  
seen that 
aM, 
(i) The equation defining R (a ,  _M__) for all (a ,  ._M__) ~ F Is 
(9) G (R; a ,  ._M_) = 0, 
with G(R; a,__M_.) gwen by (4). Differentiating (9) with respect to M, it can be 
R(a,_.M_) = 0 if and only if (using the Imphclt Function 
Theorem) 
ReRM'(1 -F,(M,/a,)) = n( l  +~,) (1 - F,(M,/a,)). 
So, using Lemma 2 we can say that for a fixed value of  a e F, with a, 4: 0, 
Vt = 1, 2 . . . .  n, the only turmng point of  R (a,__M_) is such that 
(10) M,= R- l ln ( l+a , ) ,  t=  1,2 . . . .  n. 
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Differentiating (9) twice with respect o M, (using again the Implicit Function 
Theorem and (10)) we get 
~2 M=R-' 2'R2eRM'[I-F'(M'/a')] M,= (11) R(a, M)  = - 
~M, 2 - - -  , 1nO + ~,) D (R ; .q., __M_) R-' 1nO +~,) 
with D(R; a, __M_) given by (7). We can see that each side of equation (11) IS 
negative since D(R; .a., _M_) is positive by Lemma 1 (li). 
On the other hand, 
~M, oMsR(q_,_M_) =0,  j -/= ,. M,= R -~ ln(I  +=,) 
Mi=R-' In{1 +~j) 
Hence we can conclude that for a fixed value a e F with a, ~ 0, 
Vi = 1, 2 . . . .  , n, R(a_, _M._) is a unlmodal function of _M_. 
If a_e F and ak = 0 for some k = 1, 2 , . . ,  n, then of course any value for 
the excess of loss retention limit of risk k, including Mk = R -I In (1 +Uk), will 
provide the same value for the adjustment coefficient. 
Then the maximum of R(a_, .._M_) is attained at the point (a_,.M_) which is 
the unique point satisfying G(R;a_,...MM_..)=0 and M,=R- l ln ( l+oq) ,  
t = I, 2 , . . . ,  n, I.e., for a fixed a ~ F, the maximum of R (a, _.M_..) is /~ where 
/~ =/~ (a) is the only positive root of G (/~ ; a_) = 0, with G (1~ ; a)  given by (8). 
(n) Differentiating 
(12) d (R ;a_) = 0 
with respect o a, we obtain 
ida, - / ) (~;a )  (1-c,)P,- (1 
In (I +ct,) 
I 
+oo 
+~,)L ~.¢!+.a xdg,(x)- 
Rat 
_2 ,  I ° k,, xe~a,., dF,(x)l ' 
where 
/) (/~ ;a )  = D(/~ ;a , /~  -l In (1 +at),  /~-i in (1 +o~2), . . . , /~- ,  In (1 +~x,,)). 
So, 
(13) 
if and only if 
In ( | + ct,) 
(14) ( l - c , )P ,  = 2, I ka, 
0 
a 
- -  R (a )  = 0 
8a~ 
i 
+oo 
xe "ga'x dF~(x) + (1 + oq) 2, x dF,(x) 
In (!+oq) 
Ra, 
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Differentiating (13) with respect to a,, and using (14), we obtain 
~ln (1 +a,) 
,~ ~o--~a~ l~2 x2 eSa, X dF~(x) 
0 2 
- -  .~(a)  = - 
~a ,  2 ~z)  =o /3 (/~ ; a_) -~- ~._~ = 
and 
~ k (a) ~ ~)  = o , -  1~ Ca_) = o 
Oaj 
= O, i f i=~j .  
This implies that there exists at most a point ~F  such that (14) holds for 
i=  1, 2, . . . ,n .  
Noticing that 
hm - - -  R(_q.) = [ ( I - c , )P , -2 ,  E[X,]] hm 
o,~0÷ 0a, ~,~0+ /5 (k, a) 
with a ~ F, is positive by A 9 and Lemma 1 (n), the proof  is finished. O 
To summarize, we can now conclude that the optimum programme of 
reinsurance, when a company IS to reinsure n independent risks by a combina- 
non of the quota share an excess of  loss forms of reinsurance, is the point 
(a ,  M)  which fulfils the following set of  condit ions: 
In (1 +~,) 
---, M , -  , ( i=  1 ,2 , . . . ,n )  
R 
In (1 +a,) 
a,: ( l - c , )P ,  = )~, f R~, 
d 0 
or a, = 1, 
xe Ra'* dE(x)  + (1 +a,)~, i,o+~,) x dF,(x), 
Ran 
If < 0 when a,= 1 
if >_ 0 when a, = 1 
(i = 1,2 . . . .  ,n )  
6(R;  a ,  M__) = 0 
Corollary 1 : I f(1 -c,)  P, > 2,(1 + ~,) E[X,] for some i (l = 1, 2 . . . . .  n), then the 
optimal arrangement is such that a, = 1. 
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Proof: We only have to notice that in this case 
i (1 -c , )P , -  2, xeR~df , (x ) - (1  +~x,) 2, xdF, (x)  >_ 0 R -I In (I +~,) 
i 
R I In (I +e,) 
>_2, x( l  +o~,-eRX) >_ O. 
0 
Note that we can regard the quota-share reinsurance premium for risk t 
( see  A6) as being calculated using the expected value principle with loading 
factor ~,, where 
~, = [0 - c,) - 2, E[X,]]/[2, E[X,]]. 
Then, Corollary I imphes that if &, > ~,, Le if quota-share is, in the obvious 
sence more expensive than excess of loss reinsurance, then excess of loss 
reinsurance is optimal. Excess of loss reinsurance was already proved to be the 
optimal form of reinsurance (see GERBER 1979), p 129), m the sence that it 
maximizes the adjustment coefl'iclent, under the assumption that the loading 
coeffioent is the same for the insurer and the reinsurer (which ~s not the case in 
our paper). 
When the number of risks, n, ~s greater than one, the solution found for the 
problem, may not be the solutton that we would obtain if the risks were 
considered separately In other words, if we regard as optimal a set of retention 
limits that maximizes the adjustment coeffioent, then what is optimal when 
each risk is considered individually may not be optimal when the risks are 
considered together, as we will see next 
In the result that follows, R(a,, M,) (i = I, 2 . . . .  n) is, for fixed (a,, M,), the 
adjustment coefficient associated to risk t, when this ~s considered on its own, 
defined as the unique positive root of 
G,(R,; a,, M,) = O, (15) 
where 
(16) G,(R,; a,, M,) = 2, e R'°'" dF,(x)+en'M'[l -F , (M, /a , ) ] -  1 - 
- R,[(I -e , )P , -P , , (a , ,  M,)] 
if such a root exists, or zero otherwise 
Result 2: For fixed (a,_MM_) e T we have 
rain {R,(a,,M,)} < R(_q_,__M_ ) < max {R,(a,,M,)}. 
1=1, ,n 1=1, ,n  
The need to redefine R,(a,, Mr)comes from the fact that E[W(a, M)]  > 0 does not imply that 
E[W,(a,,M,)] > 0, for all t = 1,2, ,n  
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Let 
(l 7) min 
1=1, ,n  
and 
{R, (a,, M,)} = R k (ak, Mk) 
(18) max {R,(a,, M,)} = Rl(at, Mr). 
I= l ,  ,n  
Then, considering the definition of R,(a,, M,), Vi = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, we have that 
0 <_ R k (ak, Mk) -< Rt(at, Mr), 
and, on the other hand, having in mind the proof of Lemma 1, we know that 
(19) I G,(R,;a,,M,) < 0 if 0 < R, < R,(a,,M~) 
t G, (R,; a,, M,) > 0 If R, > R,(a,, M,) 
for t = 1 ,2 , . . . ,n .  
From (19) and attending to (17) and (18) we have that 
(20) ~ G,(Rk(a k, Mk); a,, M,) < O, 
t=l 
being zero if and only if Rk(ak, Mk) = Rl(al, Mi). Simdiary 
(21) ~ G,(Rl(at, Mr); a,, g , )  ~ 0, 
~=1 
being zero if and only If Rk(ak, Mk) = Rl(at, Mr). 
Then the result follows immediately, since R(_a.,_M_) for (.a.,_M_) e T is the 
unique positive root of 
(22) ~ G, (R ; at , M,) = 0 
t--[ 
Corollary 2: If R,(a,, M,) achieves its maximum value at (a,, M,) = (6,, M,), 
i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, ~ and if R(a_,_M_) achieves Its maximum value at 
(a_, _M_) = (&, _MM_), then 
min {R, (6,, &l,)} < R (~., M_M_. ) < max {R, (6,, ~1,)} 
t~[ ,  )rt I~ l ,  ,n  
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Proof: Attending to Result 2, to the defimtlon of (~, _~_) and to the definition 
of (~,, M,), i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n, then 
min _< _< R(h, 
I=1, jn 
and 
R (~., _~_) _< max {R, (~,, ~¢1,)} <_ max {R, (6,, ~/,)} 
I~ l ,  ,rt 1~1, ,n 
which finishes the proof. O 
4. EXAMPLE 
Let n = 2 and 
i ' -  if x<0 
G I (x) = 1 
]e -aS(x+4) ,  if x> O, 
which corresponds to a ), 2, 4 , and 
{0 
G2(x)  = 1 -e  -3 (x - I ) ,  
if x< I 
if x> 1, 
which is an exponenclal. 
Let )-1 = 2, 22 = 10, Pi = 27, P2 = 23.5, el = e2 = .35, Ul = 30 and 
U2 = 15 The expected profit, before any reinsurance arrangement takes place, 
is 3.491(6) (1.55 from risk I and 1.941(6) from risk 2), R is .02849 and, 
therefore, the upper bound given by Lundberg's inequality for the rum 
probability, is 0.2774. Considering the two risks separately the adjustment 
coefficients are R~ = 0 01487 and R2 = 0 1864, giving then upper bounds for 
the ruin probablhtles of 0.6401 and 0.0610, for risks 1 and 2 respectively. 
The optimal reinsurance programme was calculated assuming different 
values for ~ and setting ~2 = .3, c~ = c2 = .25. The results can be seen on 
Table 1. Analysing Table 1, the mare aspect hat seems evident is that, as long 
as ~ increases, a similar evolution is presented by ratio M~/al, that is to say, 
the excess of loss form of reinsurance becomes less and less attracnve. 
Table 2 gives the same kind of information as Table 1, when treating the two 
risks separately. Note that Ri < R < R2. One way of explaining this occur- 
rence may be the following when the reinsurance problem is solved taking the 
risks together, there is a sort of a transfer of part of the income produced for 
the "less dangerous" (and, therefore "less needed" of reinsurance) risks, to 
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TABLE 1 
Optimal Expected Adjustment Upper Bound 
cq Retenhons Net Profit Coeffictent by Lundberg's  
Inequahty 
a I = 00 77 
a 2 = 01 00 
0 3 I 4986 0 04300 0 1444 
M I = 06 10 
M 2 = 06 10 
at = 00 57 
a 2 = 01 00 
04  14177 003919 0 1714 
M 1 = 08 59 
M z = 06 69 
a l  = 00 53 
a 2 = 01 00 
0 5 1 3946 003827 0 1787 
Mi = 10 59 
M 2 = 06 86 
at  = 00 52 
a 2 = 01 00 
0 6 I 3846 0 03794 0 1814 
M I = 12 39 
M2 = 06 92 
TABLE 2 
Optimal Expected Adjustment Lundberg's  
~z~ Retenuons Net Profit Coeffictent lnequahty 
a I = 01 00 
a 2 = 0100 E[W~] = 1 3317 R~ = 01552 ~u~(30) ~ 6278 
0 3 E[W2] = I 5803 
M~ = 1690 E[W] = 29120 R z= 1959 ~,'z(15) ~ 0529 
M 2 = 01 34 
al = 01 00 
a2 = 01 00 E[Wi] = 14583 Rt = .01508 ~(30)  ~ 6361 
0 4 E[Wz] = 1 5803 
M z = 2231 E[W] = 30387 R 2 = 1959 ~z(15) ~ 0529 
M 2 = 01 34 
a l  = 01 O0 
a2 = 01 00 E[Wi] = 1 5101 Rt = 01495 ~1(30) ~ 6386 
0 5 E[W2] = I 5803 
M~ = 27 12 E[W] = 3 0904 R 2 = 1959 gw2(15) ~ 0529 
M2 = 01 34 
a t = 01 00 
a 2 = 01 00 E[W~] = I 5322 R~ = 01490 et (30)  ~ 6395 
0 6 E[W2] = I 5803 
M~ = 31 54 E[W] = 3 1125 R 2 = 1959 V2(15) ~ 0529 
M2 = 01 34 
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substd~ze the payment of the reinsurance of those potentially more risky. In th~s 
example such interaction implied a decrease in the joint expected net profit, but 
there are substantial benefits in the company's security, as a whole. Nothing of 
this can be achieved, if one ms~sts on treating each risk separately 
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DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS IN LIFE INSURANCE 
BY HENRIK  RAMLAU-HANSEN 
Baltica Insurance Company Ltd., Ballerup, Denmark 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses distribution of surplus in hfe insurance within a general 
Markov chain framework. A conservative interest rate and a conservative set 
of transition intensities are used for reserving purposes whereas more reahstic 
assumptions are used for the purpose of distributing surplus. The paper 
examines various actuarial aspects of d~stnbuting surplus through either cash 
bonuses, terminal bonuses or increased benefits. The results are Illustrated by 
some examples. 
KEYW0RDS 
Distribution of surplus; bonus; with profits annuity pohcy; with profits 
disabihty pohcy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional life policy is a participating policy with margins of safety bruit 
into the valuation elements to allow for protection for adverse devmtmns. 
Surplus or profit can, therefore, in most cases be expected to emerge over the 
life of a portfolio of business. A large proportion of the surplus is usually 
distributed to the pohcyholders as bonuses or dividends. This distribution of 
surplus may be carried out in various ways. One method provtdes cash 
payments or reduction of premiums as the surplus arises, or the accumulated 
value of the cash bonuses may be paid when the pohcy becomes a claim or 
expires. By this method, a separate savings account is attached to the policy 
and the surplus is credited to the account as it emerges. Another way of 
distributing surplus is through terminal bonuses paid only when the policy 
expires. By this method, only survivors get a share of the accumulated surplus 
The third method, and perhaps the most widely used, is one m which the profit 
is distributed to the policyholders by means of increasing the insurance 
benefits. This method prowdes a gradual increase in the benefits granted under 
the policy. 
It is believed that these three different ways of distributing surplus cover 
many of the methods used in practice. We shall in this paper discuss various 
actuarial aspects of the mentioned istribution methods. The ~dea is that the 
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surplus should be distributed to those policyholders who contributed to the 
profit. Moreover, the distribution should be equitable, and the actuarial 
present value of the surplus generated by a pohcy should equal the actuarial 
present value of the bonuses paid to that same policy. 
The results are discussed within a general Markov chain framework where 
an insurance policy is modelled as a time-lnhomogeneous Markov chain, see 
e.g HOEM (1969, 1988). The paper is motivated by BERGER (1939), SVER- 
DRUP (1969) and SIMONSEN (1970), who &scussed some aspects of accumula- 
tion and distribution of surplus. Moreover, RAMLAU-HANSEN (1988) analysed 
the emergence of surplus using a general Markov chain and counting process 
framework. 
2. THE MARKOV CHAIN MODEL 
We shall in the following consider life insurance policies which can be modelled 
by time-inhomogeneous Markov chains with finite state spaces Hence, let S(.) 
denote the right-continuous sample path function of a time-lnhomogeneous 
Markov chain with fimte state space I, and assume that the process tarts in a 
state I ~ I at time 0. The transition probabilities are denoted by 
P,~(s, ° t) = P(S(t) = j [S(s )  = l), l, j~ I ,  s _< t, and the forces of transition 
u,j(.)o are defined by 
0 0 = P,j (t, t p,j(t) hm +h)/h, t, jE l ,  t~ j  
h~O ÷ 
The intensities are assumed to be mtegrable on compact intervals. 
Consider an n-year insurance policy characterized by the following condi- 
tions : 
1. While the policy stays in state i, premiums are paid continuously to the 
company at the rate n,(.), i.e. n,(t)dt is paid during It, t+dt). Annmty 
benefits received by the insured while in state i are denoted by b,(.). 
2. If the policy moves from state t to state j at time t, a lump sum benefit 
Bv(t ) is paid to the insured immediately after time t. 
3. When the policy expires at time n, the insured receives an amount B,(n) if 
the policy is in state t at the maturity date. 
The quantities ~z,(t), b,(t), B,j(t), and B,(n) are all assumed to be non- 
random. It should also be noted that we have restricted ourselves to continuous 
payment of premiums and annuities, benefits tied to transitions between 
different states and to maturity benefits. However, single premiums and other 
types of non-random payments can be Incorporated easily. Note also that we 
have introduced different notation for premiums paid and annuity benefits 
received because the two types of payments are affected differently by surplus 
distribution. Moreover, we shall refer to the "standard"  benefits (b,(t), B,j (t), 
B,(n), t, j e  I, t -~j)  as one unit of benefits, because one of the distribution 
methods operates by increasing all benefits proportionally. Finally, expenses 
are not included explicitly but can be regarded as separate benefits. 
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It is assumed that the company is making its valuations on the basis of a 
constant force of interest 6 and a set of transition intensities/z,j (.). The basis (6, 
it,j, t,j~ 1, i-J=j) is often called the valuation basis of the first order, and we 
shall assume that the company IS required to use this set of (conservative) 
assumptions in determining reserves and premmms. However, we shall assume 
that the actual force of interest is 6 o (6 o > 6) and that the actual behaviour of 
0 the Markov chain is governed by the intensities /to(.). The elements (O °, It,j, 
t, j e  I, ~ 4: j )  are often called the second order basis, and we shall assume that 
surplus is distributed according to this set of (realistic) assumptions. 
Given that the policy is m state i at time t, let V,(t) denote the prospective 
premium reserve corresponding to the valuation basis of the first order. 
Moreover, let SP,(t) be the single premium or the actuarial present value of 
one unit of future benefits, provided that the policy is in state t at time t. We 
shall also assume that the equivalence principle is followed, l.e V l (0) = 0. The 
reserve V,(t) is given by 
(2.1) i 
n 
! 
i 
t l  
+ v °-'  P (t, u) [b j (u) -  du 
./ t 
+ v"-' n) ej(n), 
J 
where the P,j(s, t)'s are the transition probabilities corresponding to the 
intensities #,j(.). A similar expression holds for SP,(t); just substitute 0 for 
rcj(u) in (2.1). It is well known, see e g. HOEM (1969), that ~( t )  satisfies 
Thiele's differential equation 
d 
(22) - -  V~(t)= 6 V~(t)+~L(t)-b,(t ) -  Z Itv(t)R,J (t)' 
dt j~ 
where Rv(t ) = Vj(t)+ Bu(t ) -  V,(t) denotes the amount at risk associated with 
a transition from state t to state j at time t. Similarly, SP,(t) sahsfies 
d 
(2.3) --SP~(t) = 6 SP~(t)-b,(t) - 2 p,j(t) [SPj(I)+By(t)-SP,(t)]. 
dt j_~ ,
3. ACCUMULATION OF SURPLUS 
Assume in this section that no bonuses are paid and that the company just pays 
the promised benefits b,(t), Bv(t ), and B,(n) in return for the premmms g,(t) 
The average surplus or profit realized over the term of the policy may then be 
derived in the following way. Assume that the policy is in state i at tIme t and 
that the amount V,(t) has been reserved Then during It, t+dt) the actual 
interest earned is J°dt V,(t), the premiums and the annuity benefits are zc,(t)dt 
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and b,(t)dt, respectwely, and the expected net loss due to transitions out of 
state / is  ~ ,u~(t)dt R,j(t). However, the reserve needed at time t+dt, 
j4~ 
assuming the pohcy is still m state i, ~s V,(t+dt), and hence the net profit 
becomes 
y,(t)dt = ( l+6°dt )  I . '~(t)+n,(t)dt-b,(t)dt- ~ ~( t )d t  R,j(t)-V,(t+dt). 
This leads to 
?,(t) = ~o V,(t)+~z,(t)-b,(t) - 2 kt°,J (t) Rv(t) - --~ V,(t) 
j~, dt 
and using (2.2) we get 
(3.1) 7,(t) = (60--6) V~(t) + ~ (~u~j(t)-p°(t)) R,j(t) 
j~t 
= .~6 v,(t) + Z .J~,~(t)R.(t). 
y4~ 
introducing A6 = 60-6  and Apy(t) = l%(t)-~](t)  Thus, assuming that the 
pohcy ~s m state t at time t, surplus accumulates at the rate y,(t), which, 
according to (3.1), is the sum of the excess interest earnings and the profit or 
loss associated with transitions out of state i The actuarial present value at 
time 0 of the total surplus accumulated over [0, t] during stays in the state i is 
gwen by 
(3.2) F,(t) = e-a°' P~,(O,s) y,(s)ds, 
0 
and the present value of the total surplus accumulated over [0, t] is 
(3.3) 
It should also be noted that 
(3 4) 
r(1) = Z r,(t). 
I 
i 
I 
r(t) = ~ e-~°sP°,(O,s)i~,(s)-b,(s)]as 
0 
I' - E E 
j~bt 0 
- Z e-6°t P°I,(O' t) V~(I), 
I 
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and 
(3.5) i 
l 
k~ 0 
I + e-e"'P~,(O,s)[~,(s)-b,(s)]ds 0 
j" - 2 e-~°sP~,(O,s)lx~(s)[Bu(s)+ Vj(s)] 
J#  I 0 
- e - '~° t  P°,(0, t) V~(t), 
see e g. RAMLAU-HANSEN (1988) formulas (4.1) and (4 10). Hence, F(t) may be 
interpreted as the actuarial present value of the difference between the 
premiums received and the benefits and reserves that have to be provided. The 
gain F,(t) may be interpreted similarly. 
For a broader discussion of surplus accumulation and in particular various 
stochastic aspects, see RAMLAU-HANSEN (1988). However, note that in RAM- 
LAu-HANSEN (1988) F(t) and F,(t) are random variables and not actuarial 
values. 
4 DISTRIBUT ION OF  SURPLUS 
4.1. Cash bonuses 
It was shown in the previous section that the surplus accumulates at the rate 
7,(t) in state i at time t. Hence, the surplus may be distributed by simply paying 
the policyholder an annuity ~,,(t) while the policy is in state t. These dividend 
payments may then supplement annuity benefits or partly offset premiums 
paid under the terms of the policy. The present value at time 0 of the total 
bonuses paid during [0, t] is 
S' (4.1) C(t) = 2 e -~% Y,(s)),,(s)ds, 
a o 
where Y,(s) = 1 if S(s) = t and 0 otherwise. Note that the amount C(t) is 
random, but EC(t) = F(t). In practice, companies that pay cash bonuses do 
not pay the continuous annuities 7,(t), but they may distribute the surplus 
through annual instalments or by other means, cf. Section 5.1. 
The amount C(t) may also be interpreted as the present value of the amount 
in a savings account attached to the insurance policy. During stays in state ~, 
the account is then credited continuously at the rate 7,(t). Some companies do 
follow this procedure by deferring the payment of the cash bonus until the 
policy becomes a claim or expires. If  the policy becomes a claim or expires at, 
say tame t, then the amount exp(6°t) C(t) is paid in addition to the policy 
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benefits. I f  two or more lump sum payments are possible under the pohcy, the 
surplus may be distributed through a series of payments. 
It should be noted that the distribution of surplus through periodic payments 
allows all policyholders to share in the profit. 
4.2. Terminal bonuses 
In this subsection we discuss a distribution method according to which the 
surplus is distributed to the policyholders only when the pohcles expire. No 
addmonal benefits are paid during the term of the pohcy, except at the 
maturity date. Hence, terminal bonuses may be used to enhance the maturity 
value of the policy. 
It was shown in Section 3 that the actuarial present value of the total surplus 
accumulated during stays in a state i is F, (n) gwen by (3.2). Hence, if this profit 
is to be &stributed as a payment o those policyholders who are in state t at 
time n, each should receive 
(4 2) T,(n) = F,(n)/[e -~°" P°l,(O, n)]. 
One might also limit the payment of bonuses to those survtvors who are in the 
initial state at time n. Depending on the design of the pohcy, this practice may 
favour those policyholders who have not made any claims under the policy In 
this situation, each of the surwvors m state 1 should receive 
(4.3) T(n) = ['(n)/[e -'~°n POi, (0, n)]. 
at time n 
However, it should be noted that by applying terminal bonuses only 
survivors are rewarded, and those who have died do not get a share of the 
profit, although they may actually have contributed to ~t Hence, the method 
resembles in a way a tontine scheme, and th~s may explain why terminal 
bonuses are only used in connection with pohcies with a strong savings 
element. 
4.3. Increased benefits 
In this section we assume that the surplus is used to increase the pohcy benefits 
This is one of the most common ways of distributing surplus in practice. We 
shall assume that all benefits are increased proportionally so that the original 
relationship between the benefits is preserved. Hence, the surplus is used as a 
single premium to purchase additlonal umts of benefits, cf. Section 2. 
At issue, the net premium reserve Is V~ (0) = 0 and the policy provides the 
benefits b,(s), B,j(s), for s > 0, and B,(n). Let us now assume that the policy IS m 
state t at time t and that the policy entered this state at some ume t,. Moreover, 
assume that past surplus has been used to buy D (t) umts of addmonal benefits 
so that they are now promised to be bT(s ) = b j ( s ) ( l+D( t ) ) ,  B~(s)  = 
Bjk(s) (I +D(t ) ) ,  for s > t, and BT(n) = Bj(n) (1 +D(t ) ) .  The rate of increase 
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S 
I 
of benefits at time u is denoted by d(u), i.e. D(t) = d(u) du. It should 
0
be noted that D (.) is actually a stochastic process since it is a function of the 
sample path of the Markov chain. At time 0, D(t) ~s unknown because the 
future course of the pohcy ~s unknown 
Taking the Increased benefits into account, the policy reserve is now 
(4.4) V,* (t) = V, (t) + D (t) SP, (t), 
where both V,(t) and SP,(t) are calculated using the first order valuation basis, 
cf. (2.2)-(2.3). Hence, using arguments imilar to the ones in Section 3, the 
average surplus that emerges at time t is given by the rate 
y*(t) = ~6 v,*(t) + ~ Ju,~(;)[v~*(t)+8,~(t)- v,*(t)] 
j,~t 
= ~6 v,(t) + ~ ~u~(t)[V~(t)+B,~(t)-V~(;)] 
+ D(t){ 'dJSP'(t)+ 2 
using (4 4). Thus, 
(4.5) y,*(t) = ~,,(t)+ D(t) K,(t) 
if we introduce x,(t) = zlJ SP,(t) + 2 ,dlZ,j(t) [SPj(t)+ B,j(t)-SP,(t)]. 
jq~t 
The surplus y,*(t) is used to buy d(t) units of additional benefits at a cost of 
SP,(t) per unit. Thus, we must have that 
d(t) se , ( t )  = y,(t)+ O(t) x,(t), 
or  
(46) D'(t) = d(t) = q,(t)+ D(t)r,(t), 
where q,(t) = y,(t)/SP,(t) and r,(t) = x,(t)/SP,(t). Equation (4.6) is a linear 
differential equation with solution 
S (4.7) D(t)  = q,(s) exp 
I: 
r,(u) du ) ds 
r,(s) ds),  t > t,, 
which yields, m a closed form, an expression for the total increase of the 
benefits due to the emerging surplus. 
64 HENRIK RAMLAU-HANSEN 
It should be noted that (4.7) holds only during the stay in state i. If the 
policy at some later time tj moves to state./then a similar formula holds with tj 
and j substituted for t, and i, respectively Thus, the rate of increase of benefits 
depends on the current state of the policy, but the pohcyholder should not 
expect any sudden changes in the benefits because D(.) is a continuous 
function. 
It should also be noted that in this section additional benefits are granted as 
the surplus is earned. In order to make this a prudent distribution method, it 
requires that at any time the future safety margins are sufficient o safeguard 
the company against any adverse experience. Moreover, since compames 
normally cannot reduce bonuses once they have been declared, it also requires 
surplus always to be positive, i.e. 7,* (t) has to be positive. If this is not the case, 
distribution of surplus will have to be deferred, and the method above will have 
to be modified. 
If the original policy is a single premium policy, then ~( t )= SP,(t) ,  
x,(t) = ?,(t), and q,(t) = r,(t). In this case, it follows from (4 7) that 
(S )  (4.8) l+D( t )  = ( l+D( t , ) )exp  r , (u)du , t_> t,. 
Ii 
Finally, we shall see that V,* 0)  satisfies a second order differential equation 
although it was defined as a first order premium reserve, cf. (4.4). The reason is 
that the benefits are adjusted continuously. According to (4.4), 
d d d 
- -  ~*( t )  = - -  14( t )+D' ( t )  SP , ( t )+D(t ) - -  SP , ( t ) ,  
dt dt dt 
and using (2.2)-(2.3) and (4.6) we get after some simple arithmetic the 
equation 
I4*(t) = j0 l~* ( t )+~, ( t ) -b , * ( t ) -  ~ I t~( t ) [~*( t )+B,~( t ) -~*( t ) ] .  
dt j~, 
5. EXAMPLES 
To illustrate some of the results, we shall consider two examples: A single- 
premium annuity pohcy and a dlsablhty pohcy The first example focuses on 
ways of distributing interest surplus, whereas the other example is a discussion 
of surplus distribution in a three-state model. We have not included an example 
of a typical endowment policy, because we feel that the two other examples are 
more interesting. 
5.1. An annuity policy 
Let us consider a single-premium annuity policy where a benefit b is paid 
continuously throughout the life of an individual (x). The first order premium 
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reserve is 
V(t) = b ~+, ,  t >_ O, 
using standard actuarial notation. We assume that the actual force of interest is 
a constant 6o > J and that the interest earnings are the only source of surplus, 
i.e. /z°(.) =/.t(.). 
Then, according to (3.1), surplus is accumulated at the rate ),(t) = AJ V(t), 
and we may, therefore, pay the insured the adjusted benefit 
(5 1) bt(t) = b+ Ag V(t).  
Alternatively, (4.8) shows that the surplus may also be &stributed by means of 
the increased benefits 
(5 2) b2(t) = exp[ (g° - J )  t] b. 
It is interesting to note that (5.1) is typically a decreasing function of t~me/age, 
whereas (5 2) is increasing exponentially. Thus, the two formulas represent two 
completely different ways of distributing the same surplus. 
In practIce, however, it is not possible to adjust the benefits continuously as 
It Is assumed in (5.1) and (5.2). In Denmark, for instance, pensions are adjusted 
only annually. Therefore, there is a need for more practJcal versions of (5.1) 
and (5.2). If, for example, the total surplus accumulated uring year t, 
t=  0, 1 , . . ,  has to be distributed through a level benefit b3(t ) payable 
continuously during year t, then b3(t ) has to be determined by 
(5.3) v (0  b3(t) -0 = a.,+,~+v°p~+t V(t+ 1), t = 0, 1 . . . . .  
where the superscript "0"  indicates that the values are based on J °. Hence, 
b3(0) ~s the level benefit that is paid continuously during year 0, b3(1) is paid 
during year 1 etc. It follows from (5.3) that the series of benefits b3(0), 
b3(l) . . . .  serves the same purpose as the function bl (.). 
Slmdarly, the function b2 (.) may be replaced by level annual benefits in the 
following way. Assume that the benefit is a level amount b4(t) during year t. 
Then b 4 (t + 1) IS determined by the equation 
i 
f .~  1 
b,(t) e-~°(s- ')s_,px+,AJa-. ,+sds+v°p,+,b,(t)ax+t+l 
t 
= v°p,+tb4(t+ 1) c-7,+~+l • 
Thus, we see that the surplus accumulated over the year ~s used to grant an 
increase of the benefit from b4(/) to b4(t+ I). 
Table 1 gives examples for an annmty of 10,000 issued to a male aged 60. 
The valuation rate of interest is 45%,  g = 1og(1.045), whereas the actual 
interest rate is assumed to be 8 %, i.e. fi0 = log (1.08) Moreover, the mortality 
is /z(t) = 0.0005+ 100038(~+t)-4 12which IS the standard assumption used by 
Damsh hfe compames 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS WAYS OF DISTRIBUTING SURPLUS FOR AN ANNUITY OF 
10,000 ISSUED TO A MALE AGED 60 
Age 
x+ t bl (t) b 2(t) b3(t) b 4(t) 
60 13,885 10,000 13,835 10,000 
61 13,784 10,335 13,734 10,350 
62 13,682 10,681 13,632 10,713 
63 13,580 11,039 13,529 11,089 
64 13,477 11,409 13,426 11,479 
65 13,373 11,791 13,322 11,884 
70 12,853 13,902 12,803 14,141 
75 12,345 16,391 12,297 16,861 
80 11,869 19,326 11,825 20,161 
The table highlights the difference between the payment schemes b3(t ) and 
b4(t). The calculations how that b3(t ) is larger than b4(t) during the first 
8 years after whLch b4(t ) exceeds b3(t). The distribution method that leads to 
b4(t) is widely used in Denmark, primarily because it provides ome protecUon 
against inflation However, one might also argue that m years with low 
inflation, many retirees are presumably prepared to forfeit inflation protectLon 
in return for higher benefits while they are healthy and the quality of hfe is 
higher Thus, b 3 ( l )  should perhaps be recommended more widely than it has 
been until now. 
5.2. A disability policy 
We shall in this section consider an n-year dlsablhty policy issued on an able 
male aged x. The policy may be described by the three-state Markov model 
depicted m Figure I. It is assumed that the pohcy provides a continuous 
Able ~°(t) 
i 0t/, _ 
) I Disabled 
FIGURE I The dlsabdlty model 
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annuity of  I as long as the insured is disabled Premiums are wmved dur ing 
disabil ity, and it ~s assumed that the premium payments cease after m = n -5  
years in order to avoid negatwe reserves close to matur ity.  
Damsh companies assume in their va luatmns that the transit ion lntensmes 
are given by 
and 
iz(t)  = v(t)  = 0 0005+ I00038(r+t)-4 12 
a( t )  = 0.0004+ 100060(r+t)-546 
The rate of  interest is still assumed to be 4 .5%,  i.e. ~ = log (1.045). We shall 
study surplus d~stnbutmn under the somewhat  more reahstlc assumptions that 
the actual behavmur of  the policy is governed by 
u°( t )  = O~ ~u(t), 
cr°(t) = 02c~(t), 
and 
v°(t)  = 03 v(t ) ,  
where 0 = (0L, 02,03) is given below. Moreover ,  the actual rate of  interest is 
also m~hls  example 8%,  i.e 60 = log(1.08). 
The premium zr and the first order reserves are given by 
-a t  - -aa 
vo(t) = -°' -oo a,+t ~=71- x a ,+t  ~=71, 
z,(t) = ax+,-" . -~ .  
I n f f -aa  s oo --It ~ ~X where ~ '  = vSsp~'ds, a ,~ = v sP, d~, ax~ =d,~ spuds, x~q 
0 0 0 
( ;  ) ( f  ) and wheresp~a=exp - t z (u )+a(u)du  , ,p ,=exp - ~(u)du  , 
0 0 
aa and ,p~'= sp , - ,p . ,  . The corresponding amounts  at risk are R~,( t ) - -  
V, ( / ) -  V~(t), R~d(t) = -- V~(O, and R,d(t) = -- V,(tt). Here a denotes the state 
a.ble, i the state disabled (mvahd),  and d the state dead. 
According to (3.1), surplus accumulates at the rates 
= (z l3 -da( t ) -Aa( t ) )  V , ( t )+da( t )  V~(t), 
and 
y, ( t )  = A3  V , ( t )+ Av( t )  R,d(t  ) 
= (z l~- - ,~v( t ) )  V,(t) 
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during stays m the states able and disabled, respectively. Here A6 = 60_6, 
Lla(t) = a ( t ) - i t ° ( t ) ,  zla(t) = a ( t ) -a° ( t ) ,  and zlv(t) = v ( t ) -v° ( t ) .  Hence, 
the present values at time 0 of the total accumulated surpluses are 
(5 3) /'.(n) = I" 
o 
(5.4) F,(n) = I"  
o 
and 
exp ( -6°  s) sp °~ ?o(s) ds, 
exp ( -  3°s) sp°, ~' ?, (s ) ds , 
(5.5) r (n)  = Fo (n) + r,  (n), 
cf. (3 2). Here, sp~ °'a and spa °a' are second order values of ~p~a nd ~p~', 
respectwely. The corresponding possible terminal bonuses T,(n), T,(n), and 
T(n) are given by (4.2) and (4.3). 
We have in Table 2 shown examples of (5.3)-(5.5) for policies with 
x+n = 65 and x+m = 60. Moreover, it is assumed m these examples that 
0j = 0 7, 02 = 0.8, and 0 3 = I which are close to what currently is used by 
many Danish compames. The figures illustrate clearly the size of the surplus 
inherent m the policies. Take as an example the pohcy issued at age 30. Here 
the actuarial present value of the total surplus ~s 0.144 compared with the total 
value of the premium payments zc 6~-1 which equals 0.423. The surplus might 
be &strlbuted through the terminal dividends given m Table 2. However, it is 
hard to argue that only paying 2 13 and 5 12 to the hves that are able and 
disabled at age 65 is an equitable way of distributing the profit. It Is also 
difficult to justify that large amounts hould be paid to the &sabled lives who 
have already collected benefits under the terms of the policy 
Table 3 shows for the example x = 30 the possible benefits if the surplus is 
used to continuously increase the benefits. We have shown the rates of surplus 
accumulation 7~* (t) and y,* (t), cf. (4.5), together with 1 + D, (t) and 1 + D, (t), 
respectively. Here 1 + Da(t) is the basic disablhty annuity that becomes payable 
if dlsabihty occurs at t~me t This quanuty and 7~*(t) have been calculated 
assuming that the pohcy has remained xn the state able during [0, t). Similarly, 
TABLE 2 
EXAMPLES OF PRESENT VALUES Ol" ACCUMULATED SURPLUSES AND POSSIBLE TERMINAL BONUSES FOR 
VARIOUS DISABILITY POLICIES WITH 0 = (0 7, 0 8, 1) 
]SSLIC 1000 rr Fa(n ) F, (n) F (n) T.(# O T, (n) T (H) age 
20 190 0086 0037 0123 397 929 565 
30 268 0101 0043 0 144 2 13 5 12 303 
40 408 0 110 0049 0159 I 05 277 I 51 
50 65 5 0 103 0040 0 143 043 I 13 060 
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TABLE 3 
RATES OF SURPLUS ACCUMULATION AND SIZE OF INCREASED BENEFITS 
AGE AT ISSUE X = 30 AND 0 = (0 7, 0 8, l )  
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Age 
x + t 7~*(t) 7,* (t) I + Oa( t )  I + O, ( t )  
30 0 002 0 560 1 00 I 00 
40 0012 0654 I 14 1 39 
50 0 029 0 655 1 51 l 93 
60 0045 0 381 2 68 2 69 
61 0 044 0 324 2 97 2 78 
62 0 041 0 258 3 38 2.87 
63 0 036 0 183 4 02 2 97 
64 0 027 0 098 5 38 3 07 
64 5 0 019 0 050 7 17 3 12 
65 0 0 oo 3 17 
1 + D,(t) IS the annuity payable at time t and 7,* (t) measures the rate of surplus 
accumulation, provided that the insured became disabled just after time 0. It Is 
interesting to note that (4.7) leads to 
D,(t) = q,(s) exp r,(u) du ds = exp r , (u)du - 1 
0 s 0 
with q,(s)= y,(s)/SP,(s)= A6-Av( t ) ,  SP , ( t )= ~(t) ,  and r , (u)= q,(u). 
Hence, D,(t) is m general easy to compute, and m the example in Table 3 
AT(t) = 0, so 1 +D,( t )  = exp (A6 t), cf. (5.2). 
It is interesting to note that l+Da( t )  and l+D,( t )  increase at different 
rates In particular, the sharp increase in I + Do(t ) close to maturity should be 
noted. Actually, it is easily seen that l+D~(t ) - ,  ~ as t---~ n. It may be 
explained by the fact that close to maturity, the surplus is of the size O(h), 
h = n - t ,  whereas the price of providing additional benefits is 
ri~'+ t ~ = O(h2). In practice, these excessive benefits should, of course, be 
avoided, and it may be achieved by shifting to a system with cash or deferred 
bonuses when the policy approaches maturity. 
In Table 3, 1 +D,(t) yields the annuity at time t if the disability occurred at 
time 0. However, if disability occurs at some later time, say t,, then it follows 
from (4.7) that the benefit at time t _> t, is given by 
(S )  1 +ZS,(t) = (l +D.(t ,))  exp r,(u)du 
Ij 
= (1 +Da(t,) ) (1 + D,(t))/(l + D,(t , ) ) .  
Thus, if for example dlsablhty occurs at age 40, then the initial annuity Is 1 14, 
which after 10 years of &sabihty will have risen to (1.14)(1.93)/1.39 = 1.58. It 
illustrates that the benefits while disabled depend on the duration of the 
disability. 
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TABLE 4 
EXAMPLES OF DISABILITY ANNUITIES | + D,(1) IN THE SITUATIONS WHERE 0 3 = | ,  2 AND 5 
AGE AT ISSUE x = 30 AND (01,02) = (0 7,0 8) 
Age 03 = 1 03 = 2 0~ = 5 
x+t  
30 1 00 1 00 I 00 
40 1 39 I 42 I 52 
50 I 93 2 07 2 53 
60 2 69 3 18 5 27 
65 3 17 4 II 901 
TABLE 5 
PRESENT VALUES or  ACCUMULATED SURPLUSES FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF 0 
AGE AT ISSUE .~ = 30 
0 = (0~, 02,03) /'o(n) .r,(n) r(n) 
(0 7, 0 8, 1) 0 101 0 043 0 144 
(07, I, I) 0051 0054 0 104 
(0 7, 1, 2) 0 051 0 062 0 113 
(07, 1, 5) 0051 0085 0 136 
(0 7, 1, 10) 0 051 0 112 0 163 
We have also shown in Table 4 the kind of &sabihty annumes that can be 
offered if it is further taken into account that disabled lives often have a much 
higher mortahty than able hves. We have shown examples of l+D, ( t )  in the 
situanons where 03 = 1, 2, and 5 Otherwise, the assumptions are the same as 
in Table 3. It is clear that substantial mortality gains on the &sabled lives 
might be used to increase the disablhty benefits further 
However, in some cases mortahty gains on disabled lives would rather be 
used to offset unsatisfactory disabdity experience among able lives. In this way 
all get a share of the " favourab le"  mortality among dxsabled lives. To give an 
impression of to what extent an unfavourable value of 02 can be offset by a 
favourable value of 03, we have shown m Table 5 some examples where 
02 = 0.8 and 1, and where 03 = 1,2, 5, and 10. Hence, taking 
0 = (0t, 02, 03) = (0.7, 0.8, 1) as our basis, it is seen that even 03 = 5 is not 
suffioent to ehmmate the overall effect of 02 = 1, whereas 03 = 10 more than 
compensates for the effect of 02 = 1 
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CREDIBIL ITY MODELS WITH TIME-VARYING 
TREND COMPONENTS 
BY JOHANNES LEDOLTER, STUART KLUGMAN, CHANG-SOO LEE 
ABSTRACT 
Traditional credibdlty models have treated the process generating the losses as 
stable over time, perhaps with a deterministic trend imposed. However, there is 
ample evidence that these processes are not stable over time. What is required 
is a method that allows for time-varying parameters in the process, yet still 
provides the shrinkage needed for sound ratemaking. In this paper we use an 
automobile insurance xample to illustrate how this can be accomplished 
KEYWORDS 
Crediblhty ; Kalman filter; shrinkage stimation; time series; trend components. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of any ratemakmg process is to estimate future claims on the basis of 
prior experience. The experience will be available for many groups over several 
time periods. It has been long known (MoWBRAY, 1914) that both statistical 
and business optimality is achieved by first estimating a rate for each group 
and then reducing the large values and Increasing the small ones. Tra&tlonally 
(e.g., BOHLMANN and STRAUB, 1972) the lmtlal estimates are sample means. 
Others (e.g. HACHEMEISTER, 1975) have recommended eterministic trend 
factors. Most all approaches that are currently used assume that the time series 
observations from a single group vary independently around a stable mean or 
trend. 
Most time series, however, exhibit time-varying levels as well as autocorre- 
lattons among adJacent observations. The optimal forecasts for such series do 
not assign equal weights to all past observations, but discount he information 
according to their age; older observations get less weight. See Box and 
JENKINS (1976) or ABRAHAM and LEDOLTER (1983) for a thorough discussion. 
Evidence for time-varying parameters was presented for automobde losses by 
BAILEY and SIMON (1959). A problem with most standard time series 
approaches, however, Is that they are designed for making forecasts based on 
single series of relatively long lengths. Typical insurance problems contain 
many (sometimes hundreds) series of short (3-7 years) duration. Because these 
short series are occurring in a common external environment (e.g., of rising 
health care costs, automobile safety improvements, etc.) many of the features 
will be common to all of the series. The ~mportance of both time series and 
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cross-sectional effects has also been noted in two recent econometrics papers by 
GAROA-FERRER et al. (1987) and ZELLNER and HONG (1989) who use 
shnnkage methods to predtct he economic growth rates of several countries 
The purpose of this paper is to bring together a dynamic model for the 
time-varying aspects of the problem and a shrinkage techmque that takes 
account of the multiple group aspect. In Section 2 we rewew the cre&bllity 
model with t~me-invariant parameters. In Section 3 we discuss unlvarlate 
structural t~me-series models w~th time-varying trend and seasonal coefficients 
and we apply the shrinkage approach of Sectmn 2 to the coefficients m the 
structural time series models. The final section illustrates th~s approach on 
actuarial data. 
2. THE STANDARD CREDIBILITY MODEL 
In all of the situations discussed in this paper the data consists of observations 
y[0, i=  l . . . . .  k, t = I . . . . .  n where k is the number of groups under 
consideratmn and n is the number of periods of observatmn. Typmally, each 
value represents the amount paid in claims, divided by some measure of the 
size of the group, P['). The objechve is to forecast he value for a future period, 
y0) for each group. n+l ,  
A linear data generating model for the observations specifies 
(2.1) y[0 = x,~fl(0+e}0 e}0~N(0, a2/pt0)) 
where e} O, for t = 1 . . . . .  n and t = l . . . . .  k, are independent and x,, are p x 1 
known design vectors, usually functions of t. Two well-known models take (1) 
p = 1 and x,t = 1 and (2)p = 2 and _x,t = (l, t)'. The data generating model in 
(1) IS part of a special case of the Biihlmann-Straub model (B~HLMANN and 
STRAUB, 1972); the linear trend in (2) is part of the Hachemeister model 
(HACHEMEISTER, 1975). The factor P[') in (2 1) is a measure of the amount of 
data that produces the observatmn Y,('), which in most actuarial situations is 
an average of many observations. The forecast of ~+;,v(') the observation 
at a future time period, ~s prowded by the estimate of the mean 
E(v(,) , ,÷ ; j  = x,~,+;fl('). 
The standard credlbihty model also assumes that the coeffioents rio), for 
i = l, . . . ,  k, are independent reahzations from a common &stribution. That 
is, 
(2.2) fl(') = b+a (') where a(')~N(p, o'2B). 
Treating this second level distribuuon as a prior &stnbutlon, the Bayes 
shrinkage stimate of,8(') is given by 
(2.3) if(')= Z,t~(')+(I-Z,)b 
where 
(2.4) (z ) 1~(,) = pro ~,,LS,; E P}') ~,t y[O 
t 
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is the weighted least squares estimate in group t, 
(2.5) z,  = B(B+ V,)-', 
and 
(2.6) 
A problem with this solution IS that estimates of the quantities B and b must 
be obtained A commonly accepted approach ~s to use the method of moments 
estimates that have been developed m variance components analysis (see 
SWAMY, 1971). However, there are a number of drawbacks with this approach. 
The estimates of B and Z, are biased and, furthermore, the moment estimate of 
the scaled covariance matrix B need not be non-negatwe definite. These 
drawbacks can be overcome, in part, by either using the Iterative estimation 
approach of DEVYLDER (1981, 1984), or a true Bayes approach instead of an 
empirical Bayes approach. The details of the Bayes anal~is can be found in 
KLUGMAN (1987). DeVylder proposes estimators B and /2 of B and /2 which 
depend wa Z, = B(B+ V,) -~ on the parameter B to be estimated. He suggests 
an iteratwe procedure where 
(2 7) ~ = Z, Z,/~ (0, 
"= Z o, 
t 
/~ = (H+H' ) /23  -2, 
and 
t I 
The iteratwe procedure starts from an initial arbitrary non-negative definite 
symmetric matrix /~0- It stops if, from one iteration to the next, the elements 
in /~ do not change by more than a specified small quantity. 
Remark. We can think of credibility models as cons~siting of two components. 
The first one in equation (2.1) models, for each group separately, the 
generation of the observations for gwen values of the coefficients ,6(0; we refer 
to this as the data generating model. The second component in equation (2.2) 
relates the parameters fl0) in the data generating model across the k groups; we 
refer to this as the shrinkage component As mentioned above, a shortcoming of 
the traditional cre&bdlty model in equations (2.1) and (2 2) is that it does not 
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allow for time-varying coefficients. As a consequence the age of the observa- 
tion does not enter into the analysis. 
3. SHRINKAGE ESTIMATION IN MODELS WITH T IME-VARYING COEFFICIENTS 
3.1. Analysis of a single series 
The following discussion concentrates on a single series (group) and, in order 
to simplify the presentation, we have omitted the group index i. In this paper 
we use structural time series models to incorporate time-varying coeffioents 
into the data generating model. These models (see HARVEY and TODD, 1983; 
HARVEY, 1984) are of the form 
(3.1) Yt = ~ct' f l t+e, ,  e t~N(  O, t72/pt) 
/~t "~- T~t  - l ~-  .P t , .v t ~ N (.O, a 2 A ) . 
As the notation indicates, the et's are  normal and independent with mean zero 
and variance tr2/Pt,  and the vt's are.independent and multivariate normal with 
mean vector zero and covariance matrix a2A.  Furthermore  t and ~,, are 
mutually independent. Actuaries have used models of this type before. DE 
JONG and ZEHNWIRTH (1983), for example, use these models in the credlblhty 
context and show that the data generating equation of traditional credlbdity 
models can be formulated in this form. NEUHAUS (1987) applied this type of 
model to the prediction of number of policies, claim frequency and mean 
severity, and he discussed how to select the appropriate model and how to 
estimate its parameters. A recent apphcation of these models in an insurance 
context is described by HARVEY and FERNANDEZ (1989) who combine a 
structural time series model for the size of claims with a model for the number 
of claims. 
The simplest special case of the model in (3.1) assumes that p = 1, x, = 1 
and T = 1. This model allows the mean level 3, of the series to change over 
time according to a random walk, fit = Bit-~+ vt. The exponentially weighted 
moving average forecasts that arise from th~s model (see ABRAHAM and 
LEDOLTER (1986), for example) are a special case of the recurslve credibility 
model dlscusssed by GERBER and JONES (1975) and ItS generahzatlon by 
SUNDT (1981). If Var(v/ )= 0, implying that the coefficients fit = fl are 
time-mvarmnt, then this model simplifies to the data generating equation of the 
Biihlmann-Straub model. 
Another speclal case of interest is the model with a time-varying linear trend 
component where 
(3.2) x ,= I0 l ,  f i t=  F f l ° ' l  T= I~ 11 and A = [20' 0 1 
" k/~ ,_1 1 ~2 
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This model allows the slope fl~t = fl~,r-J +v2~ and the intercept 
f l0t  = fl0. t - I+f l l ,  t - I  + Vlt to  change over tame. With 21 = 22 = 0 the model in 
(3.1) reduces to the data generating equataon of the Hachemeister model. 
I f  quarterly or monthly data are analyzed, it may be necessary to incorporate 
a seasonal component. A model with 
-1- -P0, 1 
0 /~,, 
(3.3) x, = 1 , ,fir = Y, ., T= 
0 7I- I  
0 7t-2 _j 
-1 1 0 0 0-  
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 - l  -1  -1  
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
-Plt] 
V2t /
vz = v3, [  and A = 
-21 0 0 0 0 -  
0 22 0 0 0 
0 0 23 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
can be used for quarterly data. The first two components in fit correspond to 
level and slope at time t. The last three components offl ,  correspond to addltwe 
seasonal factors. If the 2's are zero, the model reduces to the Hachemeister 
linear trend model with seasonal indicators 
The reference in structural tame series models (3.1) as discussed in HARVEY 
and TODD (1983). The standard Kalman filter updating equations (see, for 
example, JAZWINSKI, 1970; MEINHOLD and SINGPURWALLA, 1983) are used to 
obtain fl,~,, the esumate of,8,, that is based on the observations Yj, Y2, . . . ,  yn. 
Furthermore, one can 6btam its covarlance matrix a 2G,,I., predict 
future coefficients fin+; from ~,,+,,, = T '~, , . ,  and future observations Y,,+t 
from Y . ( I )=  x, ' ,+;T ' f l , i , .  
Starting values are needed to anitaahze the Kalman filter recursions 
(3.4) ~/,,_, = T~,_,,,_, 
= + 
Gtt - I  = TGz- t l t - I  T '+A 
G m = Gm_ l -k ,x /Gm_ I 
k ,  = G, r_16~(x /G , i , _ lx r+PZI )  - I  
For a single series an (3 1) we start these recursions with a p x 1 vector of zeros 
for ~010 and a diagonal matrix with very large diagonal elements for Go 0- This 
78 JOHANNES LEDOLTER, STUART KLUGMAN, CHANG-SO0 LEE 
non-informative mltlalizahon reflects our ignorance about starting values in the 
absence of prior data. Other initialization approaches are possible (ANSLEY 
and KOHN, 1985; KOHN and ANSLEY, 1986, DEJONG, 1988), and their 
relationships are discussed in LEDOLTER, KLUGMAN and LEE (1989). 
With a non-lnformatwe prior distribution the Kalman filter estimate /~n,n 
is an unbiased estimator of the coefficient at time n, fin- The estimate is a 
weighted average of the n past observations. In general, older observations 
receive less weight if there is evidence that the coefficients are time-changing. 
The Kalman filter updating equations, and therefore the estimate flnln and 
the forecast Yn(l), depend on the variance ratios A in equation (3 I). These 
parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function 
of o .2 and A is obtained from the prediction error decomposition 
(SCHWEPPE, 1965). Assuming a non-informative initialization the log-hkehhood 
function can be written as 
n-p  l 
(3.5) l(a 2, A ; data) = c . . . .  log a 2 - log f,  
2 2 ,=p+t 
_1  ~ (y t_x /~, l t _ l )2 / f t  ' 
20 .2 t-p+l 
where Y,-~c,'l~tl,~ l is the one-step-ahead prediction error at time t, and 0.2f, 
is its variance; fl,i,-I and f,  = P,-I+x,'G,i ,_l~: , can be obtained from the 
Kalman filter recursions The maximization ~s simplified by the fact that one 
can concentrate the log-likelihood function with respect o a2; the numerical 
maximlzahon of the concentrated log-hkehhood l~ (A, data) needs to be carried 
out for elements in A only. 
3.2. Analysis of multiple series and the introduction of shrinkage 
So far we have discussed the analysts of a single series with time-varying 
coefficients. In insurance applications we not only have a single series, but we 
have n observations from k groups, and the estimation of A can be improved 
by incorporating information from the other groups Here we assume that the 
A in the k groups are the same. As the value of n is usually small relative to k, 
it is not possible to estimate separate variance ratios for each series. Assuming 
independence across the k groups we can add the Iog-likehhood functions in 
(3.5) for the k groups and obtain estimates of a common A via numerical 
optimization. An estimate of the varmnce a 2 is obtained from 
(3.6) ~.2 _ 1 Z (Y}')- '~' ~(') e,,~ ,l,- 02If, (') . 
(n -p )k  ,=l ,=p+l 
The estimate of .4 is used to carry out the Kalman filter recursions. This is 
done for each group separately, using a non-reformative mnlallzatlon The 
resulting coefficient estimate ~}/r~ provides us with an estimate of the parameter 
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at time n, fl,~'); ItS covariance matrix is g,ven by a~Gl[~, The estimate is a 
weighted average of  the n observations. The estimate of  A determines the 
weights m this average. Posmve variance ratios in A imply that the importance 
of each observation in determining the estimate depends on ItS age. I f  the 
variance ratios are zero, then the Kalman filter estimates implify to the usual 
regressmn estimates/~(') m equation (2.4). 
So far there has been no shrinkage, as we have ignored the cross-sectional 
correlations. In order to effect shrinkage we introduce a second equation, 
(3.7) fin(') = b~+g ') where a},')~N(O, 17 2 B,). 
This equation specifies that at time n the coefficient vectors in the structural 
time series model for the k groups vary independently around a common value 
b,,. We combine this equation with the results from the k separate Kalman 
filters, 
(3 8) hi,) (,) .-(,) ~v~,)~N(9, a2tz(,)~ P'nln_ = fin~ + ,_vn where , - ,  n ln /  
are Independent across groups These two equations yield the standard 
two-stage credibility model in Sectmn 2. The shrinkage estimate based on (3.7) 
and (3.8) is gwen by 
(3 9) fl,~') = Z,~,~?.+(l-Z,)bn, 
- ~(0 The results m Section 2 can be used where Z, = B. (B. + V,) i and V, = ....i,,- 
to estimate b,, and B..  In our examples we have used deVylder's lteratlve 
approach discussed in Section 2. 
3.3. Discussion 
Adding this second equation to induce shrinkage is somewhat heuristic, but is 
needed as by itself the model in equation (3.1) does not incorporate cross- 
sectional correlations. 
In theory, a cross-correlation structure can be introduced by specifying a 
certain covarlance structure for the error terms in a multivariate version of  the 
model in (3 1) However, it is usually quite difficult to identify the exact form 
of the cross-correlation structure, especially for the short time series which are 
typical with insurance data. We have avoided these modelling issues by 
introducing a heuristic shrinkage equation at the last available observation 
period 
Model-based approaches to shrinkage are clearly possible. One alternative to 
the above heuristic shrinkage approach is a model that introduces a shrinkage 
equation for the coefficient vector at the initml time period zero. That is, one 
assumes that fl0 (') = b o+q(o '), where the q(0 '), for t = 1 . . . .  k, are independent 
realizations fr6m a normal distribution with mean vector zero and covarlance 
matrix a 2 B 0 . This implies that at the initial time period the standard actuarial 
shrinkage model is valid I f  the elements in A are zero, implying that the 
coefficients in the data generating model are tzme-invariant, his model and the 
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traditional credibility model are identical. For time-varying coefficient models 
we start from the standard actuarial shrinkage model at time zero, but assume 
that the coefficients for subsequent periods are subject to stochastic hange. 
For the inference in this model one initmlizes the Kalman filter m each group 
by the same/~'l)0 = b0 and rz0) = Bo treats b0 and B0 as unknown parameters, ~ ~ LJ' 010 , ~ 
and simultaneously obtains esumates of A, .b0 and B 0. This results in shnnkage 
of the Kalman filter estimates/~'~n at time n towards the common initial mean ~ T 
.b0. But even for modest positive values of A this shrinkage ffect disappears 
very qmckly as n increases, and for moderate n there ~s hardly any shrinkage. It 
is for these reasons that we have rejected this alternative approach and have 
concentrated our discussion on the former, somewhat heunsttc procedure. 
Another model that introduces cross-sect~onal correlations is one that 
assumes that the k coefficients at time t, fl['), for i = 1,.. , k, vary indepen- 
dently around a common trend component .bt which itself follows a structural 
time series model. LEE (1991) studies these common-trend type models in 
detail, and we hope to report on this work in a future paper. 
The advantage of our admittedly heuristic method is that it Js more general 
than the tra&tional credibility approach. It recogmzes the fact that most time 
series exhibit changing levels, trends and seasonality, and it discounts prewous 
observations when ~t determines their estimates The difference between the two 
approaches is shown best in the case of the Bfihlmann-Straub model The 
traditional approach shrinks the sample means towards a common average, 
whereas our new approach shrinks exponentially weighted averages. Further- 
more, it can be shown that for A = 0 our approach coincides with the solution 
in Secuon 2. 
4. EXAMPLES 
In this section two examples are given, with the second one being analyzed m 
detail. These examples provide dlustrations of situations m which models that 
combine time-varying and shrinkage aspects are likely to improve the 
results 
4.1. Worker's compensation 
MEYERS (1984) studies yearly loss ratios under Worker's compensation i sur- 
ance for 319 classes (occupation groups) and three years A model without 
trend component is appropriate since these data are already adjusted for 
inflation Meyers uses the Buhlmann-Straub model m his analysis However. 
MEYERS and SCHENKER (1983) provide evidence that the loss ratios are not 
constant, but vary independently from year to year around a common mean In 
the notation of our present paper 
(4 I) ~',= I l l  ' fl'=- Lfl~ F l°tl',j T= I~ 11 l '  and A = I~' ~ l '  
CREDIBILITY MODELS WITH TIME-VARYING TREND COMPONENTS 81 
where ,Bit is an unchanging long-term average and ~0t is the level in year t. An 
approach that combines this state-space model with shr inkage can be expected 
to improve the forecasts for future losses, as many of  the 319 classes have very 
small sample sizes. 
4.2. Automobile bodily injury 
The data for the second example are taken from the automobi le  insurance 
industry Quarter ly data on the amount  (not adjusted for inflation) paid under 
the bodi ly injury component  of  automobi le  insurance policies (LOSS) and the 
number of  cars covered by these pohcies (EXPOSURE)  were obtained from 
31 states. Only states without no-fault  laws were included, as under no-fault  
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FIGURE I Multiple time series plot of the ratio R = LOSS/EXPOSURE 
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laws many claims that would otherwise be covered by the habllity portion of 
the insurance are paid under the bodily ln lury component. Data from the first 
quarter of 1983 to the second quarter of 1988 (n = 22) are used m our 
analysIs. 
The ratio R~ '~ = LOSS}')/EXPOSURE~ '), where t = 1 . . . .  22 (quarters) and 
i = 1, .., 31 (states) is our dependent variable that needs to be predicted The 
multiple ume series plot of the rattos RI o in Figure 1 shows presence of 
seasonality and a need for a logarithmic transformation. The presence of 
seasonahty is seen more clearly in Figure 2 where we have plotted esumates of 
the multiphcattve seasonal indices for the 31 states. We use the followmg 
procedure to obtain the seasonal indices. For each univariate series we 
calculate centered yearly moving averages to estimate the trend component; we 
then obtain, for each time period t, an estimate of the seasonal factor from the 
ratio of the observation and the corresponding centered moving average, next, 
we average the seasonal factors for each quarter to obtain seasonal in&ces for 
the four quarters; finally, we normalize these indices so that they sum to four. 
The dot plot of these normahzed seasonal indices m Figure 2 shows a seasonal 
pattern; in the fourth quarter the rattos R} ') tend to be highest 
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FIGURE 2 Dot plot of the seasonal radices for the 31 states 
A multzple time series plot of the transformed observations, Yt (') = log R~ '), 
is given m Ftgure 3. This plot in&cates that a hnear trend model with addttive 
seasonal components provides a good description of the transformed observa- 
tions. 
In the standard actuarial model tt ts usually assumed that the variance of the 
error component ts related to the exposure p0); that is, Var (e~ ')) = a2/P, ~') We 
now want to check whether this ts a reasonable assumption. Since the 
exposures PI ') do not change much over time, we calculate an average xposure 
fi~') for each state Due to size differences among the states, these averages are 
quite different. Next, we adjust each time series Y~') for trend and seasonahty 
and calculate an estimate of tts variance. The restduals from a regression of y I,) 
on time t and additive seasonal indicators are used to calculate the variance 
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FIGURE 3 Mult iple time serms plot of Y = log(LOSS/EXPOSURE)  
estimate. In Figure 4 we plot the resulting mean square errors against the 
reciprocal of the average exposures. The linear relationship confirms that 
Var (el ')) = a2/P} ') is a reasonable assumption 
Based on this preliminary analysis we are led to consider the structural time 
series model with a linear trend and additive seasonal components, 
(4.2) Y[') = xt'flt(')+e} ') e~')~N(O, trZ/P~ ')) 
o) 
~ ~ j to t _  1 --  
where ~:,, T and A are given in equatton (3.3). Our model allows for 
time-varying coefficients and reduces to a hnear trend regression model with 
quarterly indicators xf 2t = 22 = 23 = 0. 
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FIGURE 4 Plot of the mean square error ~om the linear trend regression with seasonal indicators 
against he reciprocal of  average xposure, k = 31 states 
The maximum hkehhood estimation approach in Section 3 is applied and, 
assuming independent groups, estimates of t72 and the three variance ratios are 
obtained It is found that 62 = 3.8089* l0 -3, 21 = 0.0495, 22 = 0.0044 and 
~-3 = 0.00008. The e snmate 23 is close to zero and the log-hkehhood eficiency 
(ratio), lc(~.~,~.2, A3)-lc(AI, ~.2,0), IS quite small. This implies that the 
seasonal coefficients do not change much over time. Contours of the log- 
hkehhood function of 21 and 22, for ~-3 = 0.00008, are,plotted m Figure 5 
This plot, as well as the large log-hkehhood eficiency 1c(21,2 z, 0) - lc(0,  0, 0) 
= 19.16, shows that a standard least squares approach which assumes time 
constant intercept and slope coefficients would be ,nappropriate 
In order to check the adequacy of the structural time series model in 
equation (4.2) we calculated the standardized one-step-ahead forecast errors for 
periods 6 through 22. Standard,zauon of the forecast error by its standard 
error 6./', ~/z assures that its variance does not depend on time. We found that 
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FIGURE 5 Contour  plot of the concentrated Iog-l ,kehhood function The variance ratio that 
determines the vanablhty  in the seasonal component  is set at its estimate ).3 = 0 00008 Probabi l i ty 
coverage of the contours ~s obtained from the Chl-square approx~mat,on 
the standardized one-step-ahead forecast errors were serially uncorrelated for 
essentially all 31 groups^ 
The estlmates of 21 22 and ~-3 are used to calculate the estimates h(,) for , I Jn ]n ,  
n = 22 (the last available time period) and z = l, . . . ,  3l (states). Dot diagrams 
of the k = 31 esttmates of intercept, slope and seasonal coefficients (only the 
first one is shown), together wzth their standard errors, are given zn Figure 6. 
The standard errors are obtained from the diagonal elements m 62"=(° "-~' n Ln - 
We notice considerable varmbthty among the k = 31 intercept estimates. 
Furthermore, we find that the between group vartablhty is much larger than 
the uncertainty that is assocmted wzth each estimate (that is, the within group 
varmbflity as measured by the standard error of the esttmate). This result 
indzcates that there should be no or httle benefit to shrink the intercept 
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FIGURfi 6 Dot plots of the estimates and their standard errors for the intercept, slope, and seasonal 
coefficaents m model (4 2), k = 31 states 
esUmates. The dot plots of the slope estamates and thear standard errors show a 
different pacture; the wathm group varmbahty as qmte large when compared 
wath the variabdity between the slope esttmates. These pictures suggest hat 
shrinkage procedures should pool the slope estimates towards a common value. 
The same conclusion is reached for the seasonal factors (the third, fourth and 
fifth component of the beta vector). They, too, should be shrunk towards 
common means. 
Next, we apply shrinkage and calculate the shrinkage stamate dascussed m 
equation (3.9) of Sectaon 3. That is, we compute 
(4.3) klt~ = 97/~(,) +(l-Z,)b,, ~. --t cn .  ~ 
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where Z, = B. (B .+ V,) -t and V, = G~'i ).  DeVylder's modification in (2.7) is 
used to esttmate b. and B.. The only minor difference is that we are using the 
maximum hkelihood estimate 62 -- 3.8089 * 10 -3 from the Kalman filter as the 
esUmate of a 2 In Ftgure 7 we compare the esumates before and after 
shrmkage. The graphs confirm what we had antictpated From the results in 
Figure 6. The slopes and seasonal components are shrunk towards thetr 
respective means, whereas the intercepts are essentially unchanged. 
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FIGURE 7 Intercept, slope and first seasonal coefficient estimate m model (4 2) before and after 
shrinkage, k = 31 states 
Forecast comparisons 
The pre&ction of future values ~s a major reason for fitting models to data. We 
must now mvestlgate whether the proposed new approach leads to forecast 
improvements In particular, we address the following two questions' 
(1) Has shrmkage of the coeffictents improved the forecasting performance of 
our rime-varying trend component model9 To address this issue we 
compare forecasts that are calculated from the shrinkage estimates ~,}') in 
(4.3) [method 1] and forecasts that are calculated from the standard 
Kalman filter esUmates 1~}[,~ [method 2]. 
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(2) Has our generalization of incorporating ttme-varying trend components 
helped the forecastmg? To investigate this question we compare the 
forecasts that use the shrinkage estimates ff,~') m (4.3) [method 1] wtth 
forecasts that are calculated from the shrinkage esttmates in the standard 
regresston model with constant hnear trend and seasonal indtcators [Hache- 
metster, method 3]. 
A true test of the forecast performance of a model is obtamed by an 
out-of-sample comparison of forecasts and actual observations. Here we use 
the last four observations RC~)9 through R~,  for t = 1, . , 31, as our hold-out 
sample. Thm is a reasonable choice as actuarial practice bases predictions of 
future premiums on about four to five years of past data. For each state we 
calculate four one-s[ep-ahead forecast errors Rt - / ? , _~( l ) ,  t=  19 . . . . .  22, 
where /? t(l) = exp [Yt(l)] ts obtained by applying the Averse transformation 
to the forecast of the logarithmtcally transformed data For each state 
separately, we then compute the mean square error MSE, the mean absolute 
devtation (error) MAD, and the mean absolute percent error MAPE For each 
measure (MSE, MAD, MAPE) and for each method (methods I through 3) we 
calculate a weighted average that combines the mformatlon from the 31 states 
The average xposures p0), t = 1 . . . . .  31, are used as weights. The results are 
given m Table 1. Table 1 also shows the results of a further refinement of 
method 1 (Kalman filter with shrinkage). In method 1R we shrmk the last 
4 components of the 5-dimensional coefficient vectors, but leave the first 
components (intercepts) unchanged 
TABLE I 
WEIGHTED AVERAGES OF ACCURACY MEASURES AVERAGE EXPOSURES ARE USED TO COMBINE 
THE INFORMATION FROM k = 31 STATES 
Method 1 
Kalman filter model 
(4 2) with shnnkage 
1 IR  
Method 2 
Kalman filter model 
(4 2) without shrmkage 
Method 3 
Hachemelster 
constant linear trend 
& seasonal mdlcator 
model with shrinkage 
MSE 32 28 31 88 39 24 38 02 
MAD 3 75 3 70 4 20 4 32 
MAPE 5 12 4 99 5 35 5 40 
In addition to the comparison of the aggregate measures, we compare the 
measures for each state separately. We asstgn a score of 1 if in state ~ the first 
method leads to a lower MSE (MAD, MAPE) than the second. The proportion 
of states where method I outperforms method 2 (method 3) is gwen in 
Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
PROPORTION OF STATES WHERE ONE METHOD OUTPERFORMS THE OTHER 
89 
Compar ison MSE MAD MAPE 
Method 1 vs Method 2 58 55 58 
Method 1 R vs Method 2 71 65 61 
Method 1 vs Method 3 61 58 61 
Method I R vs Method 3 65 55 55 
Method 2 vs Method 3 55 52 55 
Method I R vs Method 1 52 48 52 
Comments. (i) For shrinkage methods we calculate the forecasts Y,(I) after 
shrinkmg the estimates that are obtained at hme t. We carry out a new 
shrinkage if we go to another forecast origin. (ii) The Kalman filter methods 1 
and 2 reqmre estimates of the variance ratios 21,22 and 23. In order to avoid 
the numerical maximization of the log-likelihood for each forecast origin t, we 
use the estimates that are obtained from the complete data set (n = 22). 
(m) The transformation /~, ( l )= exp[Y,(l)] results in the median of the 
pre&ctlve distribution of Rt+t. The mean of the predictive distribution can be 
obtained by incorporating the variance of the predictive distribution into the 
inverse transformation (see GRANGER and NEWBOLD, 1976). Because differ- 
ences are usually relatively minor and because ~t is not obvious whether the 
mean of the posterior distribution is preferable to the median we have not 
pursued this adjustment. 
Interpretation of results 
Table I shows that we can improve the one-step-ahead forecast performance if 
we allow the trend and the seasonal components to change over ttme. 
Comparmg the results of the two shrinkage methods (methods l and 3) we find 
that the structural time series model in (4 2) leads to a 15.1. (16.1), 13 2 (14.4), 
and 5.2 (7.6) percent reduction in MSE, MAD, and MAPE, when tt is 
compared to the Hachemeister model with fixed trend and seasonal compo- 
nents. The numbers m parentheses reflect the improvements ff shrinkage ~s not 
applied to the intercepts in the structural time series model. Table 2 leads to a 
similar conclusion. The one-step-ahead forecasts from the structural time series 
model with shnnkage outperform the forecasts from the Hacheme~ster model 
in roughly 60 percent of the states (the proportion varies from 55 to 65 percent, 
depending on the accuracy measure that is used m the comparison). 
Tables l and 2 also show that shrinkage of the coefficients improves the 
forecasts in the structural time series model (4 2) The size of the Improvements 
that are due to shrinkage (method 1 vs method 2) is roughly the same as the 
one we obtain by allowing the trend and seasonal coefficients in the two 
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shrinkage methods to change over time (method I vs method 3) There is very 
httle difference between the forecasts from the structural time series model 
without shrinkage and the Hachemeister shrinkage model with fixed trend and 
seasonal coefficients (method 2 vs method 3). 
This example shows the feaslbthty of an approach that applies shrinkage to 
the coefficient estimates in structural time series models and illustrates its 
potential for forecast improvements GARCIA-FERRER et al. (1987) and 
ZELLNER and HONG (1989) reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of 
macroeconomic data. They find that individual country growth rate forecasts 
are improved by shrinking the forecasts to a common average However, their 
shrinkage methods are somewhat different from the ones considered in this 
paper. Furthermore, they apply shrinkage primarily to forecasts and not to 
estimates in time-varying coefficient models. 
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A SIMPLE PARAMETRIC MODEL FOR RATING AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE OR ESTIMATING IBNR CLAIMS RESERVES 
BY THOMAS MACK 
Munich Re, Mumch, FRG 
ABSTRACT 
It is shown that there ~s a connection between rating in automobile Insurance 
and the estimation of IBNR claims amounts because automobile insurance 
tariffs are mostly cross-classified by at least two variables (e.g. territory and 
driver class) and IBNR claims run-off triangles are always cross-classified by 
the two variables accident year and development year. Therefore, by translat- 
ing the most well-known automobile rating methods into the claims reserving 
situation, some known and some unknown claims reserving methods are 
obtained For instance, the automobile rating method of BAILEY and SIMON 
produces a new claims reserving method, whereas the model leading to the 
rating method called "marginal totals" produces the well-known IBNR claims 
estimation method called "chain ladder". A drawback of th~s model is the fact 
that it is designed for the number of claims and not for the total claims amount 
for which it is usually applied. 
As an alternative for both, rating and claims reserving, we describe a simple 
but realistic parametric model for the total claims amount which is based on 
the Gamma &stribution and has the advantage of providing the possibility of 
assessing the goodness-of-fit and calculating the estimation error. This method 
is not very well known in automobde insurance--although a satisfactory 
application is reported--and seems to be completely unknown In the field of 
claims reserving, although its execution is nearly as simple as that of the chain 
ladder method. 
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Cross-classified ata; (automobde & property) ratemaklng; IBNR claims; 
Gamma model; maximum hkehhood method. 
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1. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF SOME AUTOMOBILE RATING METHODS 
In the automobile insurance tariffs of many countries several tariff variables 
are used, e.g the horse-power class of the car, the bonus/malus (or no claams 
discount) class of the driver or the class of the territory where the car is 
prlnciplally garaged. In this way the portfolio of automobile insurance policies 
is cross-classified into a number of cells whach are each supposed to be 
homogeneous, o that all pohcies of the same cell pay the same premium. For 
the sake of slmphclty we wall consider m the following only two tariff variables, 
which are subdivided into m and n classes respectively. When then have mn 
cells labelled ( i , j ) ,  t = 1 . . . . .  m, j  = 1 . . . . .  n. Now let n,j be the known number 
of msureds (policy years) of cell ( t , j )  and s U thear observed total claims amount 
as realization of the random variable S~. For some of the cells, n~ may be so 
small that it IS not advisable to use s,j as the only basas for the calculation of 
the net premium E(Sv) /n  Y of that cell. Therefore one searches for marginal 
parameters x,, i = 1 . . . .  m, and y j , j  = 1, . . . ,  n, with 
either x, yj  = E (Sv) /n  v (multiphcative approach), 
or x ,+y j  = E(S~) /n~ (additive approach). 
Thas also reduces the number of figures needed to describe the tariff premiums 
from mn to m+n.  In the following we only consider the multlphcatwe 
approach, but the methods described can easily be translated to the addltwe 
approach, too. 
The problem of finding appropriate marginal parameters x, and yj Is one of 
the classical problems of insurance mathematics It has been known for a long 
tame that the sample marginal averages 
Xt ~- St + /tilt+ 
yj = (s+j /n  +j)/(s+ +/n+ +) 
(where a '+ '  indicates summation over the corresponding index) give a 
satisfactory approximation of E(S, j ) /n, j  only If the taraff variables are indepen- 
dent. But generally this ~s not the case. Therefore, in the last 30 years several 
different methods have been proposed. We will now shortly rewew three of the 
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most well-known mainly following the description gwen by VAN 
EEGHEN/GREuP/NussEN (1983) For a more comprehensive and more recent 
comparative analysis see JEE (1989) 
The first breakthrough was achieved by BAILEY/SIMON (1960), who esti- 
mated x,, y: by mimmlzing 
Q= ~ ~ (stj-nvx,yj)2/(nvx,Y:) 
I=l J=l 
t=l J=l 
but their underlying assumption of Q having (up to a factor) the distribution of 
a chi-square will normally not be true (see VAN EEGHEN/GREUP/NIJSSEN 1983) 
Moreover, it can be shown (VAN EEGHEN/NIJSSEN/RUYGT 1982) that for the 
minimizing parameters x,, yj the mequalmes 
nqx, yy >_ ~ S~, t= l  . . . . .  m, 
j= l  j= l  
,l,jx,yj ~ ~ 59, J= l . . . .  Pl, 
t~l t--I 
hold, l e. there results an overest~matlon f all marginal oss amounts (m the 
multlphcatwe case only). 
Therefore BAILEY (1963) and later JUNG (1968) proposed estimating x,,)5 
directly from the intumvely appeahng conditions 
(la) 
and 
(Ib) 
nluxty J ---- ~ s~1, 
j= l  ./=1 
i = ] ,  . , m,  
nvx,y j = ~ sv, j=  1 . . . . .  n, 
t=l 1=1 
which can be solved iteratively: starting with, for example, yj = 1, (la) results 
in x, = s,+/n,+, which is inserted in (Ib) giving new .35 etc The procedure 
converges quickly. This method has been called "marginal totals" If the 
random variables Su denote the number of claims instead of the total clmms 
amount, then this method can be shown to be maximum likelihood under the 
assumption that all S,j are independent and Po~sson distributed with parameter 
%x, yj (see VAN EEGHEN/GREUP/NIJSSEN 1983, p. 93). But for the more 
important case where Sv is the total clmms amount one has no model from 
which the equauons above derive and thus, for example, a staust~cal test of the 
goodness-of-fit cannot be designed esther 
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SANT (1980) proposed estimating x,,yj by the method of weighted least 
squares, i.e. by minimizing 
~ (sv-nux,yj)2/nv = ~ ~ nu(sv/nu-x, Yj) 2 
t= l  j= l  t= l  j=l 
But the powerful tools of regression analys~s like the R 2- statistic, the analysis 
of residuals and the estimation of the pre&ctlon error can only be applied 
rigorously if all S v are normally distributed with Var (S~) proportional to n~. 
Both assumptions are not very realistic. 
Using the additive approach, the weighted least squares method leads to the 
same equations for the marginal parameters x,,yj as the marginal totals 
method, which in this case is no longer the maximum hkehhood estimator for 
Polsson distributed numbers of claims. 
Altogether, in the case of S v being claims totals all three methods described 
above are only of a heuristic nature without an underlying realistic model. 
2. SOME METHODS OF  EST IMATING IBNR CLAIMS RESERVES 
AND THEIR  CONNECTION TO AUTOMOBILE  RAT ING METHODS 
We now turn to the problem of estimating IBNR claims reserves. For an overview 
see VAN EEGHEN (1981) or TAYLOR (1986). Here s,j and S,j respectively--we 
intentionally use the same symbols as before--denote the inflation-adjusted 
total amount of payments made In development year j , j  = 1 .... .  n, for 
accidents occurred in accident year z, i = 1, . . . ,  m If one works with incurred 
amounts, sv and S,j denote the total amount of changes In valuation made in 
development year j on behalf of claims of accident year i. Working with 
incremental amounts we may assume that all S,j are independent Typically, 
one has n = m and sy is known for all i+j _< m+ 1 (run-off triangle), and one 
is interested in estimating E(S,j) for t+J > m+ 1. The known measure of 
exposure n,j here normally only depends on the accident year t, i.e. n,j = n, 
(number of policies or number of claims reported in the first development year) 
or is even ignored (i.e. nv = I for all i,j). 
One of the most important ways of treating the IBNR problem is to assume 
a multiphcative structure of the type 
E(S,j) = x, yj 
and to estimate the parameters x,, yj from the triangle of known data. This 
way was used, for example, by DE VYLDER (1978), who estimated x,,yj by 
minimizing 
(s,~- x,yj)  2 
l,J 
(where the summation is for all i,j where s• is known). This is exactly the same 
method as was used by SANT (1980) in the context of automobile insurance if 
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one puts all n v = 1 there. Analogously each method which estimates the 
marginal parameters x,, yj for cross-classified automobile insurance data can 
also be translated mto a method for estimating the IBNR claims reserve. One 
only must take the different pattern of known data (triangle instead of 
rectangle) into account 
Let us consider as further example the method of marginal totals. 
Again working with n = m and n v = 1, we get the conditions 
(H,) E x, yj : E su' i :  1 . . . . .  m,  
J J 
(Vj) E x, yj = E s's' j = 1, . . ,m,  
i i 
where the summation iS for those indices where the corresponding su are 
known (i.e. in the case of a full triangle j runs from 1 to m+ 1 - t  and i from 
1 to re+l - j ) .  The same equations are also obtained if one derives the 
maximum hkehhood equations in the Polsson case. 
Because of the triangular structure, the above equations can here be solved 
recurslvely : We start with the general observation that the solution of thts type 
of problem is only unique up to a multiphcatlve constant c # 0 because if x,, yj 
is a solution, x, c, yflc is a solution as well. Therefore, without loss of generality 
we can put y l+ .. +Ym = I. Then using equation (HI) we have xt = st+. 
From equation (Vm) we get y,, = sl , , /x l .  Then (H2) yields x2, (Vm-O yields 
Ym-  I e tc .  
But it is also possible to derive a direct formula for the unknown mean 
claims amount E(Sv) = x,yj. For h > m+l- t  it can be shown (see KREMER 
1985, p 133-136, or Appendix A where a shorter proof is given) that 
where 
x, yh = Sq " fm+ 2-," fm+ 3-, " ' fh-,"  ( fh -  1) 
J= l  
~-  Sk i  Sk i  , J = 2 ,  . . . , m.  
~. k=l  I= l  /,.-I /=1 
J 
If one reahzes that E skt 
/~  I 
is the accumulated claims amount of accident 
year k known at the end of development year j, one sees that we have just 
obtained the well-known chain ladder method which is thus shown to be the 
same as the marginal totals method for n U = 1 Furthermore, from the 
marginal totals condmons (H,), (V j) one easdy sees that an incorporation 
(analogously to (la) and (lb)) of the known exposure n, into the estimation of 
the IBNR claims reserve can be dispensed with, as n, can be amalgamated with 
the marginal parameter x, (m the multlplicatwe approach only), whereas the 
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apphcation of the chain ladder method to the claims ratios sfj/n, assumes a 
different model. 
It is interesting to note that the analogue of the BAILEY-SIMoN method 
seems to have never been pubhshed as a method for estimating the IBNR 
clmms reserve. 
Another interesting point as the fact that in the context of IBNR clmms 
esnmation only the mulnpllcatwe approach seems to have been used, although 
several applicataons to automobile rating indicate that there the additive 
approach maght give a better fit (see e.g. CHANG/FAIRLEY 1979). A special 
feature of the addmve approach ~s that ~t may lead to neganve values 
E(S,j) = x,+yj. This would make no sense m the ratemaking satuatlon but m 
the case of claims reserving it can be very reahstic (settlement gains) 
Clearly, also xn the context of clmms reserving the least squares method and 
the marginal totals method (and, of course, the BAILEV-SIMOr~ method) could 
be carried through with the additwe approach, too, both producing an 
~dent~cal set of equattons for x,, Y/as has already been mentmned in the sectmn 
on automobde rating 
There is a natural connectton between the multtplicattve and the ad&tive 
approaches because, through the log-transformation, 
stt/n~t ~ x,yj 
becomes 
log (sv/nv) ~ log (x,)+ log (yj). 
This means that an estimate for E(S,j/%) can be established by applying an 
addmve approach to the log-transformed data log (s,/nv) and by transforming 
back the obtained solutmn log (x,), log (yj) using the exponentml functmn. Thas 
was done by CHANG/FAIRLEY (1979) for automobde rating and by KREMER 
(1982) (see also ZEHNWIRTH 1989) for clmms reserving (wath n,j = 1). For the 
solutmn of the transformed (addmve) problem, both used the method of 
(weighted) least squares (here gwmg the same result as the marginal totals 
method) m order to estimate the marginal parameters log (x,), log (yj). 
As ZEHNWlRTH (1989) points out, this procedure contains an Imphcat 
distributional assumptmn: In order to fulfill the conditions of normality and 
homoscedastaclty for the least squares estlmatmn of the parameters log (x,) and 
log (yj), it has to be assumed that log (Sq/n,j) has a normal distnbuhon with 
mean value log (x,)+ log (0~) and a varmnce whach as propomonal to 1/nv Thas 
implies that S,:/n,~ is assumed to have a lognormal distribution. CHANG/FAIR- 
LEY and KREMER dad not take this imphclt dastnhutmnal assumption into 
account Therefore, they systematacally underestamated E(S,j/n,j) as they used 
x, yj = exp (log (x,)+log (yj)), which as the medtan of the lognormal &stnbu- 
non whereas the expected value is x,y, exp (a,j2/2) wath a,~ = Var (log (Su/n,,)). 
As stated above, we have homoscedastlc~ty tf we assume that a,~ = a2/n,j, 
where a 2 can be estamated by 
2 nv(l°g (sv/nv)-log (x, y j ) )Z/ (c -m-n+ 1), 
t.J 
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which is just the expression to be minimized by the least squares method. Here 
c denotes the number of cells where s,j is known. 
Unfortunately, we have lost the multlphcauve structure, as generally 
E(S,j/n,j) = x, yjexp(a,2j/2) cannot be cast into the form E(S , j /n , j )=  ,%~j 
anymore. 
Whereas all the models discussed before have been shown to be only of a 
heuristic nature both in automobile rating and in claims reserving, the 
Iognormal model relies on a parametric assumpUon for S,j, and the instruments 
of regression analysis can be used to check this assumption against the data. In 
the next section another method ~s given which rehes on a reasonable 
distributional model and therefore also allows the application of various 
important and useful staUsUcal tools. This model has two advantages over the 
lognormal model First, it IS not just any model for S,j but can be traced back 
to a micro-model for the total claims amount of each single insured unit and 
can therefore be expected to be realistic. Second, we can choose either the 
mulUphcatlve or the additive structure for E(S,~/n,j), whereas the lognormal 
model yields neither of these structures. 
3. A PARAMETRIC MODEL FOR RATING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE OR 
ESTIMATING IBNR CLAIMS RESERVES 
We use the same notations as before, i e. we have mn cells labelled (t,J), each 
with known measure of exposure n,~ (possibly independent o f j  In the case of 
clmms reserwng) and with total claims amount variable S,j (realization s,j). In 
the case of claims reserving we know the reahzatlons ,j m the run-off mangle 
only. We now assume, following TER BVRG (1980), that the total claims 
amount R,jk of each umt k = 1 . . . . .  n,j of cell (t,J) has a Gamma distribution 
with mean value m,j (independent of k) and shape parameter ~(independent of 
i , j, k) ,  i.e. with probability density function 
f j  (z) = exp ( - ~zlmy) z ~- i (~lmu)~lF(oO 
(here the usual representation of the Gamma density has been reparametr~zed 
m order to Implement he mean value m,j directly as a parameter). Because in 
practice many units k will have a realization r,jk = 0 of R,jk, the shape 
parameter 0¢ has to be conceived of as smaller than 1 m order to attribute a 
high probability to the nelghbourhood of z = 0 (for instance, we have 
prob (R,jk < m,j/10) = 0.79 for ~ = 0.05) Assuming that all n,j umts of cell 
0, J )  are independent, our distributional assumption lmphes that 
S,j = R,j~ + R,j2+ ... also has a Gamma distribution but with mean value n,jm,j 
and shape parameter n~o¢ And this is the dtsmbutlon we shall work with m the 
following, because we usually know only the realizations ,j of S,j and not those 
of R,j~. The assumption that the shape parameter ¢zis the same for the units of 
all cells may seem questionable in some cases But this should be detected by 
testing the goodness-of-fit (see next Section). 
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In the multiphcative approach we assume furthermore that m,j can be 
displayed in the form m,j = x,y j  with unknown parameters x,,yg, whxch we 
shall estimate with the maximum likelihood method. 
Assuming that all S,j are independent, the likelihood function on the basis of 
the realizations saj > 0 is given by 
, x, Ya 
Therefore the loglikelihood function 
- -  ( s , , r ( , , , ,~)  ) .  
x~yj 
IS 
log (L) = 2 {-as,j/(X, Ya)+n,J°~ log (0cs,j) - n,a0c log (x, y j ) - log  (s, jF(nvot)) } 
(where the summation is for all l,j where s,j is known). The maximum 
likelihood estimator are those values x , ,yg ,  ct which maximize L or equiva- 
lently log (L) They are g~ven by the equations 
0 = i3 log (L ) /~x  a = o~ ~ (sv/(~:,2yj) -n, j /x , ) ,  
.I 
i=  1, . . . ,m,  
0 = ~log(L ) /ay j  = c ry '  (s,,l(x,y))-,,,,lyj), s = 1, . ,n ,  
I 
which show that the last condition 8 log(L)/a~x = 0 is not needed for the 
calculation of the likelihood estimator for x , ,y j ,  which can immediately be 
seen to be given by 
f I s,a 
x a -  ~ - - ,  , = 1, . . ,m,  
na+ j yj 
(2) 1 s,~ 
y j -  '~- ' - - ,  j= l  . . . .  n 
H +j  t X t 
These equations have a high intuitive appeal. For, considering the goal of 
approximating % by nvx,  y j ,  we see that this amounts to approximating 
sq/(nqyj)  by x, and therefore the %-weighted mean of a,j/(nvyj), j =- 1, , n, 
should be a reasonable stimator for x, 
Also, equations (2) are not new. They have already been used by VAN 
EEGHEN/NIJSSEN/RUYGT (1982). They call them the "direct method" and 
write (on page 111)' 
"This set of equations are a direct translation of the lntumve calculations 
presented ... by F. K. GREGORmS. In fact, a soluuon is found when lteratively 
calculating the values x, and yj by ineans of the formulae given in (2) by letting 
yj = I (j = l . . . .  n) be the starting value The procedure converges rapidly 
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We may rewrite (2) as 
Z nvx  = Zsv /y~,  
J J 
i = 1, . . . ,m,  
~_~ nvyj  = ~ s, j /x, ,  j = 1 . . . .  n, 
I 1 
which is similar but not equivalent o (la) and (lb). 
As yet, we have not been able to find an argument why a 'satisfactory' 
solution should (approximately) satisfy (2). . .  
The method was more or less developed as a first try and we were surprised to 
see, that, once formalized, it produced practically the same results as the 
method of marginal totals." 
So much for the quotation from VAN EEGHEN/NIJSSEN/RUYGT (1982). 
One year later the Dutch actuaries found an argument for their method 
because the booklet of VAN EEGHEN, GREUP and NIJSSEN (1983) contains on 
page 109 a small hint saying that the assumpUon of a Gamma distribution for 
R,jk would lead to the "direct method".  But there, as in TER BERG (1980), a 
much more general regression model is considered, of which our simple 
cross-clasmfied situation is just a specml case. Moreover, these authors have 
concentrated on ratemaking, whereas we want to emphasize the applicability to 
claims reserving, too. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the likehhoood equations for the 
addmve approach 
Z (s , j / (x ,+Y J )2 -nv / (x ,+Y J ) )  = O, I = l , . . . ,m,  
J 
( s , j / (x ,+y j )2 -nv / (x ,+y j ) )  = O, j = 1 . . . . .  n, 
t 
must be solved with the help of, for example, the NEWTON-RAPHSON numerical 
method. Moreover, these equations are different from those suggested by the 
"direct method"  : 
x, = ~_~ (sv -n , jy ) /n ,+,  t= 1 , . . ,m,  
J 
yj = ~_, ( s , j -%x, ) /n+j .  j = 1 . . . . .  n. 
I 
4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
This parametric approach with a realistic dmtributional assumption enables us 
to use many tools for the statistical analysis, as has been clearly set out by 
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ALBRECHT (1983), who describes the case e = 1 in considerable detail but 
again as a general regression model. Besides the consistent and (asymptotically) 
efficient estimation of the model parameters, we have the possibility of testing 
the significance of the tariff variables with the likelihood ratio test (see 
ALBRECHT (1983) for details), we can calculate the error variances of the 
parameter esUmators and we can check the goodness-of-fit We first consider 
the goodness-of-fit' According to our model, S,j has a Gamma distribution 
with E(S,j) = n~m,j and Var (Su) = 2 n,jmu/ot. The higher the shape parameter 
nv~ of this distribution, the closer it is to the normal distribution If all S,j are 
approximately normally distributed the statistic 
2 (S~- E(Stl)) 2 
,.g Var (Sv) 
- o~ ~ (S'~/(x"O-%)2 
t,j Htj 
=0~ Z n U 1 
I,J Flfj X t y J 
is, under the hypothesis of our model, approximately at chl-square with 
c -m-n  degrees of freedom, where c is the number of cells where s v is 
known 
The special form of this statistic allows its application without having 
estimated cx. For this purpose we fix ~ in such a way that the value of the 
statistic IS just below the (say) 0.95-fractile of the chl-square distribution. If 
using this value of c~ a normality condmon hke "nv0~ > 10" is fulfilled for 
nearly all cells, we may be satisfied with the goodness-of-fit of the model. But 
we have to realize that this goodness-of-fit test only checks the fit of aggregated 
figures and cannot test the distributional assumptions within the cells 
Applying this procedure to SANT'S (1980) collision data (126 cells) we get 
(<)  = 0.021 and the three lowest values of ny~ turn out to be 6.8, 9.4 and 
11 5, so we may accept the multlphcatlve Gamma model. Using CHANG/FAIR- 
LEY'S (1979) combined compulsory data (105 cells), we get ~ (<)  = 0.0094 and 
have 9 cells were the resulting value of n,j~ is lower than 10, the lowest being 
4.5, so the fit is less satisfactory. 
A simple formula for an estimator of ~ is given by the method of moments, 
l e. by equating the variances 
(sy-n~x,Yj) 2= ~ %(x,Yj)2/°~. 
t, j  I,J 
This yields ~ = 0.014 for Sant's data and ~ = 0.0093 for Chang/Fmrley's 
data. 
Strictly speaking we should use the likelihood estimator for 0~ We then must 
solve the likelihood equation 
0 = ~ log (L)/~o~ = 2 n,:{log (c~su)-log (x ,y/ ) -  ~u (n,j~)} 
t, ] 
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Here equations (2) have been used to obtain ~n, j  = ~sq/(x,yj). ~,(z)= 
F'(z)/F(z) denotes the d~gamma function, for which the asymptotic approxi- 
mation 
~u(z) ~ log ( z ) - (2z ) - l - z -2 /12  
exists which even for arguments as low as z >_ 4 is exact to 4 decimal places. 
This approximation yields as the solution of the likelihood equation 
with 
a = 4~ nulog(nvx,yj/sv) > O, 
t,J 
b = ~ (3n~) -I 
t,J 
1 = number of cells where s,, is known C 
t , j  
Applied to Sant's data this yields ~ ~ 0.0202. For Chang/Falrley's data we get 
c~ ~ 0 0097. If  we have some small exposures n,j such that nv~x < 4, we should 
refine the approximation of the dlgamma function by using the recursion 
q/(z) = ~(z+l ) - l / z  and by including more terms of the approximation 
series. Then a direct formula for c~ cannot be given anymore We must 
therefore solve the likelihood equation iteratlvely with the NEWTON-RAPHSON 
method. 
Having estimated ~, we are also in the position to calculate the estimation 
error of the estimators for x, and yj. This is done in Appendix B. 
According to the experience of the Dutch actuaries, the results of applying 
the "dtrect method" to automobde insurance data are rather close to the 
results obtained by the marginal totals method. Translated to the IBNR claims 
reserwng problem this means that the "direct method" results will be similar 
to the chain ladder results. But with the "direct method"  we can additionally 
make use of the aforementioned advantages. Moreover, the formulae provide 
the possibility of taking the exposure n, of  accident year i into account (which 
IS different from the sttuatlon with the chain ladder). And perhaps the 
goodness-of-fit s atistic or the size of the likelihood function gwes an indication 
to answering the question "addit ive or multlphcatJve9" Because of these 
advantages of the parametric method we believe that before using a rather 
heuristic method like BAILEY/SIMON or chain ladder one should examine 
whether the parametric method fits the data. 
5. IMPROVEMENT OF THE MODEL IN THE CASE OF 
KNOWN CLAIMS NUMBERS 
Especially in the claims reserving situation we will often have difficultIes in 
finding an adequate measure nv of exposure 
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Therefore mostly ny = n, or even n v = I is taken. However, this is not 
satisfactory because the exposure to further payments or changes in valuation 
varies in fact  rather strongly over the development years. Therefore, a more 
meaningful measure of exposure will be the number ty of those claims of 
accident year t where there is a change in amount during development yearj .  
These data t,j, t+ j  < m + I, are often available in practice. 
Rating in property insurance presents a similar problem. There, even the 
risks of the same cell vary greatly with respect o their size, which is usually 
measured by the sum insured. Therefore, the number of risks is not a good 
measure for the exposure of a cell (t,j), and the sum insured is taken instead. 
But then an assumption of our micro-model is not fulfilled anymore because 
the "un i ts "  of sum insured are not independent, as a single risk consists of 
several such units. We therefore must abandon our micro-model and try 
directly whether the Gamma model for S,j with mean value E(Sv)  = nvx ,y  j 
and shape parameter ny ~ fits the data if n~ is the sum insured. The parameter cz
then does not have a specific interpretation anymore But if we know 
additionally the total number ty of claims of cell ( l , j )  we can apply the 
following stepwise approach which assumes a Gamma distribution (with shape 
parameter ~) not for the total claims amount per risk unit but for the amount 
of each single claim. Of course, this procedure can also be applied in 
automobile ratemaking if the number t~ of claims is available. 
In these situations we should use ty--the corresponding random variable is 
denoted by T,j--as an additional measure of exposure and adopt the following 
three-steps-approach, w ich follows the ideas of ALBRECHT (1983): In the first 
step we take the observed number t,j of claims of cell ( i , j )  as the measure of 
exposure and assume that the size of each corresponding amount has a Gamma 
distribution with mean value my = x,y j  and shape parameter ~. Then we are in 
our original model (with n v replaced with tu) leading to the direct method This 
yields smoothed average claims amounts x, yj .  In the second step we smooth 
the ty by assuming that all Ty are independent of each other and that each T,j 
has a Polsson distribution with parameter n,j v, wj (here using the ' old'  measure 
of exposure). Then the maximum likelihood estimator of v,, ivj on basis of the 
realizations t v is given by the equations (la) and (lb) with x , ,y j ,  s v replaced 
with v,, wj, t v respectively. This yields smoothed numbers ny v, ivj of claims. In 
the last step, E(Su)  is estimated by n,jv, wjx, yj implying that in each cell the 
number of claims is independent of the average claims amount. 
6 FINAL REMARK 
In the context of this paper we should point out the following further 
connection between rating methods and claims reserving methods. Another 
important rating method which smoothes the claims experience of several tariff 
classes is the B/.ihlmann-Straub credibility model. It also uses a cross-classifying 
approach by the two dimensions 'tari f f  classes' and 'observation years'. 
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Therefore, one will presume that it could also be translated into a method 
for estimating IBNR claims reserves. But there is a difficulty because the 
Bfihlmann-Straub model assumes that the average claims amount Su/n,j of 
tariff class l has the same expected value over all years j, whereas m the run-off 
triangle the expected value of the average claims amount S,j/n, of accident year 
t and development year j varies m a certain but unknown pattern over the 
development years. However, this difficulty can be overcome in such a way 
that the BiJhlmann-Straub model can directly be used for claims reserving, too 
(see MACK 1990). 
APPENDIX A 
PROOF THAT THE CHAIN LADDER METHOD CAN BE DERIVED FROM THE 
MARGINAL TOTALS CONDITIONS (AND THEREFORE IS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
IN THE POISSON CASE) 
We show that the chain ladder method 
x ,y  h = Sq " fm+ 2- , ' fm+ 3- , ' ' ' fh - I  " ( fh- -1) ,  
1=1 
h > re+i- l ,  
with 
( rn~- j  Z ) / ( rn+, -  3 j-~ ) 
: Ski E Ski ' 
fJ ~ k=l I=1 k=| /=[ 
j=  2 , . . . ,m,  
can be deduced from the marginal conditions 
rn+l - I  m+l - i  
(H,) E x, yj= E sv' i= l , . . . ,m, 
J=l j=l 
m+ 1-1 m+ 1 -j  
(Vj) E x,yj= E s,j, J= l , . . . ,m. 
t~l t=l 
J J 
Let c v = E x'Yt and b v = E su (i+j ~ m+ I) denote the expected and 
1=1 1=1 
the observed accumulated claims amount of accident year t at the end of 
development year j  respectively. Then condihons (H,) can be written shortly as 
c, .m+~-,= b,.m+l-,- For h > m+l - iwe  have 
Therefore 
Cth -~ C~,m+l_ t
X~y h : Czh--Cqh_l 
Cj, m + 2- ~ Cjh 
Ca, rn+[-f Ct, h-I  
106 THOMAS MACK 
c,m+2, c,h, (c h) 
~- Ct, m+l_ t . . . . .  " -- 1 
Ct, m+l - i  Ct, h-2 Ci, h- I  
j~ l  Cqm+l-  t Ct, h- 2 ~ Ci, h- I 
and we have only to show that %/c,,j_ 
and of  
j ( m + I~3 
Z y, 
I=1  k=l  Ct3 __ = 
j -  I ( m+ I--j 
C~,j_ I E Yl 
1=1 k~l  
= fj. Because of 
m+ 1 - j  
c~ 
k=l  
m+ 1 - j  
E Ck, J-1 
k=l  
) ---- bkj bk. j -  I f J  \ k=l k=t 
m+ 1 - j  m+ I - j  
Y = Y 
k~l  k=l  
m+ I - j  m+ I - j  
k=l k - I  
hold for j=  2, . . ,m We show this by recursion from j= m to j  = 2' 
It is enough to show that 
(A:) 
and 
(Am), l e Clm = blm, holds because of  (Hi). 
(B)  follows from (A j) and (V j) as 
m+ I - J  m+ I -- I  m+ 1-3  m+ I - /  
k=l k=l  k=l k=l  
m + 1 - j  m + I - J  m + I - j  m + [ - j  
k~t k=, k=, k=~ 
F ina l ly ,  (A j _ i )  follows from (B)  and (Hm+2-)  as 
m+ 2- j  m+ I - j  
E Ck,] -[  = Z Ck , j - l+Cm+2- J  1 - I  
k=l  k~l  
m + I - j  m + 2 - j  
= Z bk, j - l+bm+2-y , J  - I  = E bk,) - I  
k=l  k=l  
This completes the proof. 
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APPENDIX B 
ESTIMATION OF THE (ASYMPTOTIC) ERROR VARIANCES 
We have estimated the marginal parameters x,,  yj with 
either x, yj = E(S, j /nu) (multlplicatlve approach) 
or x,+ y: = E(Sv/n, j )  (additive approach). 
by the maximum likelihood method and now want to know how precise these 
estimates are, i.e. we want to calculate Var(X,), Var(Yj), Var(X, Yj) or 
Var (X, + Yj) where X, and Yj denote the random variables corresponding to the 
estImators for x, and yj respectively. A standard result of maximum likelihood 
theory states that under certain regularity conditions which are fulfilled here, 
the following holds true: If a parameter vector O = (Oi, . . ,Or)  is estimated 
by the maximum hkelihood method, the obtained estimator O has asymptoti- 
cally a normal distribution with mean value O and with a covarlance matrix 
which is equal to the inverse of the information matrix 
( ~2 l°g (L ) )  
I(O) = E - 
~0, ~0: ,.: 
where L = L(O)  is the likelihood function. 
In our case we have O = (x2 . . . . .  x,,,, Yl . . . . .  Yn) where we have omitted Xl 
without loss of generality in order to obtain a unique solution of the hkelihood 
equations and have considered ~ as being known (For the case of cx being 
included in O, TER BERG (1980) has shown that this does not change the 
calculation of Var (X,), Var (Yj) and Cov (X',, Yj)). We now have 
Cov (X2 . . . .  ,Xm,  YI . . . . .  Y,,) "~' l (x2  . . . . .  Xm,Y l  . . . . .  yn) - I  =: / - I  
,~ I(:c2 . . . . .  ~m, Yl . . . . .  .fin) -1 =" i - t  
where :~2, .. . ,  .fin denote the estimated values of the true parameters x2, . . . ,  Yn 
From i -I we directly obtain asymptotic approxlmative values for Var (X,), 
Var (Yj) and Cov (X,, Y~). This also gives immediately an approximation for 
Var (X, + Yj) = Var (X,) + 2 Cov (X, ,  Yj) + Var (Y2) 
which we want to know in the additive approach. In order to obtain Var (X, Yj) 
for the multiplicative approach, we make use of a general theorem on the 
higher moments of normally distributed variables (see e.g RICHTER 1966, 
p 369) to get 
Var (X, Yj) ~ Var (X,) Var (Yj) +(Cov (X,, Yj))2+Var (X,) (E (yj))2 + 
+ 2E(X,) Cov (X,, Yj) E (Y j )+(E(X , ) )  2 Var (Yj) 
(which holds exactly if X, and Yj are normally distributed) This can be 
calculated from f - i  and from E(X,) ~ ~,, E(Yj) ~ )~j. 
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Therefore, the only thing left to do is the calculation of I and l - I  Con- 
centrating again on the multiplicative approach, the loglikehhood function is 
log (L) = - ~ (ctS,j/(x, yj) + o~n,j log (x, yj) + g (ct, n,~, S,j)) 
I,J 
and yields (using E(S,j) = n,jx, yj and the Kronecker symbol 6 v with J,j = 1 for 
i = j, 6,j = 0 otherwise) 
i~ z log (L) 0on,+ 
A,k: = E - - 6,k, 2 < i , k< m, 
~X, ~X k Xt 2 -- -- 
Oz log (L) 
B,j" = E - 
Ox, Oyj 
i~ 2 log (L) 
CO: = E - 
8Yz ~Yj 
(where n+j includes 
information matrix 
_ o tnq  
xtyj 
2<l<m,  1 _<j<n,  
_ O~n+j 60' 1 < l , j<  n 
y)2 -- ' 
nlj). With the matrices A = (,4,k), B = (By), C = (Co) the 
I can be represented as partlhoned matrix (A B) 
I=  B t C 
where A and C are diagnoal matrices. 
Unfortunately, an explicit formula for the inverse matrix I-1 is not available. 
One therefore must apply a numerical inversion method. But the dimension of 
the inversion problem can be reduced with the help of the following result for 
the inverse of a partitioned matrix (which can be verified by calculating I -  ~ I
and H- I ) :  
i _ .=  ( D -1 -D- '  BC- '  ) 
_C - IB tD- I  C - I+C- IBtD- IBC- I  
= ( A-'+A-IBF-IffA-t_F - IB tA - I  -A-IBF-I)F -I 
with 
D = A-BC- I f f ,  
F = C-BtA- IB .  
A straightforward calculation yields for the elements of D and F 
D,k = ~(t~,kn ,+- -p~k) / (X ,  k) ,  2 _< i, k _< m, 
F 0 = o~(Jon+j-qo)/(ytyj) , 1 < l, j  _< n, 
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with 
~ n,tn,j P,k = nvnk~ , qo = 
j=l  n+j t=2 nt+ 
Therefore, only the smaller matrices D and F must be inverted in order to 
obtain I - I  and also I- I .  
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SEPARATING TRUE IBNR AND IBNER CLAIMS l 
BY R. SCHNIEPER 
Wmterthur, Switzerland 
ABSTRACT 
A simple model for IBNR claims is presented Estimates for the loss reserves 
and for the ultimate claims rate are derived. Approximations to the mean 
square error of the estimators are produced. A more specific parametric model 
is suggested for the case that we deal with claim numbers instead of claim 
amounts. The general method is illustrated by a practtcal apphcatlon to the 
pricing of a casualty excess of loss cover. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The IBNR Method which we present in this paper has been developed m 
connection with the pricing of casualty excess of loss covers. The method can 
also be applied to loss reserving problems for long tail business, however it is 
best understood m connection with the practical problem which motivated its 
derivation. 
A reinsurer has to quote a price for an excess of loss cover. The statistical 
information at hand are the revalued individual excess claims from different 
accident years as well as a revalued measure of the exposure pertaining to each 
accident year (e.g. the revalued premium income) The problems connected 
with the revaluation of the claims and of the measure of exposure are by no 
means trivial. We shall however assume that this revaluation can be performed 
m a satisfactory way and that our data have been corrected for premium and 
claims inflation We shall call this revalued statlsucs the 'as if' statistics. 
To price the cover we have to estimate the ultimate clamas amount m the 
layer, i.e. to perform the IBNR correction. In this paper we present a simple 
method which reqmres only about twice the amount of computation of the 
chain-ladder method and which has the advantage of bemg practically 
unbmsed. An additional advantage of the estimator defined below is that one 
can assess its preclsxon. It ~s felt that these two properties are of special 
importance when pricing layers with high deductibles where data are scarce 
In the next section we present the general model. In the third section we 
restrict ourselves to claim numbers. In both these sections we dlustrate the 
I The Paper has been presented at the XXlth AST1N Colloqtuum m New York undcr the title 
'A  Pragmatic IBNR Method'  
ASTIN BULLETIN, Vol 21, No I 
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theory with an extremely simple example. In the last section we apply our 
method to a practical problem. 
2. THE GENERAL MODEL 
2.1.  Summary  s ta t i s t i cs  
Most IBNR methods require only one summary statistics: the IBNR triangle. 
If we have the excess claims from n accident years, the IBNR triangle contains 
the following information: 
yea: 
1 2 n 
Yl, 
x2, 
x., 
XI 2 Xl,n 
X2,2 X2. n-  I 
Exposure 
E I 
E2 
e. 
Where X,j is the total amount of excess claims from accident year t in 
development year j. 
For our purposes we need a more detailed summary statistics which we now 
define Let N,.j denote the total claims amount pertaining to new excess claims, 
i.e. to claims which were not yet recorded as excess claims in development year 
j -  1. Th~s is the true IBNR component. Let D v be the decrease in total claims 
amount between development year j -  1 and development yearj  with respect o 
claims already known as excess claims in development year j -1  This is the 
IBNER component (incurred bu not enough reported claims). D,j may take 
negative values but cannot by definmon be larger than X,,j_ ~. 
The following relations hold true between the X's, N's and D's" 
(2 .1 .1 )  X,i  = N,t i = 1 . . . .  n 
(2.1.2) Xv = ~'~, ,3 -  1 - -  D,j + N,j i = 1, .. n j = 2 , . .  n 
Of course we only observe the variables for which z+j <n+l .  We shall not as 
is usually done reduce the data to one IBNR triangle, the X-triangle, but we 
shall work with two triangles, the N-triangle of the genuine IBNR claims and 
the D-triangle of the IBNER claims 
From (2.1 1) and (2.1 2) it IS seen that the X-triangle can be derived from the 
N- and D-mangle. 
To illustrate these definitions let us consider a very smaple example. 
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EXAMPLE 
There  are  3 acc ident  years.  For  each acc ident  year  we have  the usua l  'as  i f '  
s tat is t ics :  reva lued  and  deve loped ind iv idua l  excess c la ims  as well as a reva lued  
measure  o f  exposure  
Accident 
year number 1 
E I = 20 
Accident 
year number 2 
E 2 = 25 
Accident 
year number 3 
E 3 = 32 
Claim 
number 
Development year number 
1 2 3 
I m - -  
2 2 15 
- -  05 15 
- -  15 25 
- -  - -  l 
05 
05 1.5 
15 
- -  05 
- -  2 
- -  1 
05 
05 
1 
15 
2 
A c la im demoted  by ' - - '  is a c la im wh ich  has  not  yet reached the pr io r i ty  or  
wh ich  has  dropped be low the pr ior i ty .  
In our  example  the t rad i t iona l  IBNR t r iang le  is" 
X-triangle 
I 2 3 
3 5 65 
25 5 
55 
and  the new stat ist ics are 
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N-t rmng le  
1 2 3 
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D-mang le  
3 3 1 
25 35 
55 
I 2 3 
m 
m 
I -05  
I 
2.2. Assumptions 
Let H k denote the set of those variables in the N- and D-mangle which are 
observed up to calendar year k. 
Hk = {N U, D~ I i+j  <k+ 1}. 
For the sake of convenience we also introduce 
H 0 = {0,~}. 
H,  is the set of all variables which have been observed so far. H,+s_ 2 is the 
history of the process up to the calendar year lmmedmtely preceding the 
emergence of N U and Du. 
We make the following assumptions: 
(A0 E[Nv [H,+j_2] = E,2j t,j = I, . .  n 
The expected IBNR claims amount does not depend on past history, it is the 
product of the exposure measure of the accident year with a factor depending 
on the development year only. 
(Az) E[D,j] H,+j-2] = X',j_,6j t = 1, .n 
I=  2 , .  .g /  
The expected ecrease m IBNER claims amount is equal to the reported claams 
amount of the previous development year times a factor depending on the 
development year 
We only observe those variables for which ~+j _< n+ 1 but for the purpose 
of loss reserving and rating we shall need the assumptions to hold true for all 
t,j = 1 . . . .  n. 
I f  we knew whether individual claims are open or closed it might be 
preferable to replace the X, fs  in (A2) by the corresponding total claims amount 
pertaining to open claims 
(A3) 
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{N,j,D,j IJ = 1,2 . . . .  n} 
are independent sets of random variables, i.e. random variables pertaining to 
different accident years are stochastmally independent. 
Assumpnons (A i), (A2) and (A3), though they are qmte general, are not 
always satisfied in prams. In pamcular, as was remarked by one of the editors, 
a new claims manager arriving on the scene may have an impact across claims 
cohorts In such a case assumptmn (A3) would of course no longer hold true 
This I think, shows the limitations of all staustmal models and methods used to 
assess loss reserves' when applying them to practical problems, we should 
always make sure that we have all the necessary reformation on the process 
generating the claims and that we take that mformaUon into account when 
choosing a staustical method to estimate the outstanding losses. 
2.3. Pricing 
We now focus our attentmn on the pricing problem, i e. We want to esumate 
next year's expected excess claim amount E[X,+ h,,] or alternaUvely next year's 
expected ultimate claims rate 
(2 2.1) R = EVX"+"" 1 
/ / k  En+ I _.J 
If the measure of exposure E,,+ I ~s the premmm income, then R is the expected 
ultimate burning cost. Assuming that (A0 and (A2) hold true for accident year 
n + 1, one obtains strmghtforwardly: 
(2.2.2) R(O) = E = 2 ,  (1 -62) ' . . . ' (1 -6 , )+ 
L/ /En+l _J 
2z(1-63)" ... ' (1 -6 , )+ 
where 
2,,_~ (1 -6 , )+ 
2, 
0=0.1 ,  .2,,62 . . . .  6,). 
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From (A0,  (A2) and (A3) it fol lows that 
n+ l - j  
Z N~ 
(2.2.3) ).j - j = 1 . . . .  n 
n+ I - j  
Z e, 
awl  
and 
n+ 1 - j  
Z D~ 
t= l  
(2 .2 .4 )  3j - .+,-j j = 2 . . . .  n 
X,, j_  1 
t= l  
are biasfree estimates of  the 2's and 6's respectively. 
(2.2.5) R(0) = 2 , (1 -32)"  ... " (1 -3 . )+]2(1 -33)"  ... " (1 -3 . )+) . .  
is an est imate of  the ult imate claims rate R. The individual estimates being 
biasfree and the correlat ion between the factors being ' smal l '  because of  (A3) 
the bias of  R (0) can be neglected. 
EXAMPLE (continued) 
I! 6.5 1 ^ ^ 
21 - - 0.143 22 - - 0.144 23 - - 0.05 
77 45 20 
2 0.5 ^ 
62-  - 0.364 63-  - 01 
5.5 5 
/~ = 0 .100+0.159+0.050 = 0.309 
2.4. Loss reserving 
The loss reserve for accident year ~ is 
L, = Etx,. I/t.] 
Under  assumpt ion (A~) and (A2) it is easily seen that 
(2.2.6) 
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L, = X,,.+ l _ , ( l -6n+2_ , ) "  . . .  ' ( I -O . )  
+ E , [2 .+2_ , ( I - J .+3_ , ) . .  (1 -6 . )  
+- J-n+3-,( 1 - f in+n. - , ) . . .  (1 -6.)  
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+ 2,] 
i.e. the loss reserve consists m a component for IBNER claims and a 
component  for IBNR claims the former depending on the claims observed so 
far and the latter on the exposure. 
One obtains an estimate of  L, by replacing the parameters m (2.2.6) by their 
estimates (2.2.3) and (2.2.4) respectively. 
EXAMPLE (continued) 
Accident X,..+i-, d.+t-, IBNER, E, IBNR, L, 
year t 
1 65  I 65 20 0 65 
2 5 I 1 5 5 25 I 25 6 75 
3 5 5 0 700 3 85 32 6 67 10 52 
17 23 77 
Where A, + i -, = (1 - J ,  + 2-,)" ... "(1 - J,) is the IBNER correction factor. 
To compute the loss reserves in practice we will o f  course use the original 
claims as opposed to the revalued claims used for pricing purposes; we will also 
have to choose a suitable measure of  exposure. 
It is interesting to compare (2.2.6) to the formulas for loss reserve provided 
by the chain-ladder method and by the Bornhuetter-Ferguson method respec- 
tively 
The loss reserve for accident year i according to the chain-ladder method 
I S :  
(2.2.7) L, = X,,,,+ l - ,"  Fn+ 1-, 
Where Fj is some factor pertaining to development year j (for details see for 
instance Nationale-Nederlanden [2]) The same quantity as estimated by the 
Bornhuetter-Ferguson method is' 
(2 2.8) L, = X, . ,+ i_ ,+E, 'G ,+I_  , 
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Where G,+t_ ,  is a factor which is applied to the exposure. 
Wath a suitable notation we can rewrite (2.2.6) an the following way: 
(2.2.9) L, = X,.n+l_ , A,~+~_, +E,A,,+i_ ,
It IS seen that formally our est imator is a general,sataon of  both the chain- 
ladder and the Bornhuetter-Ferguson estamator'  zl,,+t_, = F,,+~_, and 
A , ,+~_ ,=0 gwes the chain-ladder est imator whereas d,,+l_, = 1 and 
A,+~_, = Gn+ 1-, gaves the Bornhuetter-Ferguson estamator. 
2.5. Performance of the estimator 
We now want to assess the performance of  R (0) defined an (2.2.5) In order to 
do so we need the following stronger assumptions.  
(A]) E[N,j [ Hi+j-2] = E,2j Var [Nv] = E, aj 2 
(A9 e[D,j ] /4,+j-2] = L.~-,~, Var[O,. I n.]  = X,.~_,~ 2
Developing R(t)) an a Taylor  series, we obta in '  
2,,-i 6R(O) 
(2.3.1) R(O) ~- R(O) + E -- (0,-0,)  
,= i 60, 
(A3) amplies that 0, and 0j are not strongly correlated for t 4= j hence 
2,,-, (aR(0) )2 
(2.3.2) mse (R(0)) = E(R(O) -R(O))  2 ~- 2 Vat (0,) 
,=~ I gO, o 
where we have replaced the unknown quantltaes. 
aR(0) 
60, 
by the approxImat ions" 
,~ R ( O O , o ~ o " 
We stall have to find approxamataons for the Vat (0,) From (A]), (A~) and (A3) 
it follows that.  
%z 
(2.3.3) Var@)  - j = 1, . n 
Pl-~- I - j  
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$j2 
(2.3.4) Var (dij) - ,+ l - ,  j = 2 . . . .  n 
Z X, j_  I 
on the other  hand we have the fol lowing blasfree est imators of  ~j2 and rj2 
respectively 
n+l  - j  1 
(23.5)  6J z_  1 E (Nv- 3vE')2-- j = I, 
n- j  ,=, E, 
1 , ,+ i - j  I 
(2.3.6) rf - E (Dv-~JX',J - I )2 -  J = 2, 
n - j  ,= I X , , l -  l 
.n - - I  
.n - - I  
and if there are enough development  years at hand we have:  
2 .= 0 and 3 , ,=0 
and one may assume:  
2 0 and r,~ 0 O" n = ~ , 
Plugging the expressions given above into (2.3 2) we obtain an approx imat ion  
for the mean square error o f  R (0) 
EXAMPLE (continued) 
JR  _ (1 -32)  (1 -33)  = 0.700 6R 
g21 622 
OR _ - ) . , (1  -33)  = -0 .157  6R 
662 663 
2 
Var (21) - crl - 48- 10 -5 
Var ()-3) - - -  
E I + E 2 + E 3 
-0  
El 
- (1 -33)  = 1.1 6R _ 1 
623 
- -~- i ( l  - ,~2) - i2  = -0  235 
mse '/2 (R(0))  = 0.017 
Another  posslbdlty to evaluate (2.3.3) and (2.3.4) is to specify a parametr ic  
model. An example is given m the next section. 
Var (32) - vzz - l lO 10 -5 Var (33) - z32 - 0 
Xll + X21 Xi2 
from which one obtains 
El +E2 
Vat  (~-2) - azz - 2" 10 -5 
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3. A MODEL FOR CLAIM NUMBERS 
We use the same definitions as In section 2 with the difference that claim 
amounts are now replaced by claim numbers: Xy denotes the number of excess 
claims from accident year t in development year j. D,j is the decrease in total 
number of claims between development year j -  1 and development year j with 
respect to claims already known as excess claims in year j - I .  (D,j is a 
non-negative integer smaller or equal to X,,/_ 0- N,j denotes the number of new 
excess claims pertaining to accident year t in development year j. Rela- 
tions (2 1.1) and (2 1.2) hold true. 
EXAMPLE (continued) 
From the individual claims of the example of section 2 we obtain the following 
IBNR triangle for claim numbers. 
X-triangle 
I 2 3 
4 4 
4 
N-mangle 
1 2 3 
D-mangle 
2 3 I 1 
3 3 2 
5 3 
1 2 3 
m 1 1 
2 
Under assumptions (Al) and (A2) relation (2.2 2) holds true. R(O) is now the 
expected ultimate claims frequency and Jj is the probability for an excess claim 
to drop below the priority between development year j - I  and development 
year j. 
The expressions given in (2.2.3) and (2.2.4) are blasfree estimates of the 2's 
and 5's respectively. (2.2.5) gives an estimate of the ultimate claims frequency 
R (0). The bias of the estimate R (0) can be neglected. 
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EXAMPLE (cont inued)  
10 6 1 ^ 
2~ - - 0.130, 22 - - 0.133, 23 - - 0.05 
77 45 20 
3 1 
62 - - 0.6, ~3 = - = 0.25 
5 4 
R(O) = 0.189 
The performance of  R(O) can be assessed with (2.3.2). 
We now make the following parametric assumptions: 
(A'l') Nv [ H,+j_2 N Po,sson (2j" E,) 
(A~') Do I H,+j-2 ~ Binonual (6j, X, j_ l). 
It ~s easily seen that: 
(A[') =*- (A[) ~ (A,) i = 1, 2. 
We also assume that (A~) holds true. The log [ikehhoods of  the parameters 
are : 
n+ ] - J  
(3.1) l (2 j )=-  E, 2 j+ 2 Nv Iog2j 
l= l  / 
"log(6j) + X,.,_, - Z Dv log( l -~ j )  
and it Is seen, that the ~v and 6j of (2.2.3) and (2.2 4) are the maximum 
likehhood estimates of the 2fs and 0fs. 
From the maxamum likehhood theory we know that 
- '  
Var ( ; )  ---~ F -  E for 2 E, --~ oo 
L. t - - I  
we therefore use the following approx~matmns: 
(3.3) Var (2j) ~ 2J n+l - j  J ~ l~ .  n 
E, 
I n ] 
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analogously" 
 j0- j) 
(3.4) Var (3j) "~ ,,+ ,-J 
E X~,j_ I 
t=l 
j = 2 , . . .n  
and we obtain an approximation of  the mean square error of  R(t~) by plugging 
(3.3) and (3.4) into (2.3.2) 
EXAMPLE (continued) 
Var(~l)  = 17 l0 4 
Var (62) = 480.10 -4 
fR  6R 
- 0.3 
6).1 622 
f iR f iR 
- - 0 097  
662 663 
Var (~2) = 30 10 -4 
Var (63) = 469' 10 -4  
- 0.75 
6R 
6). 3 
-1  
- -0 .185  
mse In [R(t~)] = 0 080 
Var (23) = 25- 10 -4 
4.  A PRACT ICAL  PR IC ING EXAMPLE 
The following IBNR mangle (X-mangle) is borrowed from a practical motor  
third party hability excess of  loss pricing problem" 
dvpt 
year I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
75 289 526 845 80 1 
I 6 148 321 396 550 
13 8 424 36 3 53 3 96 5 
29 140 325 469 
29 98 527 
I 9 294 
191 
76 9 79 5 
60 0 
Exposure 
10'224 
12'752 
14'875 
17'365 
19'410 
17'617 
18'129 
The excess claims and the measure of  exposure (premmm of the whole 
portfolio) have been revalued. Based on these 'as if' statistics we want to 
esumate the ulumate burmng cost 
Using the chain-ladder method we obtain: 
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Accident 
Exposure 
yea r
Total 
Clatms Estimated Estimated 
Amount Cumulatwe Ultimate Ultimate 
per dvpt Factor Claims Burning 
year Amount Cost 
n+l - t  
1 I 0' 224 79 5 1 79 5 0 78 % 
2 12' 752 60 1 03 62 0 49 % 
3 14'875 965 I 05 101 I 068% 
4 17'365 46 9 1 37 64 0 37% 
5 19'410 52 7 2 00 105 3 0 54% 
6 17'617 294 375 1102 063% 
7 18' 129 19 I 17 07 326 0 1 80% 
110'372 848 3 0 77% 
(For details on the chain-ladder method see for instance Natlonale-Neder- 
landen [2]). 
It ~s seen at once that the estimated ultimate burning cost pertaming to 
accident year 7 ~s much larger than the other estimated burning costs. This is 
due to a well known problem inherent o the chain-ladder method: the claims 
amount of the least developed accident year ,s multlphed with the largest 
cumulative factor providing thus a very imprecise stimate which can heavily 
influence the overall ultimate burning cost This drawback of the chain-ladder 
method can easily be corrected by weighing the estimated ultimate burning 
costs of the individual accident years in a different way. Let Fj denote the 
cumulative factor provided by the chain-ladder method which is to be applied 
to the claims amount of development year j. X,j, E, and R denote respectively 
the total claims amount, the exposure and the ultimate burning cost as defined ,n 
section 2. The estimated ultimate burning cost pertaining to accident year i ~s then :
X,.,+i-,'F,+|-, 
E, 
The chain-ladder method weighs these estimates with E, the exposure of the 
corresponding accident year, thus g, ving the following overall estimated 
ultimate burning cost 
X,,.+=-,'F.+i-, 
t= l  
R= 
I=t 
Instead of E, we use the following weights: 
E, 
Ell+ I - t  
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which correspond to 'used exposure' and give less weight to less developed 
accident years. 
We obtain the following overall estimated burning cost: 
Xi, n+ l_t  
a=l  
R= 
l=t Fn+l - t  
We have the thus redenved a special case of the Cape Cod method [3], an 
IBNR method similar to the Bornhuetter-Ferguson method [1]. This method 
provides the following estimates" 
Total 
Claims Eshmated 
Accident Amount Cumulative ' Used Ultimate 
year Exposure as per Factor Exposure' Burmng 
dvpt year Cost 
n+l - t  
I 10' 224 79 5 1 10' 224 0 78 % 
2 12'752 60 1 03 12'335 049% 
3 14'875 96 5 I 05 14' 199 0 68% 
4 17'365 46 9 1 37 12'697 0 37% 
5 19'410 52 7 2 O0 9'712 0 54% 
6 17'617 29.4 3 75 4'698 0 63% 
7 18' 129 19.1 17 07 1'062 I 80% 
384 1 64' 928 0 59 % 
We now consider the more detaded statistics of the N- and D-mangles. The 
statistics of new IBNR claims are' 
~eCCar~ dvpt ear I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
75 183 285 234 186 
1 6 126 182 16 I 140 
138 227 40  124 12 I 
29 97 164 116 
29 69 371 
19 275 
191 
07 51 
106 
N-triangle 
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The statistics of decreases in the claims amount are: 
125 
~ r ~  dvpt ear 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
-31  48 -85  230 
-06  09 86 - 14 
-59  I01 -46  -311  
-14  -21  -28  
0 -58  
0 
39 25 
56 
D-tnangle 
The striking feature of these more detailed statistics is that even in 
development year 6 and 7 there is an important amount of new claims to the 
layer, however this fact is partly compensated by a decrease of the amount of 
already known excess claims and therefore the less detailed traditional IBNR 
statistics gwe the spurious impression that the total amount of excess claims is 
exactly known after six or seven development years which is obviously not the 
case in this example. 
We now want to estimate the ultimate burning cost with our method. From 
(2.2.3) and (2.2.4) we obtain: 
1 0 45 10 -3  
2 1 06 10 -3 -0  359 
3 I 40 10 -3 0 072 
4 1 15 10 -3 -0048 
5 I 18 10 -3 --0054 
6 049 10 -3 0070 
7 050 10 -3 0033 
We see that the 2's reach a maximum in year 3 and decrease thereafter but It 
would be misleading to assume that 2j = 0 for j > 8. 
Between the 1st and the 2nd development year there is an important increase 
of the known excess claims, after that the excess increase or decrease more or 
less randomly and the di's oscillate around zero. 
By plugging the parameters into (2.2.5) we obtain the following estimate for 
the ultimate burning cost" 
R(O) = 0.61%, 
An estimate which ts almost identical to the one obtained with the Cape Cod 
method. 
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Under  assumptions (A0,  (A2) and (A3) we know that R(O) is a practtcal ly 
biasfree est imate of  R(0),  whereas neither m the case of  the chain- ladder 
est imate nor in the case of  the Cape Cod estimate do we know anything about  
the bias of  the est imator.  
We now make the stronger assumptions (A]), (A~) and (A;) and we estimate 
aj and rj according to (2.3.5) and (2.3.6). 
1 0 054 
2 0 074 0 387 
3 0 109 1269 
4 0 079 1177 
5 0 056 3 460 
6 0 057 0 303 
7 0 0 
The assumpt ion ~7 = 0 and 47 = 0 is not very reahstlc, however Jt has httle 
impact on the mean square error of  R(0). F rom (2.3.3) and (2.3.4) we now 
obtain the standard devlatxons of  the est imators of  our parameters.  
I 0 16 10 -3  
2 0 24 10 -3 0 070 
3 040 l0 -3 0 121 
4 0 34 10 -3 0 095 
5 0 29 10 -~ 0 260 
6 038 10-9 0026 
7 0 0 
We also need the fol lowing expressions" 
fiR JR fiR 
- Al = 1.253 -- /12 = 0.921 -- A3 = 0.993 
J) . l  622 623 
JR 6R f ir 
- A4 = 0.948 - A5 = 0.899 - A6 = 0.967 
6 24 6 25 6 26 
JR 
-1  
627 
6R 1 
- -21A 1 - -  - -0  00041 
662 1 -62  
JR  1 
- - [21  A I +22/12] - --0.00166 
J J3 1 - J3  
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From 
JR  1 
_ _ [21/I I +22zJ2+23z13] - -  
3 34  I - -  o~ 4 
- 0.00279 
3R 1 
- - - [21Al+ ... +24A4] -- 0.00381 
fig5 I -35  
JR  1 
- - - [21A l+ • . +25~5] -- - -000546 
3 3 6 1 - 36 
3R 1 
- - [21z J i -q - - . . . - -1 -26z~6] -  - -0 .00574 
3 37 I - 37 
(2.3.2) we now obtain 
mse'/Z(R(0) = 0 13%) 
Our method also provides a measure of the precision of the point estimator. 
To summarize what we have obtained so far we can say that we have an 
estimate of the burmng cost after seven development years (0.61%), this 
estimate ~s practically unbiased and reasonably precise since its standard 
deviation ~s (0 13 %). Our detailed statlshcs have shown us that there are stdl 
some excess clmms to be expected m the following development years, a fact 
which we would have overlooked ~f we had only used the usual IBNR statistics. 
To assess the impact of further development years on the ulturmte burmng cost 
we can use the experience of s~mdar portfolios or some market statlst~cs if that 
kind of data ~s available, If such ~s not the case we can extrapolate our 
estimates of the 2's and of the J 's 
Based on the analysis of the gwen portfoho, a reahst~c extrapolation would 
be: 
28 = 29 = 0.5 10 -3 
2 j=0 j=  10,11 
4 =0 . /=8,9 ,  
Thus our estimate of the ultm~ate burning cost ~s 
R = 0 .71%.  
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DISCUSSION PAPERS 
THE SCHMITTER PROBLEM 
BY P. BROCKETT, M. GOOVAERTS, G TAYLOR 
At the ASTIN Colloquium in Montreux, HANS SCHMITTER posed the follow- 
mg problem. 
PROBLEM 
Consider the class J -o f  distributions with range [0, b], mean /t and variance 
a 2. Let ~PO, F(U) denote the probability of ultimate ruin under a compound 
Polsson claim process with given premium loading O, initial capital u and 
individual claim size d.f.F. For fixed 0 and/t, which F~.~ maximizes ~u0, F(U) 
for a particular given u? In particular, is F diatomlc? 
PRACTICAL  BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
H. SCHMITTER describes the following practical background m which the 
problem arises. 
The problem of determining bounds for ruin probabilities arises when an 
insurer dec~des his reinsurance retentions m order to increase the stability of an 
account. He may not only choose between various forms of reinsurance (quota 
share, surplus, excess loss etc.) but he usually combines them in what is called a 
reinsurance program. When evaluating reinsurance programs he needs to 
compare their prices and the effectweness of the protection they offer. The 
reinsurance price is the difference between the gross (i.e. before reinsurance) 
and the net 0.e. retained, after reinsurance) xpected profit. The effectweness of
the protection, on the other hand, can be measured by the probability of ruin : 
the lower the probability of ruin of the retained account he more effectwe the 
reinsurance program. Computing ruin probabdlties i often criticized as being 
pointless because their absolute values are sa~d to be irrelevant. However, ff 
two reinsurance programs both reduce the expected profit of the ceding 
company by the same amount he one leading to the smaller probability of ruin 
is likely to be preferable. 
The ruin probabdity depends on the mitml reserve (known to the ceding 
company), the security loading (defined as the expected retained profit, hence a 
function of the reinsurance program) and on the retained claim amount 
distribution In practice, the latter ~s hardly ever known, apart from the 
maximum retained claim which is given by an excess loss deductible or a policy 
limit. At best we have to our disposal esumates of the expected value and the 
variance. An exact computation of the rum probability is, therefore, not 
possible and one has to accept the determination of upper and lower bounds. 
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So far we do not even know the least upper bound in the case where the 
expected value, the variance and the maximum claim are known Perhaps the 
answer to the above question is not an isolated problem but leads to further 
investigations and applications: Suppose that for several independent risks the 
expected profits, frequencies, expected values, variances and maximum claims 
are known. What is the least upper bound of the overall ruin probabihty for a 
given initml reserve9 Is there a natural way of allocating parts of the initial 
reserve to the independent risks? A question often asked In practice. 
DISCUSSION 
At Montreux, GREG TAYLOR pointed out that F more dangerous than G in 
stop-loss order implies that ~o. F(u) >-- ~v0, c(u) for all u (GoOVAERTS and DE 
VYLDER, 1984; TAYLOR, 1985) 
Hence the problem is reduced to seeking an extremal distribution in .Y in 
terms of stop-loss order. However an extremal distribution in terms of stop-loss 
order does not exist in class .P. 
The problem was further discussed at the " 1990 Risk Theory seminar at the 
Mathematisches ForschungslnstltUt of the Federal Republic of Germany, in 
Oberwolfach" 
MARC GOOVAERTS pointed out that an upper bound can be obtained by the 
criterion of danger which satisfies the range [0, b], l ,  but not a 2 where now 
danger is defined as in BOHLMANN et al (1977). One can deduce a distribution 
which is more dangerous than all of those belonging to the class of distribu- 
tions with prescribed range, mean u but with a minimal variance, larger then 
a21n analogy to KAAS and GOOVAERTS (1986). 
But only danger as well as first order stop-loss ordenlng will give rise 
to inequalities between ruin probabilities If we have E(X)= E(Y) and 
E((X-t)+) < E((Y-t)+) Vt then ~IlO, F,(ll) ~_~ ~JO, Fx(U) uniformly for all 0 
and u. The problem of finding Sup E((X- t)+) does not give rise to a unl- 
F~ E./- 
form (in t) extremal distribution. 
It is solved by constructing a polynomial of degree two above (X - t )+ which 
is tangent o this function in 2 points. The abscissas of these points will be the 
mass points (a recent reference is e g GOOVAERTS et al., 1990) These results 
are known but they cannot be used to obtain an upper bound for the infinite 
time ruin probability because the extremal distribution depends on the value 
of t. 
One finds the following solution : A risk X with spectrum (r, s) exists with 
mean # and variance a z if and only if s = r', where r' = lt+[a2/(lt-r)] 
The following mass points of the extremal distributions are obtained : (0, 0') 
in case 0<t< 1/20', ( t+x/~-t)2+a 2, t -x / (~-t )z+a 2) in case 
1/20' < t <_ l/2(b+b') and (b,b') in case l/2(b+b') <_ t < b This indicates 
that even for the simple extremal stop-loss problem no umform extremal 
distribution exists. Also BROCKETT and Cox (1985, 1986) present explicit 
solutions to the above problem when n = 1, 2 or 3 moments are given using 
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Tchebycheff systems of functions. KVMPERMANN (1970) also solves this 
problem in general. 
A problem closely related to the one stated by SCHMITTER and as intragumg 
IS the following: consider S = X~ + ... Xu under the classical assumptions and 
find Sup E( (S - t )+) .  
F~ P 
This problem can be solved for the case Fxe. ' f l  (= a set of dlstnbuhons 
w~th given It and b), (see BUHLMANN, GAGLIARDI, GERBER, and STRAUB, 
1977) An attempt o solve the above problem (F x e.;, r) has been presented by 
KAAS and GOOVAERTS (1984), cited above. 
Also at Oberwolfach, P BROCKETT demonstrated that the Fe .7  which 
minimizes the adjustment coefficient R of the claim process lies m the class D 2 
of dlatomlc &stnbutlons. Since 7J0, F(U) ~ const, e -R'' for large u, this imphes 
that the reqmred F hes m D2 for sufficiently large u. It does not, however, 
identify F for smaller values of u. In fact, the extremal F for large u can be 
identified as follows: 
Massp = (b -p)z / [aZ+(b- i ,O  2] at i t -aZ / (b - l . t ) ;  and Mass l -p  at b. 
Similar results can be obtained for maximizing the adjustment coefficient. 
These results can also be found m DE VYLOER, GOOVAERTS and HAEZEN- 
DONCK (1984), BROCKETT and Cox (1983, 1986) and KEMPERMANN (1970, 
1971). 
GREG TAYLOR suggested that, to the extent hat Schmltter's problem related 
to premium rating (as SCHMITTER had said it did), that problem was probably 
not the most relevant for solution. In practice, the assumption of ummodahty 
of F would almost always be reasonable, and this ad&tlonal restriction on F 
could be expected to decrease the upper bound on ~u0. F(U) substantially 
Moreover, this additional condmon does not add to the difficulty of the 
problem The history of this goes back to VERBEEK (1977), who dealt w~th the 
extremal unlmodal stop-loss premmm with fixed mean and upper bound, and 
TAYLOR (1977) who extended the results to the context of an arbitrary fimte 
number of hnear constraints on the unimodal &stribution. Much extension has 
subsequently been made by GOOVAERTS (and co-authors) and BROCKETT and 
Cox 
The relevant result for Schmltter's problem if unimodality ~s reqmred ~s that 
the extremal distribution must lie in the class 7 3 of step functions with 3 levels 
(with possible equality of 2 or 3 levels). 
BROCKETT and Cox (1985, 1986) demonstrate hat the unlmodal process hes 
m the class 5/~2. As m the case where unlmodahty Is not reqmred, they give an 
explicit optimal solution to bounding the adJustment coefficient. They give the 
corresponding solution for an arbitrary fimte number of hnear constraints on 
F, and ~t is again true that his extremal distribution solves Schmitter's problem 
for sufficiently large u. 
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THE SCHMITTER PROBLEM AND A RELATED PROBLEM:  
A PARTIAL  SOLUTION 
BY R. KAAS 
Universtty of Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
ABSTRACT 
At the 1990 ASTIN-colloqulum, SCHMITTER posed the problem of finding the 
extreme values of the ultimate ruin probability ~(u)  in a risk process with 
initial capital u, fixed safety margin 0, and mean u and variance a 2 of the 
individual claims. This note aims to give some more insight into this problem. 
Schmitter's conjecture that the maximizing individual claims distribution is 
always dlatomic is disproved by a counterexample. It is shown that if one uses 
the distribution maximizing the upper bound e -Ru to find a ' large'  ruin 
probability among risks with range [0, b], incorrect results are found if b is 
large or u small 
The related problem of finding extreme values of stop-loss premiums for a 
compound Polsson (2) distribution w~th identical restrlchons on the mdlwdual 
claims is analyzed by the same methods. The results obtained are very 
similar. 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
In a paper presented at the ASTIN-colloquium 1990, HANS SCHMITTER gives a 
derivation of an exact algorithm to compute the value of the ultimate ruin 
probability ~(u)  for a compound Polsson ruin process with given premium 
income c per unit of time, and with claims having a finite number of mass 
points In connection with this paper, he posed the following problem: given 
that the individual claims have mean /1 and variance a 2, which claims 
distributions minimize and maximize the ruin probability for a given u ? A 
practical justification of the problem can be found in the paper by BROCKE'rr, 
GOOVAERTS and TAYLOR (1991), who also sum up the results of the discussion 
of this matter at the colloquia of Montreux and subsequently Oberwolfach. 
In the classical ruin model, the non-ruin probability of a compound Poisson 
risk process can be shown to have a compound geometric distribution with 
geometric parameter depending only on the safety loading 0, and with terms 
having a distribution function related to the stop-loss premiums of the 
individual claims. 
In this note we also describe another problem, very similar to Schmitter's. 
Suppose a reinsurer has to determine a stop-loss premium for a risk with the 
following properties, the risk has a compound Polsson distribution with known 
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parameter 2, and the individual claims have known mean /1 and variance a 2 
To be able to quote a safe premium, the reinsurer tries to determine the claims 
distribution leading to the maximum value of the net stop-loss premium. Some 
work in this direction was done by KAAS and GOOVAERTS (1986) and 
STEENACKERS and GOOVAERTS (1990). See also GOOVAERTS et al. (1984) 
A lower bound for both the ruin probabdlty and the compound Poisson 
stop-loss premium under these restrictions is attained by the dlsmbutlon 
concentrating all mass at p, see for instance GOOVAERTS et al (1990). This 
distribution IS not actually an element of the set of feasible &strlbutions, which 
is not a closed set. We will prove that both our functionals, ruin probabilities 
and compound Polsson stop-loss premiums, are continuous at this boundary 
point. Other funct~onals, like the variance, the skewness and the adjustment 
coefficient do not have this property. See Section 2. 
In this paper we concentrate on the upper bounds, and indicate how one 
may find the diatomic claims dlstnbunon leading to the highest rum probabd- 
ity using the algorithm mentioned above. The compound stop-loss premium 
can be computed by a very similar formula, based on special properties of the 
compound Poisson distribution See Section 2 We found counterexamples for 
Schmitter's conjecture that the maximal ruin probability always is realized by a 
dlatomlc distribution. For the compound Poisson stop-loss premiums, the 
optimal diatomic distribution also was not always the overall maximum. See 
Section 3. 
A useful heuristic approximation to the maximal ruin probabdlty with 
dlatomic claims is described in Section 4 It is based on maximization of the 
most important term of the geometric dIstribution Our hm~ted numerical 
experience shows that this solution leads to a ruin probabdlty which is 
invariably close to the maximal dlatomlc ruin probablhty. For small 2, this 
same dlatomlc distribution also often leads to near-maximum compound 
Poisson stop-loss premiums. 
One of the referees remarked that applying this heuristic approach one 
actually solves Schmmer's problem optimally for very small values of the m~tial 
capital. More precisely, if the initial capital/the retention is very small (less than 
½E[X2]/E[X]), the maximum ruin probablhty/compound stop-loss premium is 
attained for the dlatomlc distribution with 0 as a mass point. 
In any case it can be shown that this heuristic solution is better than many 
other choices of the feasible distribution. Ifx~ and xz are the mass points of the 
heuristically found feasible distribution, with x~ < x2, any distribution with 
least mass point larger than Xl leads to lower ruin probabilities and compound 
Polsson stop-loss premiums. 
In Section 5 we ~mpose one more restriction on the claims distribution, 
namely that the support is contained in an interval [0, b] One might expect 
that the distribution with the largest value of the upper bound for the ruin 
probablhty e-R" also has a high probability of ruin. It can be shown that the 
adjustment coefficient R with the claims distribution is minimal for the 
dlatomlc distribution with b as one of its mass points. Then obviously e-R,, IS 
maximal. But if the maxtmum claim b is very large, the ruin probability with 
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this distribution is close to mimmal rather than maximal On the other hand, 
the adjustment coefficient R is maximal for the diatomlc distribution with 0 as 
a mass point, but for small values of u this distribution has maximal ruin 
probability, in spite of the fact that is has minimal e -R'. So looking at the 
adjustment coefficient leads to the wrong answer, unless b is small and u is 
large, say for b < 2u-p ,  see the previous paragraph and Section 4. 
In Section 2 it is shown that the third moment (skewness) of the compound 
Poisson distribution is maximal for the dlatomlc claims distribution with b as a 
mass point. So one may expect hat for large retentions, th~s claims distribution 
leads to maximal stop-loss premiums. Also in Section 5 we will show that for 
small retentions the situation is reversed 
2. SOME THEORY AND NOTATION 
In both problems we study, the issue is to find a maximum of a functional H~, 
working on distribution functions Fx of random variables X in a certain set. 
More specifically, we may write both problems in the following form" 
(1) Maximize H,[Fx] 
subject o X is a non-negative random variable, with E[X] = /1, 
Vat [X] = a z 
Here Hu[] assigns to Fx either the ruin probability ~u(u) in a compound 
Polsson risk process with fixed safety loading 0 and Initial capital u, or the 
stop-loss premium ns(U ) at retention u of a compound Polsson (2) distributed 
random variable S, both with individual claims distributed as X. In the 
remainder of this section we will give expressions for H,[  ] for both problems 
m case X has a finite range. Also, we will characterize the feasible random 
variables X hawng a two-point support. Finally, the theory of ordering of risks 
is applied to derive results on some integrals over H,,[ ]. 
Consider the classical actuarial ruin model, that is, assume a compound 
Polsson process wIth claims intensity 2, non-negative individual claims distrib- 
uted as X, premium income per unit time c = ( I+0)  2E[X], which means 
there is a safety loading 0 (assumed positive), and initial capital u See for 
instance BOWERS et al. (1986, Chapter 12). Let the stochastic process N(t)  
denote the number of claims up to time t, and S(t)  = X~+ .. +XN(,) the 
accumulated claims until t~me t. Define the maximal aggregate loss as L = 
max {S(t ) -c t l t  >_ 0}. The ultimate ruin probability ~, (u) denotes the probabil- 
ity that the insurer's urplus will ever become negative: 
(2) ~u(u) = P [min{u+ct -S ( t ) J t  >_ 0} < 0] = I -P [L  ~ u]. 
Defining L~, L2, .. as the amounts by which record lows in the insurer's 
surplus u+vt -S ( t )  are broken, and M to be the number of record lows in the 
surplus process, we may write 
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M 
(3) L = 2 L,. 
t= l  
Then M has a geometr ic distr ibut ion with parameter  ~(0).  F rom Theo- 
rem 111.2.2.3 in GOOVAERTS et al. (1990) we see that the geometric parameter  
~(0)  = (1 +0)  -1, and the distr ibut ion function of  the L, equals 
(4) FL , (y )  = l - -nx (y ) / zcx(O) ,  
where nx(y)  = E l (X -y )+]  denotes the net stop-loss premmm for X at 
retention y, so nx(0) = E[X]  
From (2) and (3) we obtain the fol lowing expression for the ruin probabihty" 
(5) N(u)  = P[L  > u] - P [L i+  +Lm > u]. 
1+0 ' 
SCHMITTER (1990) gives the fol lowing expression for the ruin probabi l i ty  in 
case X has finite support  {x~,x2 . . . . .  x,.}, with associated probabdlt ies 
P l ,P2 ,  - ",Pro: 
0 p;, 
(6) ~(u)  = 1 - - -  L (--Z)k~+ +kmeZ ' 
1+0 k,.k2. .k,, j=l kj! 
2 
where z = -- (u - -k lx l - -  . . .  - k ,nxm)+ " 
C 
Similar expressions can be found in GERBER (1990), SHIU (1989), and earher 
TAKACS (1967). The in&ces k 1 are assumed to range over 0, 1 . . . . .  I f  all mass 
points xj are strictly posative, j = 1 . . . . .  m, (6) Is a sum with only a fimte 
number of  non-zero terms, so it leads to an easdy programmed algor ithm to 
compute ~(u)  for &screte claims &stnbut lons  I f  one of  the mass points, say 
Xm, Is equal to 0, carry ing out the (infimte) summaUon over km m (6) leads to 
the same expression as (6) with m replaced by m-  1, ,2 by 2(1 --Pro), and pj by 
p j / ( l - -pm) ,  J = 1 . . . . .  m-  1. 
In Section I I I .5 of  GOOVAERTS et al. (1990) we find that the distr ibut ions 
with mean # and var iance  o "2 that are d iatomlc w~th support  {xj, x2}, for 
xl = #-e ,  can be character ized by 
(7) xl = l t -e ,  x2 = #+a2/e ,  
Pt = P [X  = xt] = 0"2/{0"2+•2}, P2 = P[X  = x2] = l - -p t  
For  0 <x~ < x2 < ~,  we must have 0 < x~ < /~, so 0 < c < lt. Note that x2 
increases with xl for xt ~ [0,/1). 
Insert ing (7) in (6) with m = 2, we see that ~u (u) is cont inuous for d latomlc 
distr ibut ions as a function of  e at e ~ 0. So there ~s a sequence of  feasible 
dxatomlc distr ibut ions,  whose rum probabd~tles converge to the one of  the 
claims distr ibut ion with P[X  = #] = 1, or e = 0 
THE SCHMITTER PROBLEM AND A RELATED PROBLEM 
The compound Po~sson stop-loss premium can be written in the form 
(8) ~s(U)= ~ 2~e-2/n!E[ (X l+. . .  +Xn-u)+] .  
n~0 
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If the range of the claims is finite, there is an expression for the compound 
stop-loss premiums imilar to (6) If S has a compound Poisson (2) dlstnbuuon 
with mdiwdual claims distribution as m (6), and Nj counts the number of 
occurrences of clmm s~ze xj, such that S = x t 'N~+ ... +xm'N, , ,  then ~t ~s 
well-known that the Nj are independent Polsson (2pj) distributed random 
varmbles. So the stop-loss premium of S at retention u can be written as: 
(9) ~Zs(U) = E[ (S -u)+]  = E[S] -u+ E[ (u -S)+]  
= E[S I -u  + ~ e - '~(u -k lx ,  - ... -k , ,x , , )+ ]~I (2PJ)k' 
kl,k 2, ,k. j=l  kj! 
It Is evident that ns(0) = 2u, rCs(OO) = 0, t/,,(0) = (1 +0) -I and ¢(oo) = 0 
do not depend on the actual choice of the feasible distribution. We will show 
that this holds for the integrals over Zrs(U) and ¢(u)  as well; the weighted 
integrals over U~Zs(U) and u~, (u), however, are minimal/maximal when the 
third moment of the individual claims Is. 
We will use the following ldentiUes, valid for non-negatwe random variables 
Y with E[Y j+2] < oo, and which can be proved by parUal mtegrauon: 
ioo I v 1 i (10) yJTzy(y)dy = yg+ [ l - F r (y ) ]dy ;  
o o j+ l  
i 
v 1 
yg[ l -Fv (y ) ]dy  =--E[Y J+ ' ] ,  j > O. 
o /+1 
Using (I0) and familiar properties of moments of compound distributions, we 
may deduce for every feasible distribution of the individual claims: 
i 
oo 
(11) ns(u) du = ½E[S 2] = ½{Var[S]+(E[S]) 2} = ½ {~(0"2+ l/2)--}- 22]d2} ;
0 
S v 1 I v ~(u)du  = E[L] = E[M]E[L1] = [ l -FL~(u)]du o 0 o 
ioo 
1 ~x(U)  du = __1 E[~ X 2] --~ °2}-~12--- 
011  Oll 2 OiL 
138 R KAAS 
The following relations 
(12) U~s(U) du = 
o 
I ~ u~u (u )  du = o 
for weighted integrals hold' 
E [S 3] = ~ E [ (S -  E [S] + E [S]) 3] 
~ {2E[X3] + 3 22~ (/t2 + Gr2) + ~.3 a3} ; 
{-E[L 2] = J2- E[E[L2IM]] 
½E[M" E[L~] + M(M-  1) (E[L,]) 2] 
½ E[M] E[L~] +½ E[M(M-  !)] (E[L,]) 2 
(a2+~2) 2 
_ 1 1 1 E[L~] + (E[Lt]) 2 - E[X 3] + 
20 -~ 60/~ 402,u 2 
So the fatter the tall of the Individual claims X (measured by their skewness, or 
what is the same since a and o "2 are given, by their third moment), the larger 
the integral over u~ (u) and Uns(U). 
In the theory of ordering of risks as described in GOOVAERTS et al. (1990), 
one compares top-loss transforms or distribution functions of risks over the 
whole interval [0, c~). In our case it is sufficient if these functions are ordered 
only on the interval [0, u]. Suppose that for instance X has lower stop-loss 
prermums than Y on the interval [0, u]. If Z is another independent risk, we 
have 
i oo E[(X-(u-z) )+]  dFz(z) o 
<_ E[ (Y - (u -z ) )+]dFz(z )  = E[ (Y+Z-u)+] .  
o 
E[(X+ Z-u)+IZ  = z] dFz(z) (13) E[ (X+Z-u)+]= 
From this porperty we see directly that if X~,X2, . and Yt, Y2 . . . .  are 
sequences of independent risks distributed as X and Y respectively, and X 
has lower stop-loss premiums than Y on [0, u], then we have 
E[(Xt+ +Xm-u)+]  < E[ (Y t+. .  +Ym--U)+] for all m = 1,2 . . . .  Using 
(8), we see that a compound Polsson distribution with X as claims distribution 
has a lower stop-loss premium in u than one with Y. Using (4) and (5), we see 
that ruin probabilities are lower as well. 
3. MAXIMIZING THE FUNCTIONALS NUMERICALLY 
It is easy to maximize the ruin probablhty numerically over the diatomic 
feasible dmtrlbutions. This can be accomphshed using algorithm (6), together 
with (7) to characterize the feasible diatomlc distributions. It involves merely a 
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one-dimensional maximization over the interval x I ~ [0, It]. To do this, one first 
computes (6) at a number of  values of  x~ to detect the interval m which the 
maximum Is to be found, and subsequently uses a method hke golden section 
search to determine the maximum more exactly. A reference for numerical 
techniques to compute a maximum of a function over an interval is PRESS et 
al. (1986). In Figure 1 we give graphs depicting the &atomic ruin probability 
(u, xl ,  xz ,p l ,p2)= ~'(u, xl) as a function o fx  t ~ [0,1t], where xl ,  x2 ,p t ,  P2 
are related by (7). We took /1 = 3, a 2 = 1, 0 = 0.5, and u = 1 5, 4.5 and 9 
respectwely In these graphs, the scale m the y-direction varies. 
As announced, the rum probabdlty is minimal and continuous at x~ T/z. In 
Figure 1 we see that for small u (u = 1½) the maxlmum rum probabil ity is 
found taking x~ = 0. A close inspection reveals that the rum probability does 
not depend on x~ if x~ > u. Indeed m (6) one sees that the ruin probabdlty 
does not (directly) depend on mass points larger than u. It also follows from (4) 
and (5). For large u (u = 9), ~,(u) is very nearly constant for small to moderate 
values of  x~, then increases, and next decreases teeply to ~ts minimal value at 
xl '1"/z. 
For intermediate u (u = 4.5), the situation ~s rather unclear there are some 
local maxima. For this specific situation we were able to find a three-point 
distribution with a larger ruin probabd~ty than the one corresponding to the 
maximizing dlatomlc distribution. In fact, for 
xl = 1.56592, x2 = 2.67226, x3 = 5.182086, 
Pl = 0.071198, P2 = 0766835, P3 = 0.161967 
the ruin probabil ity IS 0 279271, which, although (probably) not the optimal 
solution, is higher than the maximal dlatomlc ruln probability 0.279185, found 
at x~ = 2.5597, x2 = 5.2712. 
Although we tried a lot of  combinations o f#,  a 2, 0 and u, we rarely found a 
randomly generated three-point dxstnbutlon better than the best dlatomxc 
&stribution; if we &d, the &fference was never substantial. 
We dad not try to optimize systematically over all three-point spectra. First, 
this Is not a trivial task: if the number of  mass points is m, the number of  free 
variables equals 2 m - 3, being the number of  support points x~ plus the number 
of  probablhtles pj, minus the number of  restrictions. So to find the maximal 
ruin probabdity over all three-point spectra involves solving a three- 
&menslonal maximization, with borderline condmons p: 2 0. Second, even 
supposing we successfully optimized over three-point distributions, there ~s stdl 
no guarantee that for instance a 15-point support might not be better 
The fact that for small u the ruin probabil ity is maximal at x~ = 0 can be 
explained as lbllows. By relation (11), one sees that neither ~(0) and ~(oo), 
nor .~ ~u(u)du depend on xt By (12), however, we see that the weighted 
integral increases (linearly) with the third moment of  the claims &stnbut~on. So 
the weighted integral is minimal for the diatomlc distribution with x~ = 0, 
which means that taking x~ = 0 gives the smallest integral over up (u) So at 
small values of  u, ~(u)  should be large for xl = 0 By similar reasoning, one 
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explains that for large u, a large value of  xl leads to maximum g,,(u). For too 
large values of  x l ,  we obtain low ruin probabilities (close to the minimal 
value), as explained in the following section. 
For the same reasons, one can expect a similar pattern to arise in the case of  
compound Polsson stop-loss premmms This is indeed the case: see Figure 2. 
In this figure, we took 2 = 2, u = 3 and t72 = 1. At small u (u = 2), the 
stop-loss premium is virtually constant over x l ,  but it is maximal at Xl = 0. At 
large u = 20, we see that the stop-loss premium is practically constant for x~ 
from 0 (where it equals 0.0109) to very close to u. Then it increases very steeply 
to its maximum value 0.0522, and for x~ T l~, it decreases continuously to its 
minimal value of  0.0088. For intermediate u = 7, with increasing xl,~s(U) 
increases shghtly and irregularly at first from 1.3373 to the maximal value 
1 3954, and then for x~ T P, ~t decreases again to its infimum 1.3008. For  this 
case we found again an example where the maximal dlatomlc distribution was 
not a global maximum over all feasible claims distributions The maximal 
dlatomlc distribution is at xl = 2.~, where 7Zs(U)= 1.3954, but a larger 
stop-loss premium of 1.3995 is attained by the trlatomlc distribution 
x] = 0, x2 = 2.8, x 3 = 5 7143, Pl = 0 0286, P2 = 0.8754, P3 = 0.0961. 
In fact, as one of the referees pointed out, it can be proven that the diatomic 
distribution with x~ = 0 as a mass point is optimal for very small values of  u 
(u _< ½ E[X2]/E[X]) The proof  goes as follows 
From Theorem III.5.2.3 of  GOOVAERTS et al. (1990) we see that unoCorrnly 
for all u < ½E[X2]/E[X] = ½ ~+a2/lt), the maximal stop-loss premium over 
the feasible dlstrlbutlons IS attained for a random variable X 0 having mass 
points 0 and ~+t~2/,u, see (7). As a consequence of  (13), we have immediately 
that if H ~s the distribution function of  X0 and X is a feasible claim size, then 
F~" has smaller stop-loss premium in u than H*" for n = 2, 3 , . . ,  too In view 
of  (8), we have then found that H is the claims distribution maximizing the 
compound Poisson stop-loss premmm, when the retention u ~ ½ ~+o'2//1). 
Using (4), we can deduce by similar reasoning that this same claims 
distribution also maximizes not only P[L I > u] for u N ½ (Jl+a2//t), but also 
P[L I+. . .  +L, ,> u] for all m= 2,3 . . . .  and thus maximizes the ruin 
probability (5). 
So Schmitter's problem is solved for very small values of  the inltml capital u. 
This result is confirmed in Figure 1 for u = 1½. But note that in Figure 2 for 
u - -2  > ½(u+a2/~)  still the distribution having mass point 0 led to the 
maximal compound Poisson stop-loss premium 
4. AN APPROXIMATION FOR THE MAXIMIZING 
DIATOMIC DISTRIBUTION 
Though we are as yet unable to solve the problem of  maximizing 
~(u) = P[L > u] given # and a 2, a problem we can solve is the maximization 
of  P[Li > u]. We may expect P[L > u] to be large when P[Li > u] is, 
because the term with m = 1 In (5) has the largest weight factor. 
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In view of  (4), and since nx(0 ) = E[X] = /z is gwen, to maximize P[L, > u] 
we just have to maximize nx(u), the stop-loss premium of  X. The solution to 
this problem can for instance be found m GOOVAERTS et al. (1990), Theo-  
rems II I .5 2.2 and 5.2 3. These theorems express that the maximal  stop-loss 
premium for a (non-negatwe) risk X w~th mean It and variance a z at retenuon 
u is the dlatomlc distr ibut ion with smaller mass point x. = max {u-d,O}, 
where d = {(,u-u)2+0.2} ~. When 0. is small with respect to 1u-HI,  we may 
write 
(14) (U-lz)-d (u -#-d)  u-/~+d _0.2 = _ _  - ~ ~ r 2 / ( u - u ) .  
u-p+d u-kt+d 
So we may conclude that the dmtomlc dtstr ibut lon w~th the fol lowing mass 
points gwes a 'h igh '  rum probabi l i ty :  
0. 2 
(15) xl = #-e ,  with e -  ~½0.2/(U-- l l ) ,  SO x2 = u+d~ 2u-l~ 
u-#+d 
In the examples we tested, the d latomic distr ibut ion maximiz ing the ruin 
probabi l i ty  had xl only shghtly smaller than u -d .  See Table 1. 
Of  course this same dmtomlc d~stnbut~on maximizes the term w~th n = 1 of  
the compound Polsson stop-loss premium (8) So one may expect this 
distr ibut ion to have a high stop-loss premium if the probabi l i ty  of  just one 
clmm Is large, which is the case ff 2 ~s small. For  large 2, however, this 
approx imat ion will not be as useful. 
Our heuristic procedure may not always lead to the opt imal  value, but it can 
be shown that it ~s better than many other choices Suppose Z has distr ibut ion 
(15), and suppose Y is another  feasible choice such that the least mass point  of  
Y ~s larger than that of  Z, which is u-d  We know that nz ( t )  is plecewlse 
hnear, w,th edges at u -  d and u + d. Since Y has no mass below u -  d, we have 
nr(u-d) = nz(u-d) Also, nv(u)~ nz(U) since nz(U) is maximal.  So 
nr ( t )  _< nz(t) for all t < u, which means that Y generates lower compound 
Polsson stop-loss premiums and rum probabdit les.  
TABLE 1 
VALUES OF q,,' (//) FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE HIGIIER MASS POINT IN A D1ATOMIC DISTRIBUTION 
~= I, er2= 1 ,0= l l t= 3, o'2= 1,0 = 5 
u= 15 u=45 u=9 u= 15 u=45 u=9 
x2 = ~(u) = ~(u) = ~(u) = ~(u) = ~(u) = ~(u) = 
oo 102003 002315 000008 534796 248974 078779 
~+a2/~ 272504 039292 002315 550047 278350 098945 
optimal 275023 081105 034151 550047 279190 106205 
u + d 269824 078214 033632 534796 276506 101811 
2 u-B 272504 .078651 033659 550047 277596 101901 
10 146348 071460 024767 534796 265714 106184 
15 130637 055095 034151 534796 259498 101901 
20 123125 044244 031936 534796 256613 097203 
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In particular, the dlatomlc solutions with support {b, b'} with b > u -d  are 
apparently non-optimal. 
5. EXTREMAL VALUES OF THE ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT 
Consider all claims distributions with mean u, variance a 2 and as an extra 
requirement, support contained in [0, b] for some b >_ ~+a2/l~. Just as we did 
in the previous section for P[L  1 > u], one may tackle the problem of finding 
extremal ruin probablhtles by using distributions leading to extremal values of 
related quantities like an approximation or an upper bound for the ruin 
probability. Here we use the upper bound e -R~, where the adjustment 
coefficient R is the positive solution to the equation 
(16) 1 + (1 + O) ar = E [erX]. 
Asymptotically, this upper bound can be used as an approximaton, since 
V(u)e R" has a limit in (0, 1) for u ~ oo. 
It can easily be shown that the diatomic distribution with mass points 0 and 
iL+a2/l t is minimal in second degree stop-loss order, while the one with mass 
points b and la -a2/(b- lO is maximal. See Theorem II 4.2.3 of GOOVAERTS et 
al. (1990). This implies that these special dlatomic distributions have minimal 
and maximal moment generating functions on (0, oo) in the class considered, 
and accordingly the corresponding adjustment coefficients (roots of (16)) are 
maximal and minimal respectavely. 
One would expect that the support {:t-a2/(b- lO, b}, with minimal adjust- 
ment coefficient, leads to large ruin probabihty, too Taking b too large, 
however, so l t -a2 / (b - /O  is very close to/~, results in the opposite of what we 
wanted: the ruin probability of this distribution is very small rather than 
maximal. For b -o 0% by (7) we see that the mgfE[e rx] --* oo for all r > 0, so 
then R --* 0, which gives us the trivial upper bound ~v(u) < 1 So we observe 
that for b --* oo, the upper bound e-R" increases, while the rum probability 
decreases. But if b is not too large, say such that l l -a2 / (b -~)  ~ xt as in (15), 
which means that b ~ 2u-k t ,  this distribution does lead to a large ruin 
probability 
On the other hand we learn for instance from Figure I that for small u, the 
diatomlc distribution with mass point xt = 0 has maximal ruin probablhty, 
even though it gives the tightest upper bound e-R~ 
It can be shown, too, that the compound Polsson distributions with these 
distributions for the individual claims are extremal in second degree stop-loss 
order. This means that they have minimal and maximal third moment, and 
since mean and standard deviation are fixed, also minimal and maximal 
coefficient of skewness. As proved at the end of Section 2, these same special 
spectra also generate the extreme values of j" UTrs(U)du So one would be 
inclined to expect that they lead to high and low values of the compound 
Poisson stop-loss premium as well, but the same caveats as above apply 
here. 
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6. SOME F INAL  REMARKS 
To conclude, we comment on tables of some results for distributions with 
support {/t-a2/(b- lz) ,  b} for &fferent values of b. These distributions have 
minimal adjustment coefficient (maximal skewness) for all feasible distributions 
with support contained in [0, b]. They are compared to other distributions 
described above: the optimal diatomic distrlbut~on, the heuristical approxima- 
tions to the optimum found by applying (15) and the distributions with only 
one positive mass point: support {0,;u+a2/u} and {~}. The latter support is 
denoted by higher mass point ~,  where the mass on ~ is of course 0 (but 
contributes to a2). Note that for u not too large and b = 20, the phenomenon 
described above indeed occurs Even though we showed that looking at the 
minimal adjustment coefficient sometimes gwes incorrect results, especially for 
large b or small u, we fear that this method wdl be used quite often. 
Further note that for large u and a 2, mimmal and maximal ruin probabihty 
are widely apart. For a 2 small with respect o u and u, the ruin probabihty 
cannot vary enormously. 
Table 2 gives some results for the compound Poisson stop-loss premmms. 
Note the meaningless results obtained by the wrong choice of b for large values 
of u, and also for small values of u. 
An approach that we plan to follow in the near future ~s to try to optimize 
the compound Poisson stop-loss premium over the set of claim &stnbutions 
with support {0, J, 2 J , . . . ,  nJ}. The more general problem is obtained taking 
limits for n ~ ov and J ,I, 0. The restricted problem can be written in the form 
of the maximization of a non-hnear criterion function w~th three linear 
constraints on the probabilities pj = P[X = j6], required to be non-negative 
TABLE 2 
VALUES OF 7~s(tl ) FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE HIGHER MASS POINT 
IN A DIATOMIC DISTRIBUTION 
~ = 3, or 2= 1 ,2=2 u=3,  o 2= 1 ,2=5 
u = 2 u = 7 u = 20 u = 5 u = 20 u = 40 
x2 = ns (U)  = ha(u)  = Ks (U)  = Ks (U)  = rCs(U) = r~s(U)  = 
4 270671 
it+a2/~ 4 330598 
opt imal  4 332192 
u+d 4 331675 
2u-~ 4 324805 
5 4 270671 
10 4 270671 
15 4 270671 
20 4 270671 
25 4 270671 
30 4 270671 
300816 0 008804 10 101076 
337326 0 010879 10 138862 
395435 0 052178 10 138862 
374006 0 047330 10 105046 
374694 0047347 10 105033 
376488 0 014677 10 101069 
380493 0 022903 10 104438 
356405 0 034962 10 103393 
342594 0047335 10 102812 
334135 0 052137 10 102458 
328482 0 051061 10 102223 
004413 0 002488 
077055 0 003859 
136463 0 058680 
077758 0 049633 
077807 0 049638 
105061 0 005110 
113764 0 007883 
124541 0 012330 
116290 0 018726 
103217 0 028545 
091199 0040868 
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for all j. By restricting to an arithmetic spectrum we are able to use Panjer's 
recursxon instead of (9), the necessary partml derlvatwcs can also be computed 
by a recurswe scheme. The procedure can be generahzed if more moments are 
known. 
Of  course, as the t~tle of our paper m&cates, max~m~zatlon ver the dmtom~c 
distr ibutions only does not gwe a complete solution of e~ther problem. We find, 
however, that by using this technique both problems are sufficiently solved for 
practical purposes In the first place, our examples led us to the conviction that, 
although the optimal dmtomic distr ibution is not always globally optimal, it is 
not much removed from this opt imum. Second, in our opmton m practice one 
might judge the attractweness of risks or risk processes with known mean and 
varmnce of the claxms by the worst feasible dmtomlc distribution as well as by 
the overall worst feasible distribution. 
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SHORT CONTRIBUTIONS 
A NOTE ON THE NORMAL POWER APPROXIMATION 
BY COLIN M RAMSAY 
Actuarial Science 
University of Nebraska - Lmcoln, USA 
ABSTRACT 
The normal power (NP) approximation essentially approximates the random 
variable X as the quadratic polynomial X ~ Y+7(Y  z -  1)/6 where 
,Y = (X -~) /a  is the standardized variable, Y ~ N(0, I), and /.1, a y are the 
mean, variance skewness of X respectively. The coefficients of this polynomial 
are not determined by equating the lower moments. It is shown that matching 
these moments does not ~mprove the overall accuracy of the approximation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Let X be the aggregate claims in one year, Zk be the size of the k 'h claim and N 
be the total number of claims, i.e., 
N 
X= E Zk, 
k=l  
with X = 0 if N = 0. Let F(x) be the cumulative distribution function (cd0 of 
X. It is well known that F(x) is given by 
oo 
F(x) = E P eG*k(x)' x_> 0 
k=0 
where G(x) is the cdf of Zk, G*k(x) is the U h convolution of G with itself, 
G*°(x) = I for x > 0, andpk = P[N= k] 
Direct evaluation of F(x) is possible only m very special cases, so approxi- 
mations are needed. A simple and easy approximation to F(x), is the normal 
power (NP) approximation. The essential idea of the NP approximation is to 
transform the standarlzed original variable k = (X-lO/a, where It = E[X] 
and a 2 = Var[X],  into a symmetric variable Y = v(.,V). In particular v is 
chosen so that Y is a standard normal variable or IS nearly so. By inverting the 
Edgeworth expansion of the unknown cdf of k and using Newton's method 
(see BEARD et al. (1984), pp. 108-111), it can be proved that 
(I) 2 ~ Y + ~ (y2_ l) 
6 
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where Y,-~ N(0, 1) and ~ is the skewness of X. This results in the NP 
approximation 
(2) F(x )  N( -3  ~/~-~ 6~)  - -+  +1+- -  , 
Y 
where .g = (x -pp) /a .  This approximation is valid for ~ > 1, and is fairly 
accurate ff 0 _< y _< l, with the accuracy decreasing as ~, increases. 
2. THE MAIN RESULT 
Since the inverse transform v- l (Y)  approximates .X, one would expect he left 
hand side (LHS) and the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1) to have 
approximately equal moments However this is not the case because 
I (  Y (Y2-1) )  I = 1+~2/18 E Y + ~- [. y+)~3/27 
if k= 1 
if k=2 
if k=3 
while 
! If k = 1 
E[2  k] = if k = 2 
if k=3.  
If ? is small, the terms 72/18 and y3/27 can be neglected, giving an approximate 
equality between the first 3 moments of the LHS and RHS. On the other hand 
if ~, is large, the variance and skewness of the RHS of equanon (1) will be 
inflated, possibly leading to poorer approxlmanons 
The important question at thJs point is this: can the accuracy of the NP 
approximation be improved by equating the first three moments of the LHS 
and RHS of equation (1)? To this end, consider the quadratic 
(3) k = aY+b(Y  2-  1) 
where a and b are real constants and, once again, Y ~ N(0, 1) Matching the 
first three moments yield the following equations 
These equations reduce to 
(4) a = x/1 - 2 b 2 
~, = 6b-4b  3. 
1 = a2+2b 2 
= 6a2b+8b 3 
for I-l/  < b _< 1/ 1 
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? = 008 
2 
0 
20 
30 
40 
7 = 0 238 
22 
0 
20 
30 
40 
7 = 0 593 
22 
0 
20 
30 
40 
= 0 779 
22 
0 
20 
30 
40 
7 = 1 082 
0 
0 
0 
4O 
y = 1 628 
22 
0 
0 
0 
4O 
F(22) NP Adj-NP 
0 1586 0 1587 0 1586 
0 0249 0 0249 0 0249 
00019 00019 0 0019 
0 0001 0 0001 0 0001 
F(22) NP Adj-NP 
0 1579 0 1587 0 1583 
0 0288 0 0289 0 0286 
0 0031 0 0031 0 0030 
0 0002 0 0002 0 0002 
F(22) NP Adj-NP 
0 1529 0 1587 0 1566 
0 0362 0 0372 0 0362 
0 0068 0 0064 0 0062 
0 0011 0 0009 0 0008 
F(22) NP Adj-NP 
0 1526 0 1587 0 1553 
0 0394 00411 0 0395 
o 0084 o 0084 00080 
0 0011 0 0014 00014 
F(2) NP Adj-NP 
0 1376 0 1587 0 1525 
0 0376 00470 0 0440 
0 0125 0 0119 0 0109 
0 0042 0 0027 0 0024 
F(£) NP Adj-NP 
0 1280 0 1587 0 1452 
0 0370 0 0562 00496 
0 0140 0 0184 0 0159 
0 0069 0 0057 0 0048 
It is clear that for - 2 xf i  -< Y -< 2 x/~, equation (4) has exactly one root in the 
region -1 / ` /2  _< b _< l/x/~. Since the d istnbuuon of insurance claims are 
usually posmvely skewed, only the case where 0 _< y _< 2 V/2 is consldered. 
For  0 _< 72 x/2, let b0 be the umque root of equation (4) which hes m the 
region 0 _< b0 _< l/V/2, and let 
(5) ao = ,/1 - 2 b o. 
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Substitutmg the values into equation (4), the followmg approximation results 
(6) F(x) N(  -aO lab Y )  + +1+ . 
2bo 
This approximation will be called the "ad justed"  NP approximation 
Table 1 shows the values produced by the traditional NP approximation 
(equation (2)) and by the adjusted NP approximation (equatxon (6)). The 
values of F and NP are taken from PENTIKAINEN (1987, pp. 32--34, cases 
1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). Followmg PENTIKAINEN, F IS actually 1 -F  (the right tall 
probability) for 2 > 0. From this table, it is clear that both NP approximations 
yield similar values. As a result, equation (2) must be viewed as being superior 
because it is easier to use, i.e., it requires fewer steps to derive this approxima- 
tion 
Finally, it should be noted that these approximations have not been properly 
calculated; F(x) should be approximated as follows: 
(7) F(x) = P[X _< .~1 
P[aY+b(Y 2- 1) < 2] 
= P[rt < Y<- rz] because b > 0 
= N(rz)-N(rO 
where rl < r z are the roots of the equation 
(8) 2 = ay+b(y"- 1), 
with a = 1, b = y/6 for the traditional NP approximation, and a = a0, b = b0 
for the adjusted NP approximation. The approximation (7) will serve to 
increase the estimates of the right tall probabilities 1- F(x). However, over the 
range of applicability of the NP approximations, i.e, for .~ > I and 0 _< y < 1, 
the extra term N(rt) is mslgnlficant. 
REFERENCES 
BEARD, R E, PENTIKAINEN, T and PESONEN, E (1984) Rtsk Theory Chapman and Hall, London 
PENTIKAINEN, T (1987) Approxmlate valuation of the distribution of aggregate claims ASTIN 
Bulletin 17, 15 39 
COLIN M RAMSAY 
Actuarial Science, 310 Burnett Hall, Umversity of Nebraska - Lincoln, 
Lincoln, NE 68588-0307, USA 
BOOK REVIEW 
M.J.  GOOVAERTS, R KAAS, A .E  VAN HEERWAARDEN, T BAUWELINCKX 
(1990): Effecttve Actuarial Methods. Elsevier Science Publishers BV, Amster- 
dam, 316 pages, US$ 92 25/DFL. 180.00 
The 'Effectwe actuarml methods' comprise three separate ssays on Ordering 
oJ Rtsks (Part 1), Credthdity Theory (Part 2) and IBNR Techniques (Part 3) Via 
these topacs the authors present material from actuarml scaence which as 
,nterestmg, both from a mathemat,cal nd an applications point of wew. The 
latter as haghhghted by analyses based on real portfoho data using the software 
packages SLIC (stop-loss reinsurance), CRAC (credibdity) and LORE ( IBNR 
modelling). 
In PART 1 a revaew of various ordermgs of risks, together with a &scussaon 
of the related algebraac propertaes, are gwen. Having these tools avadable, ~t Is 
relatively easy to tackle specific problems m the collective risk model These 
mainly are esumation and ordering of adjustment coefficients and rum 
probabilities, but also results on optmlal reinsurance are obtained. In many 
cases do these 'order '  results allow for easier numerical calculations. After a 
rather tnvml excursaon into the realm of survwal distributions, this first part 
closes wath a &scussaon on incomplete mformat~on, Le. s~tuat~ons where only 
moment condmons and/or shape information (hke ummodahty) of the relevant 
random variables are/is assumed. Think for instance of the constructaon of 
stop-loss premiums wath n moments known. 
PART 2 on Cre&bdity Theory starts wath a very readable mtroduchon on 
'what is credibdlty all about '  before gwmg an overv~cw of the various models 
and thear analysis. The models included are those by BtJHLMANN, BUHLMANN- 
STRAUB, the hierarchacal one and regression type models. The materml as 
presented in a well-documented, self-contained way whach gwes the reader a 
thorough msaght into the basic theory Proofs are gaven exphcltly Some 
interesting extensions of the 'classical theory' are gwen in Chapter VI These 
comprise credibility formulae of the updating type together wath results on 
covarmnce structures leading to such formulae Furthermore, in a section on 
credlbdaty for loaded premiums, at is shown how credibihty estimators can be 
based on weaghted loss functions; examples are Esscher and variance prem- 
xums. After some brief comments on multtd|mensaonal cre&bdlty, the authors 
spend some more time on sema-linear credibility where hnear functaons of 
transformed varmbles are considered as estimators. An interesting chapter on 
insurance apphcatlons of credibility theory, based on the CRAC-software 
package for two level, sema-linear haerarch~cal credabflaty ends thas section of 
the book. 
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The final PART 3 contains an introduction of IBNR-techmques. These 
involve mechanical smoothing (where no underlying model is assumed), 
statistical methods (mostly of (auto)regression type) and credibility based 
methods (including Kalman filtering). Via the loss reserving software package 
LORE, the versatility of the methods presented is demonstrated on real data 
coming from : 
- -  recuperation in credit insurance; 
- -  loss-reserwng for habdlty insurance for notaries; 
- -  loss-reserving in automobile habdlty insurance, and 
- -  'activity coefficients' m a pension fund of physicians. 
The overall material is well-balanced between the three parts with exercises 
adding to the course-book status. It is clear that having the software would add 
to the understanding of some of the material presented though this ~s by no 
means a necessity. One of the main attractions with respect o teaching lies in 
the fact that based on this one book, actuarial students wdl gain considerable 
insight into some of the specific techniques which are by now well-estabhshed 
as core material within modern actuarial science. I am convinced that many 
actuarml students, and indeed many researchers m the field, will find this text a 
very useful one to have on one's bookshelf. 
PAUL EMBRECHTS 
LETTER TO THE EDITORS 
Dear Sir, 
I am writing m connection wxth the Claims Reserving Manual, Volume 2, 
published by the Institute of Actuaries. 
Volume 1 of this manual deals w)th arithmetic or deterministic methods, 
while Volume 2 covers more advanced methods involving probabihstic and 
statistical methods. 
We are now considering further contributions to Volume 2 and would be 
very happy to recexve articles written by members of ASTIN. The test for the 
inclusion of a method is that it has been found useful by a practitioner. The 
fact that a method may contain weaknesses from a theoretical point of view 
may be commented upon, but will not prevent its publication. Methods which 
have already been written up in journals are still ehgable for inclusion in the 
manual, although the write-up should have a practical bias. 
Contributions hould be sent to 
S. BENJAMIN esq ,  
Bacon and Woodrow, 
St Olaf House, 
London Bridge City, 
London SEI 2PE 
Yours faithfully 
S. BENJAMIN and R. VERRALL 
Editors, Claims Reserving Manual, Volume 2 
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ACTUARIAL VACANCY 
Faculty Position at the University of Manitoba 
Department of Actuarml & Management Sciences 
Faculty of Management 
The Department of Actuarial & Management Sciences has an opening for a 
tenure-track appointment m actuarial science at the Assistant, Assocmte, or 
Full Professor level beginning July, 1991 or other mutually agreed date 
Appointment as Department Head may be considered at a later date. Salary is 
competitive at all levels. 
Quahficatlons include a Ph.D. m Actuartal Science or closely related area, or 
F S.A (F.C.I .A) or equivalent. Candidates hould have a strong interest m 
effective teaching, and evidence of research capabdlty and interest m actuarml 
research. An appointment at semor levels requires an excelent research record 
m actuarial science Industry exprience is an asset and all candidates hould 
have an interest m participating in an actuarml program within a management 
school context-with a balanced emphasis on teaching and research. Primary 
duties wdl be teaching raduate and undergraduate courses in actuarml science 
and developing a research program in actuartal science 
The Faculty of Management offers actuarml education w~thxn a general 
management program at the undergraduate l vel Students choosing the 
actuarial pattern graduate with a Bachelor of Commerce (Honours) degree 
with a major in actuarial science. Specialized actuarml education is offered m a 
Master's of Actuarial Science program in the Faculty of Management and joint 
undergraduate programs with the Faculty of Science. The Department of 
Actuarial and Management Sciences also houses the L.A.H. Warren Chair m 
Actuarial Science. A Ph.D program m management science is scheduled to 
begin in 1993. There are presently three full-time faculty members m the 
actuarial area 
The Umversity of Manitoba encourages applications from qualified women 
and men, including members of wsJble minorities, aboriginal people, and 
persons with dasabdities and provides a smoke-free work enwronment In 
accordance with Canadian immigration reqmrements, priority will be given to 
qualified Canadmn cit~z~ens and permanent residents of Canada. 
Applications will be accepted until Aprd 15, 1991 or untd the posit~on ~s 
filled, and should be sent to: 
Dr. JERRY GRAY, Assocmte Dean 
Faculty of Management 
University of Mamtoba 
Wmmpeg, MB R3T 2N2 
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GUIDELINES TO AUTHORS 
I. Papers for pubhcatton should be sent m quadruphcate o one of the Editors 
tlans Buhlmann, 
Mathemat~k, ETH-Zentrum, 
CH-8092 Zurich, Swltleiland 
D Harry Reid, 
Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd, 
Eagle Stm House, 9 Aldgate I-hgh Street, 
London EC3N I LD, Umted Kingdom 
or to one of the Co-Editors 
Alols Gisler, 
"Wmterthur" Swiss Insurance Company, 
P O Box 357, CII-8401 Wmtelthur, Swltlcrland 
David WiIkm 
Messrs R Watson & Sons 
Watson House, London Rd, Relgatc, Suney RH2 9PQ, Umled Kingdom 
Submission of a paper is held to mlply Iha! it contains original unpubhshed work and is not 
being submitted for pubhcatmn elsewhere 
Receipt of the paper will be confirmed and Followed by a refereeing process, which will take 
about three months 
2. Manuscripts hould be typewritten on one side of the paper, double-spaced with wide 
margins The ba,~lc elements of the journal's style have been agreed by the Edltors and 
Pubhshers and should be clear from checking a recent ~ssue of ASIIN BULl I IIN ]f vanahons 
are felt necessary they should be clearly mdmated on the manuscript 
3. Papers hould be written m Enghsh or m Flench Authors intending to submit longer papers 
(e g exceeding 30 pages) are advised to consider sphttmg thmr contnbuuon i to two or more 
shorter contnbuuons 
4. The first page of each paper should start with the t~tle, the narne(s) of the author(s), and an 
abstract of the paper as well as some major keywords An mstmmonal affihatmn can be 
placed between the name(s) of the author(s) and the abstract 
5. Footnotes hould be avoided as far as possible 
6. Upon acceptance of a paper, any figures should he drawn m black mk on white paper m a 
form suitable for photographic reproduction with lettelmg of uniform size and sufficmntly 
large to be legible when reduced to the final size 
7. References should bc arranged alphabetically, and for the same authol chronologically Use 
a, b, c, etc to separate pubhc,mons of the same author m the same year For journal 
references gwe author(s) year, title, jomnal (m itahcs, cf point 9), volume (m boldface, cf 
point 9), and pages For book references gwe autho1(s), year, title (m ltahcs), pubhsher, and 
city 
Examples 
BARL.OW, R E and PROSCHAN, F (1975) Mathematwal Themy of Rehahthty and Ltfe 
Testing Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York 
Jr:WELL. W S (1975a) Model vanatmns m credibility theory In Clethl)th O' Theolv and 
Apphcatzons (ed P M KAHN), pp 193 244, Academic Press, New York 
Jt;wFtL, W S (1975b) Regularity condmons For exact crechbfllty ASTIN Bulletin 8, 
336 341 
References m the text arc given by the author's name followed by the year of pubhcatmn 
(and possibly a lettel)m parcntheses 
8. The address of at least one of the authors should be typed following the references 
Contutued overleaf 
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Bjdrn AJN~. Sweden Chmrman 
James N STANARD USA Vme-Chmrman 
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Jukka RANTALA Finland Member  
LeRoy J. StMON USA Member / IAA-De legate  
Jurgen STRAUSS Germany Member  
Gregory C TAYLOR Austraha Member  
Aloes GISLER Switzerland Co-E&tor  
David W]LKtC Umted Kingdom Co-E&tor  
Neither the COMMITTFF OF ASTIN nor CFUTI-RICK S a are responsible ['or statements made or 
opinions expresscd m the articles, crmmsms and dlscussmns pubhshed m A gTIN BOLLETIN 
Guidelines to Authors ~ontmued /tom mstde bad~ ¢over 
9. Itahc', (boldface) should be indicated by single (wavy) underhnmg Mathematmal symbols 
will automatically be set m Itahcs, and need not be underhned unless there is a posslblhty of 
misinterpretation 
lnformat,on helping to avoid m~smtcrpretatton may be hsted on a separate sheet entitled 
"spemal instructions to the pnnler" (Example of such an instruction Greek letters are 
mdmated with green and scrtpt letters with brown underhmng, using double underlining for 
caDtals and stogie underhmng for lower case ) 
10. Authors will recewe from the pubhsher two sets of page proofs together with the manuscr, pt 
One corrected set of proofs plus the manuscript should be returned to the pubhsher w~thm 
one week Authors may be charged for alterauons to the original manuscr, pt 
II. Authors will rccewe 50 offprints free of charge Addltmnal offprints may be ordered when 
returning corrected proofs A scale of charges will be enclosed when the proof~ are sent 
out 
